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Part one of the thesis studies differential diagnosticity towards substantive extrinsic 
information available in the environment. This research tests the interaction between 
regulatory focus and availability of extrinsic-substantive information such as consensus 
information, on the range of acceptable price. Prior research on regulatory focus led us 
to two divergent predictions. Our findings lend support to the asymmetric-elaboration 
account. Under this account, only prevention-oriented consumers are likely to change 
their acceptable price range if combinations of favorable-and-unfavorable consensus 
information are available in the environment, while promotion-oriented consumers 
disregard such information. We find that this difference is due to the differences in the 
level of difficulty experienced in specifying acceptable price range across the two 
regulatory foci. Further, we also undertake random-parameters regression models that 
provide unique general findings. For example, we find that for promotion-oriented 
consumers it is their high-level product construal, while for prevention-oriented 
consumers it is their low-level product construal that influences their respective 
acceptable price ranges, irrespective of level of external information available. 
Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.  
 
Part two of the dissertation discusses how consumer choices differ over a series of 
gains or losses. We propose that regulatory focus differences should lead consumers, 
with distinct regulatory foci, to display different likelihoods of integrating (segregating) a 
series of losses (gains). Based on this general proposition, we delve into studying the 
interaction between option framing and regulatory focus on consumers’ options 
choices. In the additive (subtractive) option frame, consumers are presented with a 
base (fully-loaded) model and are asked to add (delete) options that they want (don’t 
xii 
want). In line with our theorization, we find that this interaction significantly impacts the 
number of options chosen, reference price, amount of time taken to make decision and 
the value perceived in the options chosen. However, we also find that option framing 
may not work with promotion-oriented consumers. Further, we show that value 
perceived in the options chosen mediates the relationship between regulatory focus 
and purchase commitment. Finally, we test the influence of amount of time taken to 
make the options choice, and other predictors, on the number of options chosen, using 
two-step maximum likelihood estimation.  The theoretical and managerial implications 
are discussed and an agenda for future research is laid out. 
 
Part three of the thesis looks into how consumers’ prior price acceptance commitments 
lead to differences in information processing. We argue that if consumers commit 
themselves to a predetermined level of evaluation for the stimulus, then they will 
process information pertaining to the stimulus using only specific processing strategies. 
Essentially, we argue that committing to a goal is decisive in determining goal means. 
We specifically propose that when consumers commit themselves to a predetermined 
evaluation that is above (below) the market value of the stimulus, then they will 
consciously and/or automatically undertake processing strategies that instigate a 
regulatory fit (a regulatory misfit), irrespective of whether they are promotion or 
prevention oriented. Further, the regulatory fit or misfit instigated is purported to linger 
and is transferred to other objects within a reasonable timeframe. The managerial 
implications of these findings are discussed. 
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This research focuses on the influence of consumers’ regulatory focus on their product 
choice and behavior. Though we study several dependent variables, a general theme 
that this research is dedicated to, in each of the 3 essays, is the influence of regulatory 
focus and specifically on consumers’ price acceptance.  At first, we will illustrate the 
importance of regulatory focus research. We will briefly highlight research that shows 
that the influence of regulatory focus may be more pervasive on consumer choices than 
may appear at first glance. We will then briefly outline our motivation for research in 
each of the 3 essays. This thesis is divided into 3 parts, one for each of the essays. 
 
1.1 Regulatory Focus and Regulatory Fit 
 
Regulatory Focus theory (Higgins 1997, Higgins & Spiegel 2004) postulates two basic 
motivational systems, namely the promotion system and the prevention system. The 
promotion system governs the needs for self-actualization, maximizing benefits, realizing 
ideals through increased development, and reaching a desired situation. The prevention 
system, in contrast, governs the needs for self-preservation, minimizing losses, meeting 
obligations, ensuring security and avoiding negative outcomes. Promotion orientation 
leads to people undertaking an eager strategy in information processing with a focus on 
what’s to be gained and how can that be made possible. In contrast, prevention 
orientation leads to people undertaking a vigilant strategy with a focus on what can go 
wrong and how can that be avoided. 
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Promotion-oriented people are inherently optimistic in their outlook and prefer to look at 
the proverbial glass as “half full”, and thus aim at reaching their goals by undertaking 
expansive strategies. In contrast, prevention oriented people are inherently pessimistic, 
and prefer to look at the glass as “half empty”, and aim to meet their goals by 
undertaking conservative strategies. Though, it is assumed that both, the promotion and 
prevention systems coexist in an individual, extant research suggests that in a given 
context, one of these two systems is typically more accessible, either chronically, or due 
to priming by the task type (e.g. focus on “the gain by choosing the mug” versus “lose by 
not choosing the mug” Higgins et al. 2003) etc.  
 
To illustrate in an example, a promotion-oriented individual, buying a new car, will 
primarily be concerned with ensuring that her car has the highest-possible acceleration 
performance and the best entertainment and luxury features, contemporary looks, and is 
for a price that her maximal car-buying budget limit permits. In signal-detection theory 
terms, prevention oriented individuals, are more risk-taking, and focus on maximizing 
hits and avoiding errors of omission, thereby relying on a smaller just-noticeable 
difference (JND), when making a call on whether a change has been detected. The 
prevention-oriented individual, buying a car, will primarily focus on ensuring that her car 
purchase meets at least a specific minimum level performance in the car (below which, 
she will not even consider buying the car) and safety equipment, for a price that is well 
within her car-buying budget. In signal-detection theory terms, prevention oriented 
individuals are more conservative, and focus on reducing errors of commission by 
ensuring correct rejections and avoiding false alarms, thereby relying on a bigger-but-
more-accurate just-noticeable difference (JND), when making a call on whether a 
change has been detected. 
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Extant literature on Regulatory Focus theory suggests that firstly that promotion or 
prevention regulatory focus may be chronically held (Lockwood, Jordan and Kunda 2002 
provide a scale to measure chronic regulatory focus). Secondly, the situational context 
(which may override the chronic focus, by priming ideals or oughts, and instigate 
participants to be either promotion oriented versus prevention oriented respectively) too 
may be varied to cause people to momentarily adapt either a promotion or prevention 
orientation. For example, Pham and Avnet 2004 ask their participants to think either of 
their past and present hopes and aspirations or their duties and responsibilities.  
 
Extant research also suggests that regulatory focus may be situationally manipulated. 
Even the process of either using a product or selecting a particular product, can lead 
people to prefer varying products subsequently. Zhou and Pham (2004) propose that 
consumers have separate mental accounts for each specific task. These authors argue 
that each task is granted control exclusively either to the promotion system or to the 
prevention system, but not to both. As such, Zhou and Pham show that regulatory focus 
can be contextually instilled. In their study, participants, who made investment in growth-
oriented risky assets, that is, in trading/brokerage accounts, because of the priming 
caused by this promotion-oriented activity, sought more promotion-oriented benefits and 
were willing to make more risky decisions, in a following-unrelated task. Conversely, 
participants, who made investment in security-oriented retirement assets, that is, in 401K 
or IRA investments, because of the priming caused by this prevention-oriented activity, 
sought more prevention-oriented benefits and were willing to make fewer risky decisions, 
in a following-unrelated task.  
 
Regulatory focus has been found to have a strong influence on memory, product choice, 
willingness-to-pay and overall behavioral decision-making. Essentially, promotion-
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oriented people will prefer promotion-oriented outcomes, while prevention-oriented 
people will prefer prevention-oriented outcomes. In reporting that regulatory focus can 
moderate recall, Higgins et al. (1994) show that participants, under prevention 
(promotion) orientation, recalled more life episodes that were related to prevention 
(promotion) strategies. Further, Forster Higgins and Taylor Bianco (2003) suggest that 
participants, under promotion focus, prefer higher speeds to higher accuracy, in 
comparison to participants under prevention focus.  
 
Shah and Higgins (1997) propose that regulatory focus moderates people’s reliance on 
expectancy value of a goal outcome. Expectancy Value Model suggests that if an 
individual has a high likelihood of achieving a goal, or if the value of the reaching the 
goal is very high, or both, then the individual will be highly motivated to achieve that 
goal. Shah and Higgins argue that given that promotion-oriented people focus on ideals 
and on maximizing returns, the higher the expectancy value of a task, the more will 
promotion-oriented people be motivated to undertake it.  In contrast, given that 
prevention-oriented people focus on oughts, duties and minimizing losses, the 
motivation that prevention-oriented people will have in undertaking a task, will be more 
intrinsic and will not depend on the expectancy value of the task.  
 
Further, Higgins (2000, 2002) has proposed the concept of regulatory fit. When people 
pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory focus, then they experience 
regulatory fit, while if people pursue a goal in a manner that conflicts with their regulatory 
focus, then they will experience a regulatory misfit. Experiencing regulatory fit leads to 
increased confidence in decision making, increased motivation and increased 
polarization in attitudes, while experiencing regulatory misfit leads to reduced confidence 
in decision-making, confusion and frustration.  Based on regulatory-fit theory, one may 
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conjecture that most of the effects that we have reviewed in the prior section will be 
strengthened if the participants were to experience regulatory fit. Likewise, those effects 
will be weakened, if the participants were to experience regulatory misfit.  
 
Achieving a regulatory fit can lead people to transfer this feeling into increased monetary 
value for the product under consideration (Higgins et al. 2003). Promotion-oriented 
participants experienced a regulatory fit, when they applied a gain strategy (that is, when 
participants were urged to think about what they would gain by having the focal object). 
In contrast, prevention-oriented participants experienced a regulatory fit when they 
applied a lose strategy (that is, when participants were urged to think about what they 
would lose by not having the focal object). Regulatory misfit was rendered when 
opposite combinations of regulatory foci and gain/loss strategies were implemented. The 
decision-making process is essentially the same in both conditions. However, 
participants, in both promotion and prevention focus had a significantly higher 
willingness-to-pay for the focal object, when they experienced a regulatory fit, versus 




I will now provide a brief outline for my motivation for undertaking the research in the 
three essays in my dissertation.  
 
Part One 
Extant research in regulatory focus has focused on the influence of message frames 
(gain vs. loss) on the differences in diagnosticities perceived in each message type 
consumers with regulatory foci. (Lee and Aaker 2004; Aaker and Lee 2001). For 
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example, Aaker and Lee (2004) find that promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers find 
gain (loss)-framed messages more persuasive. However, in addition to gain and loss 
framed advertising and billboard messages, consumers are also exposed to other types 
of external messages, the influence of which is has not been studied in regulatory focus 
research. For example, amazon.com provides customers access to reviews on the left 
by earlier customers on the usability and efficacy of the product in comparison to 
competing products. How consumers with distinct regulatory focus react to different 
types of such substantive external consensus information has yet to be studied. Part one 
deals with the diagnosticity of such external information that is available to consumers. 
Specifically, part one delves into studying the influence of the interaction between 
regulatory focus and external information available to consumers, on consumers’ range 
of acceptable prices.  
 
Part Two 
Park, Jun and MacInnis (2000) study the influence of option framing on consumer 
choice. In the additive (subtractive) option frame, consumers are presented with a base 
(fully-loaded) model and are asked to add (delete) options that they want (don’t want). 
Park et al. propose that consumers, who are presented a product in subtractive frame, 
should retain a relatively large number of options in the final product. In contrast, 
consumers, who are presented a product in additive frame, should add fewer options in 
the final product, than were retained in the subtractive frame. In part two, we first review 
how the difference in the shape of the value functions of promotion versus prevention-
oriented consumers point to differences in their likelihoods to integrate losses and 
segregate gains. Based on this basic difference, we argue that consumers’ regulatory 
focus should interact with option framing and thereby lead to differences in choices in 
options. Our theorization suggests that promotion-oriented consumers are more likely to 
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choose more options and end up with a higher-priced product, than are prevention-
oriented consumers, in the additive frame. In contrast, prevention-oriented consumers 
are more likely to retain more options and end up with a higher-priced product, than are 
promotion-oriented consumers, in the subtractive. 
 
Part Three 
Prior research suggests that consumers’ motivation level determines whether regulatory 
fit occurs. Wang and Lee (2006) propose that, under low levels of involvement, 
consumers actively create regulatory fit by preferentially seeking out and elaborating 
specifically on information that creates a regulatory fit condition, over information that 
creates a regulatory misfit. However, under high levels of involvement, consumers give 
relatively high weight to substantive information, rather than preferentially seeking that 
information that helps them achieve regulatory fit. Extant research, however, lacks 
insight into whether consumers are also likely to render a regulatory misfit under specific 
conditions, just as they are able to render a regulatory fit under specific conditions. Part 
three is dedicated to filing this void in extant literature. I argue that committing to a goal 
is decisive in determining goal means. Part 3 purports that when consumers commit 
themselves to a predetermined evaluation that is above (below) the market value of the 
stimulus, then they will consciously or automatically undertake processing strategies that 
instigate a regulatory fit (a regulatory misfit), irrespective of whether they are promotion 
or prevention oriented. 
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DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSTICITY FOR EXTRINSIC INFORMATION: A 





INTRODUCTION TO PART 1 
In this research, we focus on an important-but-understudied construct, namely, the 
range of acceptable prices (also referred to as the latitude of price acceptance). Much 
prior research points to the support for the range of acceptable prices conceptualization 
of reference price ( Ofir 2004; Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999; Niedrich, Sharma and 
Wedell 2001; Rao and Sieben 1992, Kalyanaram and Little 1994; Lichtenstein et al. 
1988; Kalwani and Yim 1992; Kalyanaram and Winer 1995; Mazumdar and Jun 1992; 
Wang, Venkatesh and Chatterjee 2007). Bell and Lattin (2000) propose that consumers 
use not only the single-point reference price standard in absolute terms (also referred to 
as the adaptation level), but also the deviations from this reference price. This deviation 
from the mean reference price is the foundation for the range of acceptable prices. 
Lichtenstein, Bloch and Black (1988) suggest that price acceptability is positively related 
to the width of the range of acceptable prices. The single-point reference price and the 
upper-and-lower limit based acceptable price range are akin to two dimensions of a 
latent conceptualization of reference price, and they are correlated with each other 
(Lichtenstein et al. 1988; Urbany and Dickson 1991). While the single-point reference 
price conceptualization is based on adaptation-level theory, the latitude of price 
acceptance (that is, the range of acceptable prices) conceptualization of reference price 
is based on social-judgment theory and weber-fechner law. Petroshius and Monroe 
(1987) argue that buyers have a range of acceptable prices for every prospective 
purchase. Extant research also suggests that consumers’ exposure to price variations in 




Additionally, extant research in regulatory focus theory provides us guidance on how 
regulatory focus and regulatory fit can influence willingness-to-pay (Higgins et al. 2003). 
However, research, on how distinct regulatory foci influence the range of acceptable 
prices, is lacking. The current research attempts to fill this void. However, in addition to 
the influence of regulatory focus alone (which can be either chronic or induced 
situationally, Zhao and Pham 2007), consumers are also exposed to external information 
on the target product through voluntary and involuntary exposure to store environment or 
to product advertising etc. Often, product sales website, like amazon.com present the 
consumer with much extrinsic-factual information about the target product and 
competing products. Amazon.com, for example, provides customers access to customer 
reviews where in prior customers present product recommendations for target products 
over competing products given that the target product may better fulfill customer needs 
or vice versa. Additionally, consumers also have access to factual information such as 
the proportion of consumers, who viewed the current product, ended up buying that 
same product or the competing product. We refer to such extrinsic information as the 
extrinsic need-fulfillment-ability information on the product.  
 
In this research, we study how consumers’ regulatory focus interacts with such extrinsic 
information, which is often available in the environment, and which potentially influences 
the acceptable price range width. Specifically, we will study how the upper limit of the 
acceptable price range (that is, the highest acceptable price for the product) and the 
lower limit of the acceptable price range (that is, the lowest acceptable price for the 
product) are influenced by regulatory focus and availability of external information on the 
product. Our primary goal is to study how the presence or absence of favorable and 
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unfavorable need-fulfillment-ability information on the product influence changes in price 
acceptance versus when such information is absent.  
 
This paper is laid out as follows. First we review research in acceptable price range. 
Then, we review research in regulatory focus theory which points to two accounts that 
indicate divergent hypotheses. Under the first account, which we refer to as the 
“regulatory-fit account, both promotion and prevention-oriented consumers consciously 
attend to different information that help them specify their acceptable price range. Under 
the second account, which we refer to as the “asymmetric-elaboration” account, only 
prevention-oriented consumers consciously attend to information that they consider 
important, while promotion-oriented consumers undertake affect-based processing and 
do not elaborate on substantive information available in the environment. Our analyses 
indicate support for the “asymmetric-elaboration” account. We then attempt to check 
whether systematic differences in highest acceptable price leads to systematic 
differences in the correlates of price acceptability, namely, price consciousness and 
price-quality inferences (Lichtenstein et al. 1988). We end with theoretical and 
managerial implications.  
  
13 
CHAPTER 3  
 
ACCEPTABLE PRICE RANGE 
 
It has been argued in the preference-uncertainty literature that a single-point reference 
price representation presumes that consumers know with certainty as to how much they 
are willing to pay for one unit of the product. Hence, this literature suggests that it is 
more likely that consumers do not have a well-defined preference structure to make 
evaluations based on a single-point reference price alone.  In the presence of 
uncertainty, consumers often consider and recall a range of prices.  Additionally, 
Janiszewski and Lichtenstein (1999) propose that consumers’ price acceptability 
assessments entail comparing product price with comparison of the market price to the 
endpoints of the evoked price range. Consumers are said to find a price acceptable if it 
lies within an evoked acceptable price range, whose limits are often based on current 
variation in market prices. Most consumers are unable to identify the exact price that 
they paid for a product last time they bought it. However, most consumers are able to 
specify a general range of prices that they experienced during last purchase. All this 
evidence is assumed to suggest that consumers may actually harbor a range of 
acceptable prices, which they use as their reference price anchor (Monroe 1973).  
 
However, individual differences exist in consumers’ range of evoked acceptable prices 
(that is, latitude of price acceptance), just as differences may exist in their single-point 
reference prices (that is, in adaptation level price). Hence, two consumers, who have 
identical adaptation level prices, may still display differences in price acceptability, given 
that their range of acceptable prices may be different. Lichtenstein et al. (1988) and 
Monroe (1973) propose that for some consumers, a price may be high-but-acceptable 
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(that is, specified price is close to but below the upper limit of the acceptable price 
range) while to others it may be unacceptably-high (that is, specified price is above 
upper limit of the acceptable price range). Alternatively, two different consumers, who 
hold the same adaptation-level reference price, may be conforming to significantly 
different range widths of acceptable prices, thus displaying significantly different price 
acceptability. Such fine distinction cannot be made when studying price acceptance 
using a single-point (adaptation level) reference price concept alone. A range of 
acceptable prices conceptualization of reference price provides a richer insight into 
consumer price sensitivity, than can be provided by a single-point reference price 
conceptualization.  
 
Additionally, extant research suggests that the range explanation of reference prices 
may provide a superior explanation of price acceptance than is provided by a single 
value adaptation level explanation. For example, Janiszewski and Lichtenstein (1999) 
find that the endpoints of consumers’ evoked price range mediate the changes in price 
attractiveness ratings, whereas the single-point internal reference price did not. On 
similar lines, Niedrich et al. (2001) propose that range-frequency theory based 
acceptable-price range provides a better explanation for reference-price effects that the 
adaptation-level theory based single-point reference price. Finally, Wang, Venkatesh 
and Chatterjee’s (2007) study suggests that price range is a better predictor of 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay than single-point reference price, given that consumers’ 
price range has the least shift in choice likelihood, as compared to that in single-point 
reference price, or other comparable measures of willingness-to-pay. Hence, a study of 
determinants and moderators of acceptable price range is relevant to understanding 
consumer price acceptance phenomenon.  
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Given this, it is important for researchers to understand how two limits of consumers’ 
acceptable price range behave in reaction to the presence or absence of combinations 
of favorable and unfavorable extrinsic information on the product, versus when such 
information is absent. As such, this forms the primary intention of this research. To 
understand this, we intend to study the changes in the price acceptance levels of 
consumers when they are presented in 4 distinct information-availability conditions. 
These information conditions are presence of favorable information only (for example, 
presence of a bunch of product reviews which overwhelmingly suggest that the target 
product is more useful than the competing product), presence of unfavorable information 
only (for example, presence of a bunch of product reviews which overwhelmingly 
suggest that the target product is less useful than a competing product), presence of 
both favorable and unfavorable information, and absence of any such information. 
 
In the current research, we will follow Monroe’s (1971) acceptable price range 
conceptualization, where the lower limit of the price range need not be zero dollars.  
On similar lines, Ofir (2004) suggests that certain consumers’ acceptable price 
thresholds can be represented by an inverted U-shaped price acceptability function with 
clearly-defined upper and lower price limits. Such consumers find very low prices 
unacceptable because such prices suggest low product quality. In contrast, other 
consumers may not have a natural lower price limit, while simultaneously having an 
upper price limit. For such consumers, “lower price is better,” may be more 
representative of their price-acceptability function. To overcome this problem where 
consumers may or may not have a lower price limit, our experimental method induces a 
procedure where consumers will have a lower price limit. We don’t just ask our 
participants to provide us their lower price limit. Rather, we induce a situation which will 
elicit a meaningful lower price limit in most participants. If our procedure of eliciting a 
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lower price limit in our participants is successful, then the lower price limit specified by 
our participants, should be significantly higher than $0. On the other hand if our 
procedure is not successful, then the lower price limit that our participants specify may 
be close to $0 and may not even be significantly larger than $0. 
 
Lichtenstein et al. (1988) and Ofir (2004) have argued that consumers’ price 
consciousness and price-quality relationship inferences are two relevant antecedent-
correlates of price acceptance. Consumers who harbor low levels of price 
consciousness should be more willing to pay higher for a product that they believe is 
more appealing. As such, consumers’ price consciousness is negatively correlated to 
consumers’ price acceptance. Price-quality inference refers to consumers’ belief that 
high price is an indication of high quality. Consumers, who hold high levels of price-
quality relationship, are more willing to render higher price acceptable for products, as 
they believe that high-priced products are bound to be of higher quality. Further, such 
consumers should not find very low product prices acceptable, as the low price of such 
products indicates low product quality (Monroe 1973).  
 
This suggests that consumers, who display increased highest acceptable price under 
specific conditions such as presence of favorable extrinsic product information, are 
displaying increased should flexibility in their price acceptance behavior, in comparison 
to the condition where such information is not present. Extant literature suggests such 
consumers tend to harbor increased price-quality inferences or reduced price 
consciousness or both, under such specific conditions. We can also draw similar 




This research also focuses an understanding the types of consumers who will find 
extrinsic need-fulfillment-ability information on the product to be pertinent to their price-
acceptance decision-making. Such consumers should find the presence of unfavorable 
extrinsic information about a product to be diagnostic. The presence of such unfavorable 
information may induce uncertainty about the product, and hence such consumers may 
discount the product’s capabilities (Ford and Smith 1987, p. 363), and will infer lower 
quality for the product. This should lead these consumers to specify a reduced highest 
acceptable price limit (Rao and Sieben 1992 p. 259). On similar lines, consumers, who 
find extrinsic-product information important in their decision-making, should also find the 
presence of favorable extrinsic information about a product to be significant. The 
presence of such favorable information will cause such consumers to infer higher quality 
for the product. Hence, such consumers may tend to display higher highest acceptable 
price.  
 
In contrast, we argue that consumers, who do not find extrinsic need-fulfillment-ability 
information on the product to be important, will not display changes in price acceptability 
levels in the presence or absence of extrinsic need-fulfillment-ability information on the 
product. For such consumers, one can infer that their price acceptability levels will hold 
at the same levels, irrespective of whether favorable and unfavorable need-fulfillment-
ability information on the product is present or absent.  
 
Further, we believe that for consumers, who find such extrinsic information on the need-
fulfillment ability of the product to be important, the presence of favorable extrinsic-
product information should influence the upper price limit positively, in contrast to when 
such information is not present. Likewise, the presence of unfavorable extrinsic-product 
information should influence the upper price limit negatively for such consumers, in 
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contrast to when such information is not present. We argue however, such precise 
inferences cannot be made for the lower price limit of the price range, in the presence or 
absence of favorable and unfavorable extrinsic information.  
 
Firstly, prior literature does not provide us clear guidance on whether the presence of 
favorable or unfavorable extrinsic information influences the lower price limit, in 
comparison to when such information is not present. We argue that it is not clear 
whether the presence of unfavorable information (and thereby increase in uncertainty in 
product quality) leads to increasing or to lowering of the lower price limit. As discussed 
earlier, the lower price limit is a threshold below which the consumer assumes that the 
product has unacceptably low quality. In the face of increased uncertainty, one 
perspective will suggest that the consumer will look to increase the lower price limit in 
the hopes of buying a more expensive product so as to ensure that it has higher quality. 
However, one also contend that in the face of increased uncertainty on quality, the 
consumer may actually lower the lower price limit given that that lower price may just be 
the right price to pay for that low-quality product. Likewise, neither is it clear whether the 
presence of favorable information (and thereby decrease in uncertainty in product 
quality) leads to increasing or to lowering of the lower price limit.  
 
Secondly, from a managerial standpoint of revenue maximization, having a clear 
understanding of the behavior of consumers’ highest price limit may be more important 
than understanding the behavior of their lower price limit. Given these reasons, we 
choose to focus mainly on the influence of the presence or absence of favorable and 
unfavorable information on consumers’ upper price limit, in drawing our hypothesis. We 
will rely on the results of our study, to gain insight on how the lower price limit and the 
width of the acceptable price range are influenced by the interaction between the 
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consumers’ regulatory focus and presence or absence of extrinsic favorable and 
unfavorable extrinsic-product information.  
 
We will assess participants’ price acceptance based on their highest acceptable price 
(that is, upper price limit), their lowest acceptable price (that is, lower price limit) and 
their width of the acceptable price range (the latitude of price acceptance, calculated by 
deducting the lower price limit from the upper price limit). We provide the price of a 
competing product1, so as to provide a reference price level (adaptation price level) for 
the stimulus,  
 
The next question to be covered is under what circumstances will consumers find the 
presence of extrinsic need-fulfillment-ability information on the product to be diagnostic 
to their price acceptance, versus when such information is absent. In the next section, 
we review literature in regulatory focus theory. We propose that differences in regulatory 
focus should lead to differences in the diagnosticity for such extrinsic product 
information. 
                                                 
1 Our procedure of eliciting acceptable price range is the similar to the procedure laid out by Lichtenstein et 
al. (1988). Like them, we asked participants to specify the most and the least that they will pay for the 
product. However, our procedures differ slightly in the context of the single-point reference price. 
Lichtenstein et al. ask participants to provide a measure of their participants’ price adaptation level by 
making the participants specify the amount that they pay for the stimulus typically and on average. 
Essentially, Lichtenstein et al. rely entirely on consumers’ internal reference-price schema to evoke the 
price acceptability construct. In contrast, we provide consumers with a single-point reference price by 
informing them the price of a closely-competing product. Based on the procedure laid out in Rao and 
Sieben (1992), we argue that, in reality, the shopping environment will invariably provide consumers with 
external reference prices, which will in turn help them in eliciting their upper and lower price limits. Hence, 
we believe that relying on consumers’ utilizing the price available in the environment in eliciting upper and 
lower price limits may afford us increased external validity.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
REGULATORY FOCUS THEORY 
Regulatory Focus theory (Higgins 1997, Higgins 1998) postulates two basic motivational 
systems, namely the promotion system and the prevention system. The promotion 
system governs the needs for self-actualization, maximizing benefits, realizing ideals 
through increased development, and actively achieving a desired goal. The prevention 
system, in contrast, governs the needs for self-preservation, minimizing losses, meeting 
obligations, ensuring security and avoiding negative outcomes. Hence, a promotion-
oriented CEO attempts to improve her firm’s profits by focusing mainly on increasing 
revenue-generating opportunities of her firm. For such a CEO, new avenues of revenue 
generation will be more diagnostic in their decision-making. In contrast, a prevention-
oriented CEO attempts to improve her firm’s profits by focusing on mainly reducing costs 
and expenses that her firm undergoes, and hence will find cost-saving opportunities to 
be highly diagnostic to her decision making.  
 
Higgins (2000, 2002) has further proposed the concept of regulatory fit. Higgins argues 
that when people pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory focus then 
they experience regulatory fit, and if people pursue a goal in a manner that conflicts with 
their regulatory focus then they will experience a regulatory misfit. Experiencing 
regulatory fit leads to increased confidence in decision making, increased motivation and 
increased polarization in attitudes, while experiencing regulatory misfit leads to reduced 
confidence in decision-making, confusion and frustration.   
 
Avnet and Higgins (2006) suggest that people feel better (that is, they experience 
fluency and ease in information-processing) when they use strategies that fit their 
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regulatory focus. Experiencing regulatory fit leads people to achieve a “feeling right” 
state, which leads to increased confidence in decision making. After experiencing a fit, 
people heuristically misattribute this perception of “feeling right” to the decision-making 
process, in assuring themselves that their decisions are correct. Winkielman and 
Cacioppo (2001) propose that information-processing ease is marked hedonically. They 
suggest that processing fluency, caused due to the ease in processing information, can 
draw positive affect, which in turn, can lead to positive judgments. Higgins (2006) 
proposes that once people experience regulatory fit it leads to increased intensity of 
attraction, if the target object is attractive, and to increased intensity of repulsion, if the 
target object is unattractive. 
  
Achieving a regulatory fit can lead people to transfer this feeling good experience into 
increased monetary value for the product under consideration (Higgins et al. 2003). 
Promotion-oriented participants experienced a regulatory fit, when they applied a gain 
strategy (that is, when participants were urged to think about what they would gain by 
having the focal object). In contrast, prevention-oriented participants experienced a 
regulatory fit when they applied a lose strategy (that is, when participants were urged to 
think about what they would lose by not having the focal object). The decision-making 
process is essentially the same in both conditions. However, participants, in both 
promotion and prevention focus had a significantly higher willingness-to-pay for the focal 
object, when they experienced a regulatory fit, versus when they did not achieve a 
regulatory fit. In continuation of Higgins et al.’s line of research, the current research 
looks into how achieving regulatory fit, versus not achieving regulatory fit, affects 
consumers’ range of acceptable prices.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
SELECTIVE FOCUS ON IFORMATION THAT HELPS SUSTAIN REGULATORY 
FOCUS – REGULATORY FIT ACCOUNT 
In this section, we will review relevant literature in the domain of regulatory-fit theory. We 
refer to the review and predictions offered in this section as the “regulatory-fit” account 
for differences in information diagnosticity.  
 
In any given situation, we expect that promotion and prevention-oriented consumers 
should put in fairly-equal level of energy in information search, if they believe that that 
information will help them achieve their goals (Pham and Higgins 2005). Further, Pham 
and Higgins argue that the information search undertaken by promotion-oriented 
individuals may actually be more elaborate than that undertaken by prevention-oriented 
individuals, given that promotion-oriented individual don’t want to miss opportunities and 
hence err on the side of minimizing errors of omission. This theorization presumes that 
the promotion-specific information should be diagnostic to promotion-oriented individuals 
in achieving their goal of advancement, while prevention-specific information should be 
diagnostic to prevention-oriented individuals in achieving their goal of reducing risk.  
   
Extant research shows that researchers have been able to instill a regulatory fit in their 
participants by enabling situations or by laying out goals for their participants, which help 
sustain their participants sustain their regulatory foci. As discussed earlier, experiencing 
regulatory fit leads to higher assessment of the target. For example, Lee and Aaker 
(2004) find that people in promotion orientation are more persuaded by messages that 
highlight the gain frame (e.g. “Get energized”), while prevention oriented people are 
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more persuaded by messages that highlight the avoidance of the loss frame (e.g. “Don’t 
miss out on getting energized”).  
 
Additionally, Pham and Higgins (2005) propose that given that promotion focus is 
depicted by eagerness at achieving a desired end, they focus on looking for positive 
information available to them. Conversely, prevention-oriented people focus on avoiding 
mismatches to their desired goal, and hence focus on looking for negative information 
available to them.  
 
Further, extant research also points to situations where consumers can themselves 
selectively elaborate on information that enables them to achieve regulatory fit. For 
example, Wang and Lee (2006) extend regulatory-fit theory further by testing the 
constructive preference view (Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1992), which suggests that 
given people’s limited ability to process all available information, people selectively focus 
only on partial information, as they believe is required in order to solve the problem. This 
is also supported by cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957), which suggests that 
people look specifically for select information which supports their current beliefs.  
 
Wang and Lee argue that people, with low levels of involvement, choose to focus only 
on partial information (presented either in promotion-focus frame or prevention-focus 
style), that helps them achieve a regulatory fit, leading to higher product evaluation, 
given that regulatory fit is achieved. Thus, it is suggested that at low levels of 
involvement, promotion-oriented (prevention-oriented) people will selectively give more 
weight to information that pertains to growth and advancement (security and safety), and 
hence achieve a regulatory fit. In the current research, given that we will not be 
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manipulating the involvement level of participants, we will be presuming that all our 
participants will be operating at low levels of involvement and motivation.  
 
In their study, Wang and Lee presented participants with two toothpastes – toothpaste A 
had strong promotion and weak prevention claims, while B had strong prevention claim 
and weak promotion claims. Wang and Lee show that given a choice, promotion-focused 
(prevention-focused) participants, under low levels of involvement, chose toothpaste A 
(toothpaste B) and provided a higher evaluation to their chosen toothpaste. This is the 
case, as in doing so, participants experienced regulatory fit. Based on the literature we 
have reviewed so far, we assume that both promotion and prevention-oriented 
consumers will actively and consciously look mainly for material information in the 
environment, and will even facilitate experiencing regulatory fit.  
 
Given Pham and Higgins’s proposition that promotion-oriented consumers focus on 
looking for positive information available to them, we expect that in the condition where 
only favorable product information is available, it will be promotion-oriented consumers 
who find this information diagnostic as it helps them sustain their focus on advancement 
(being able to own a product that is going to fulfill their needs). Favorable information on 
the target product should help promotion-oriented consumers sustain their focus on their 
advancement agenda and should increase the product’s value. This regulatory-fit 
condition should push the upper limit of the range of acceptable prices upwards for 
promotion-oriented participants. Prevention-oriented consumers, in contrast, will find this 
information relatively less appealing as it does not help them sustain their focus on 
avoiding problematic products. Hence, in this perspective, we don’t foresee any reason 
to argue that prevention-oriented participants’ upper limit of acceptable price range will 
be pushed upwards in this condition.  
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In contrast, promotion-oriented consumers under the condition when no information is 
present, do not get to experience regulatory fit, and hence there is no reason to believe 
that their upper limit of their acceptable price range will rise. This implies that we expect 
promotion-oriented consumers, under the condition when only favorable information is 
available, to have an upper limit of their acceptable price range that is higher than that 
for promotion-oriented consumers under the condition where no information is present 
(the control condition). As discussed earlier, extant literature does not provide us clear 
guidance on how the lower limit for promotion-oriented consumers is influenced under 
condition when only favorable information is available, versus when no external 
information is available. Hence, we are not in a position to make a conjecture on whether 
the presence of favorable information will change the lower price limit for promotion-
oriented consumers versus when favorable information is absent.  
 
Further, we do not expect such differences with prevention-oriented consumers. 
Prevention-oriented consumers, in the condition when only favorable information is 
available, should have similar upper limits to their acceptable price range, as those for 
prevention-oriented consumers, who are not presented with any information.   
 
In the reverse condition, when only unfavorable information on the product is made 
available, we expect that it is the prevention-oriented consumers who find this 
information diagnostic as this helps them sustain their focus on security (being able to 
avoid a product that might be problematic). Again, this is based on Pham and Higgins’s 
proposition that prevention-oriented consumers focus mainly on looking for negative 
information available to them. This regulatory-fit condition should push the upper limit of 
the range of acceptable prices downwards for prevention-oriented participants. 
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Promotion-oriented consumers, on the other hand, are not expected to find this 
information diagnostic given that it does not help sustain their focus on advancement. 
Hence, we don’t foresee any reason for promotion-oriented participants’ lower limit of 
acceptable price range to be pushed downwards, in this condition.  
 
In contrast, prevention-oriented consumers under the condition when no information is 
present, do not get to experience regulatory fit, and hence there is no reason to believe 
that the limits of their acceptable price range will fall. We thus expect prevention-oriented 
consumers, in the condition when only unfavorable information is available, to have a 
upper limit of their acceptable price range to be lower than that for prevention-oriented 
consumers, when no information is present (the control condition).   
 
Further, we do not expect such differences with promotion-oriented consumers in this 
case. Promotion-oriented consumers, in the condition when only unfavorable information 
is available, should have similar upper and lower limits as those for promotion-oriented 
consumers, who are not presented with any information.   
 
In the condition, where both, favorable and unfavorable information on the product (for 
example, one group of customer reviews which suggests that the target product is more 
useful than the competing product, and a second group of customer reviews that the 
target product is less useful than the competing product) is made available, then we 
expect different outcomes. In such a situation promotion-oriented consumers should find 
favorable information diagnostic, and (based on Wang and Lee 2006) should disregard 
the unfavorable survey, as focusing only on the favorable information helps them sustain 
their focus on advancement. This should push the upper limit of the range of acceptable 
prices upwards for promotion-oriented participants.  
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Similarly, under such a condition, we expect that prevention-oriented consumers should 
find unfavorable information diagnostic and that they should disregard the favorable 
survey, as focusing on the unfavorable information helps them sustain their focus on 
avoiding mistakes. This should push the upper limit of the range of acceptable prices 
downwards for prevention-oriented participants. 
  
Hence, we expect promotion-oriented consumers, in the condition when both favorable 
and unfavorable information is available, to have a higher upper limit to their acceptable 
price range than that of promotion-oriented consumers, when no information is present. 
Likewise, we expect prevention-oriented consumers, in the condition when both 
favorable and unfavorable information is available, to have lower upper limit for their 
acceptable price range than that of prevention-oriented consumers, when no information 
is present. 
 
Given this discussion, we propose a generalized hypothesis that accounts for all these 
predictions that we have made, assuming the regulatory-fit account: 
 
H1: Systematic differences in the upper limit of acceptable price range for both 
promotion-oriented and prevention-oriented consumers across the 4 conditions 
(presence of favorable information only, presence of unfavorable information only, 
presence of both favorable and unfavorable information, and the absence of any 
information). These systematic differences in the acceptable price range will be a result 
of the upward push of the upper limit for promotion-oriented consumers in the presence 
of favorable extrinsic information on the product, and of the downward push on the upper 
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limit for prevention-oriented consumers in the presence of unfavorable extrinsic 
information o the product. 
 
In contrast to these predictions outlined here, there is some evidence offered by prior 
research in regulatory-focus, which points to some very different predictions. In the next 
section, we review these other findings, and present an outline of predictions based on 
that review. Unlike the literature reviewed for the “regulatory-fit” account, the review in 
the next section findings from regulatory focus research doesn’t rely on regulatory fit as 
the means of explaining the differential diagnosticity of environmental information. 
Rather, they rely simply on inherent information-processing differences across the two 
regulatory foci. 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
SYSTEMATIC VS. HEURISTIC INFORMATION PROCESSING – ASYMETRIC 
ELABORATION ACCOUNT 
We refer to the contrasting predictions offered by other research in regulatory focus, as 
the “asymmetric elaboration” account of differential diagnosticity for extrinsic information. 
In this section, we will review relevant prior findings in regulatory focus theory, but those 
that are outside the domain of regulatory fit and constructive preference. 
 
Pham and Avnet (2004) propose that given their eagerness in exploring new means of 
achieving their goals, promotion-oriented consumers tend to rely more on their internal 
knowledge schema in their decision-making. This leads promotion-oriented consumers 
to undertake heuristic modes of information-processing leaning towards making gut-
based judgments which include forming impression based on their affective associations 
with the stimulus, while disregarding substantive-extrinsic inputs about the stimulus.  
 
In contrast, given their vigilant tendencies, prevention-oriented consumers tend to rely 
more on external and substantive information available in the environment. Such 
consumers are more likely to undertake detailed bottom-up processing, that is, they rely 
on extrinsic information about the stimulus in forming an impression. Prevention-oriented 
consumers seem to presume that extrinsic-substantive information may be safer to 
depend on in decision-making, given that it is a better predictor of the actual worth of the 
stimulus. We make the assumption that our participants will consider the kind of the 
extrinsic need-fulfillment-ability information on the product to be substantive.  
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Additionally, extant research suggests that promotion-oriented consumers want to look 
to get as much done as possible, given their inherent eagerness to minimize errors of 
omission, and hence tend to focus on speed at the cost of reduced accuracy (Förster, 
Higgins and Bianco 2003). This instills in them a tendency to undertake more superficial 
in the processing of information. In contrast, prevention-oriented people look in detail at 
different aspects of their assignments more carefully, given their inherent vigilance at 
minimizing errors of commission, and hence tend to focus more on accuracy at the cost 
of efficiency and speed.  
 
Further, promotion-orientated consumers, given their increased likelihood of harboring 
an independent self construal (Aaker and Lee 2001), depend mostly on personal 
preference and on internal-knowledge structures, in decision making and choices (Pham 
and Higgins 2005). Conversely, Pham and Higgins argue that prevention-oriented 
consumers, given their increased likelihood of harboring an interdependent self 
construal, tend to look for their choices and decisions that are necessarily norm-
appropriate and in line with group preferences.  
 
This review suggests that promotion-oriented consumers may not find the different types 
extrinsic information (favorable, unfavorable and both favorable and unfavorable) to be 
diagnostically different from when such information is absent. Hence, the upper price 
limit for promotion-oriented consumers should not vary across these 3 conditions and 
thereby should be the same as it is in the control condition where information is not 
made available to them.  
 
In contrast, we can expect prevention-oriented consumers to find need-fulfillment ability 
information on the product to be highly diagnostic. Given their inherent tendency to be 
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vigilant, we can expect that in the condition where only unfavorable information is 
present, the upper limit of prevention-oriented consumers’ acceptable price range will be 
pushed downwards, in comparison to the control condition where information is absent.  
 
Prior work also provides us some guidance in how prevention-oriented participants will 
construe the favorable information. Pham and Higgins (2005) propose that prevention-
oriented individuals are more conscious about aligning themselves with the group 
preferences. This implies that prevention-oriented should also find the favorable 
information to be diagnostic in specifying their acceptable price range. Additionally, 
Chernev (2004 A) argues that prevention-oriented consumers have a strong predilection 
to choose the default option, over choosing an untested option. We make the 
assumption that choosing a product, associated with favorable product information, can 
be construed as opting for the default option. Further, favorable information about the 
product may also signal reduced risk. Hence, we propose that in the conditions where 
only favorable information is present, the upper limit of the acceptable price range of 
prevention-oriented consumers is likely to be pushed upwards, in comparison to that in 
the condition where information is absent.  
 
It is difficult to predict how prevention-oriented consumers will react in the condition 
where both, favorable and unfavorable information is available. Given that prevention-
oriented consumers tend to be vigilant, we suspect that they may find the unfavorable 
information to be diagnostic, and may disregard the favorable information.  
If this situation holds, then the upper limit of the acceptable price range of the 
prevention-oriented consumers may be pushed lower, in comparison to that in the 
condition where information is absent. If however it so happens that prevention-oriented 
consumers give equal credence to both favorable and unfavorable information, it is 
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difficult to predict how the upper price limit of prevention-oriented consumers may be 
impacted.  
 
Hence, in contrast to the predictions based on the regulatory-fit account, the 
asymmetric-elaboration account suggests that only prevention-oriented consumers find 
the extrinsic need-fulfillment information on the product to be diagnostic. In contrast, 
promotion-oriented consumers tend to not find this information diagnostic in specifying 
their highest acceptable price.  
 
To summarize, the “asymmetric-elaboration” account predicts that, given their tendency 
to rely on internal-knowledge structures, promotion-oriented consumers will have similar 
upper price limits of the acceptable price range, across the 4 information-availability 
conditions. In contrast, for prevention-oriented consumers, systematic differences in the 
upper limit of the acceptable price range will exist across the 4 information-availability 
conditions.  
 
Given this discussion, we propose a rather generalized hypothesis that summarizes all 
the predictions that we have made, assuming the “asymmetric-elaboration” account. 
Given that these predictions are divergent from those outlined in hypothesis H1, we refer 
to them as H1alternate: 
 
H1alternate: Systematic differences in the range of acceptable prices will be observed only 
for prevention-oriented consumers but not for promotion-oriented consumers, across the 
4 conditions (presence of favorable information only, presence of unfavorable 
information only, presence of both favorable and unfavorable information, and the 
absence of any information). These systematic differences in the acceptable price range 
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for prevention-oriented consumers will be a result of the upward push of the upper limit 
of the acceptable price range, in the presence of favorable extrinsic information on the 
product, and of the downward push on the upper limit in the presence of unfavorable 
extrinsic information on the product. 
 
It is important to note that though hypotheses H1 and H1alternate hypothesize significance 
of any contrasts of mean values for the dependent variable, across the 4 information 
conditions, taken two at a time. However, the primary focus of this research is to 
understand the difference in means of dependent variables for the condition where 
extrinsic information is absent and the means for the other information conditions. 
Hence, in analyzing our results, we will look to study both support for H1 over 
H1alternate (or vice versa) and also the contrast of difference in means of dependent 
variables for the condition where extrinsic information is absent and the means for the 
other 3 information conditions, where different combinations of information are present.  
 
Next, we focus on the reason for this differential information diagnosticity across the 
regulatory foci, under the “asymmetric elaboration” account. The asymmetric-elaboration 
account suggests that the difference in information-processing styles between promotion 
and prevention-oriented consumers may lead to the differences in the range of 
acceptable prices across the two groups. Specifically, promotion-oriented consumers are 
said to rely on their internal knowledge and hence they do not find extrinsic information 
of any kind to be diagnostic. In contrast, prevention-oriented consumers rely on 




Hence, if hypothesis H1alternate holds then, it is important to understand the reason this 
difference in heuristic versus systematic information processing. A general recognition in 
cognitive psychology literature is that if a task is deemed easy, response to that task 
may occur below the threshold of conscious awareness. However, if unexpected 
difficulty is encountered in performing the task, then that task can be consciously 
performed under systematic processing (Barr 1988). Baar (1997) argues that 
consciousness is a “facility for accessing, disseminating and exchanging information, 
and for exercising global coordination and control”. Additionally, Dehaene and Naccache 
(2000) review literature that purports that certain stimuli can heuristically and 
unconsciously capture conscious attention. 
 
In line with discussion, we conjecture that given that promotion-oriented consumers go 
mainly with their affective associations, they may be finding the task of specifying the 
acceptance price levels to be relatively easy and hence may be undertaking relatively 
heuristic means of information processing. As such, they may not need rely on extrinsic 
information in coming up with their price range. In contrast prevention-oriented 
consumers may be finding the task of specifying the acceptable price range to be 
difficult. Hence, prevention-oriented consumers may consciously start looking for 
additional information that can help them accomplish this task. Alternatively, in line with 
Dehaene and Naccahe (2000), need-fulfillment ability information on the product may be 
the type of stimulus that is capable of drawing conscious attention of prevention-oriented 
consumers. Hence, if hypothesis H1alternate holds then, we propose that prevention-
oriented consumers should experience higher level of difficulty in specifying the range of 
acceptable prices than that experienced by promotion-oriented consumers. Hence we 
propose the hypothesis: 
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H2: Prevention-oriented consumers, versus promotion-oriented consumers, should find 
the task of specifying the price range to be more difficult 
 
It is important to note that testing for hypothesis H2 becomes relevant only if support is 
established for hypothesis H1alternate. We will test this model and the validity of 
hypotheses H1 and H1alternate by using data collected by running an experimental with 2 
(Regulatory Focus: Promotion VS. Prevention) X 4 (Information-Condition: presence of 
favorable product information only VS. presence of unfavorable product information only 
VS. presence of both favorable and unfavorable product information VS. absence of any 
information) between-groups design. 
 
In order to glean a broader view of the two distinct accounts (regulatory-fit vs. 
asymmetric-elaboration) that we have identified, we reviewed all the relevant papers in 
regulatory-focus research (undertaken by Marketing researchers in Journal of Consumer 
Research, Journal of Marketing Research and Journal of Consumer Psychology, and the 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, from 2000 to early 2008), such that their 
substantive findings of which could have been interpreted as lending support to either of 
the two accounts. We identified 30 such papers and listed their substantive findings in 
table 1. Further, we reinterpreted their substantive findings to the context of the current 
research, where it was necessary to do so. Whenever it was possible, we also provided 
a conjecture of how the upper limit of the acceptable price range will be impacted, based 

































Based On Substantive Findings 
In The Paper, Our Conjecture 
On How Upper Limit (U) And 
Lower Limit (L) Of Acceptable 
Price Range, Will Be Impacted.  
 
Note: Most inferences will be 
made in the context of U, as 
extant research does not 
provide clear guidance on how 
L will be influenced under 
different circumstances 
 
1 Kirmani & 
Zhu (2007) 
Compared with promotion focus, prevention 
focus increases consumers’ vigilance 
against persuasion in a message. 
Prevention focus, versus promotion-focus, 
causes consumers to easily sense seller’s 
persuasion efforts. Kirmani and Zhu argue 
that depth-of-processing does not cause 
















For prevention-focus consumers, 
both, U may plummet, for the 
target item in the presence of a 
potential persuasion situation. U 
for the target item in the case of  
promotion-oriented consumers 
may not be affected, despite 
presence of persuasion tactics.  
2. Zhao & 
Pechman 
(2007) 
A fit between the approval-based-promotion 
orientation and positive-favorable direction of 
a message is more effective at influencing 
smoking behavior of participants who are 
chronically pre-disposed to promotion-
orientation. Conversely, a fit 
 Regulatory-
Fit Account 
U may move upwards for 
situationally-relevant products 
such as smoking aids, for both 
promotion and prevention-oriented 
consumers, in the presence of 
advertising 
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  between the disapproval-based-prevention 
orientation and negative-unfavorable 
direction of a message is more effective at 
influencing smoking behavior of participants 
who are chronically pre-disposed to 
prevention-orientation. 
  messages that help them achieve 
a regulatory fit. Conversely in poor 
fit conditions (eg. Promotion-
oriented consumers being 
presented with prevention-focused 
negatively framed message), U 




This research attempts to explain the 
process involved in impulsive-consumption 
desire for high-calorie foods. Impulsive 
eaters, versus non-impulsive eaters, 
possess a powerful connection between 
hedonically-appealing foods and promotion 
focus – activation of longing for such food 
leads to reflexive promotion-focus activation 
that is, a focus on the potential upside of 
fulfilling the desire for consuming such food, 
with little consideration for the ill 
consequences that such food can have on 
health. Further, situational induction of 
prevention focus can subside this tendency. 
Essentially, promotion-regulatory focus 
mediates the relationship between 
impulsivity and behavioral intention.  
Impulsive eaters 
are overtaken by 
promotion-
orientation and 










lead to conscious 
elaboration of the 









If an activity or situation enhances 
the desirability of an object, then U 
may move upwards. This is 
especially true of consumers who 
lower levels of self control and 
hence tend to overtaken by time-
inconsistent promotion concerns of 
consuming that product. It is 
difficult to predict how L will be 
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High prevention (promotion) orientation 
leads people to naturally trade hedonic 
(functional) attributes for functional 
(hedonic) ones. As a consequence, people, 
high on promotion (prevention) orientation, 
will experience sadness (guilt) when they 
trade functional (hedonic) attributes for 




If a product is seen high on the 
hedonic (functional) dimensions, 
then promotion (prevention) 
oriented people may have U move 
upwards. It is difficult to predict 
how U will be impacted. In the 
reverse case, where a product is 
seen high on functional (hedonic) 
dimension, both U should move 






Promotion-focused consumers, versus 
prevention-focused consumers, are more 
likely to buy really-new products. This is so, 
because promotion-focused consumers 
seem to bear lower levels of uncertainty on 
the performance of really-new products. 
Thus, uncertainty in the performance of 
really-new products mediates the 
relationship between regulatory focus and 
purchase intentions. Finally, when 
performance risk for really-new products 
was made clearly explicit, then both 
promotion and prevention-oriented 























When it comes to purchasing of 
really-new products, U may move 
upwards move upwards for 
promotion-oriented consumers, 
while U may move down for 
prevention-oriented consumers.  
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be finding the 
task of specifying 
the price range 
more difficult than 










Promotion (prevention) oriented consumers 
are more (less) likely to be sensitive to the 
presence of a dominant brand in their 
consideration set, and hence will likely (not)  
choose the dominant brand, given that 
promotion-oriented (prevention-oriented) 
consumers tend to (tend not to) undertake 
heuristic processing. This effect will be 
enhanced, if consumers are asked to justify 










If the focal product is a dominant 
brand in a consideration set, then, 
promotion-oriented consumers, 
versus prevention-oriented 
consumers, may have their U 
moving upwards.  
7. Hamilton 
and Biehal  
(2005) 
Promotion (prevention) focus can be 
situationally generated by soliciting 
consumers by thinking of themselves as 
independent (interdependent). Consumers 
under independent (interdependent) self 
construal are more likely to choose 
alternatives that maximize potential gains 




The U, for a product that can be 
viewed as a conservative-default 
choice or a reliable choice, may 
move upwards, for consumers 
who highlight their interdependent 
self construal, in comparison to a 
product that is viewed merely as a 
high- 
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be finding the 
task of specifying 
the price range 
more difficult than 










Promotion (prevention) oriented consumers 
are more (less) likely to be sensitive to the 
presence of a dominant brand in their 
consideration set, and hence will likely (not)  
choose the dominant brand, given that 
promotion-oriented (prevention-oriented) 
consumers tend to (tend not to) undertake 
heuristic processing. This effect will be 
enhanced, if consumers are asked to justify 










If the focal product is a dominant 
brand in a consideration set, then, 
promotion-oriented consumers, 
versus prevention-oriented 
consumers, may have their U 
moving upwards.  
7. Hamilton 
and Biehal  
(2005) 
Promotion (prevention) focus can be 
situationally generated by soliciting 
consumers by thinking of themselves as 
independent (interdependent). Consumers 
under independent (interdependent) self 
construal are more likely to choose 
alternatives that maximize potential gains 




The U, for a product that can be 
viewed as a conservative-default 
choice or a reliable choice, may 
move upwards, for consumers 
who highlight their interdependent 
self construal, in comparison to a 
product that is viewed merely as a 
high- 
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be finding the 
task of specifying 
the price range 
more difficult than 










Promotion (prevention) oriented consumers 
are more (less) likely to be sensitive to the 
presence of a dominant brand in their 
consideration set, and hence will likely (not)  
choose the dominant brand, given that 
promotion-oriented (prevention-oriented) 
consumers tend to (tend not to) undertake 
heuristic processing. This effect will be 
enhanced, if consumers are asked to justify 










If the focal product is a dominant 
brand in a consideration set, then, 
promotion-oriented consumers, 
versus prevention-oriented 
consumers, may have their U 
moving upwards.  
7. Hamilton 
and Biehal  
(2005) 
Promotion (prevention) focus can be 
situationally generated by soliciting 
consumers by thinking of themselves as 
independent (interdependent). Consumers 
under independent (interdependent) self 
construal are more likely to choose 
alternatives that maximize potential gains 




The U, for a product that can be 
viewed as a conservative-default 
choice or a reliable choice, may 
move upwards, for consumers 
who highlight their interdependent 
self construal, in comparison to a 
product that is viewed merely as a 
high- 
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  with interdependent self-construal, much like 
prevention-oriented consumers, focus on 
avoiding losses and hence choose the least 
risky alternative. Consumers with an 
interdependent self construal should prefer 
status quo more so than independents. 
Finally, the regulatory-focus of the consumer 
mediates the relationship between self 
construal and preference for status quo, if 
the status quo is a conservative option. 
  performance product. The U, for a 
product that can be viewed as high 
performance product, may move 
upwards, for consumers who 
highlight their independent self 
construal, in comparison to a 
product that is merely viewed as 
reliable.  




The authors attempt to explain the cognitive 
process differences between promotion and 
prevention focus. They argue that 
promotion-oriented people undertake 
relational elaboration which involves 
integrating and abstracting shared aspects 
across dissimilar aspects of information. In 
contrast, prevention-oriented people 
undertake item-specific elaboration, which 
involves engendering context-specific and 
clear-cut associations to individual items in 
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9.  Grant 
and Xie 
(2007) 
When undertaking a risk-reduction strategy 
by hedging, promotion-oriented people tend 
to focus on that half that was sold (the 
change component), versus prevention-
oriented people, who tend to focus on that 
half that was retained (the default 
component). The authors call this differential 
focus, the locus of attention. Also, 
prevention-oriented participants (versus, 
promotion-oriented participants) were more 
likely to hold the stock when the stock was 
expected to rise, while promotion-oriented 
participants were more likely sell the stock 
when the stock was expected to fall. 












task, this paper 













Despite their higher levels of satisfaction 
with their current supplier, consumers who 
have a high sense of prevention-oriented-
regulatory pride, in contrast to high-
promotion-pride consumers, tend to not 
purchase from that same supplier. Such 
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Making people aware of their cultural and 
national origins instills prevention motive 
into people, and instantaneously makes 
them risk loathing. One of the 
consequences of this is that such people 
tend to choose products that have 
compromise overall attributes rather than 
products that both have extremely desirable 
and undesirable attributes. 
Paper focuses 
mainly on the 
induction of 
prevention-












The U for a compromise product, 
may move upwards, for 
consumers whose cultural origins 






Consumers construe information at a level 
that is compatible with their regulatory focus. 
Thus, promotion (prevention) oriented 
consumers will focus on high-level 
construal, that is, abstract information (low-
level construal, that is, attributes specific) 
information to be more compatible with their 
orientations. Further, information construal 
that matches consumers’ regulatory focus 
will be evaluated to be superior. 














The U for consumers in a match 
(mismatch) condition may tend to 





Promotion-oriented consumers, versus 
prevention-oriented consumers, are more 
susceptible to the set-completion 
hypothesis, rather than to the attribute-
accessibility hypothesis. This hypothesis 
suggests that when a firm promotes two 
complementary products (e.g. a digital 
camera and a photo printer) together, then 










Under such conditions which 
highlight synergy as laid out by 
Shine et al., the U for promotion-
oriented consumers may tend to 
move upwards. This finding will 
not hold for prevention-oriented 
consumers. 
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  both products, for promotion-oriented 
consumers. This will not occur, if the firm 
promotes two products within the same 
product category (e.g. two models of photo 
printers), or to two unrelated product 
categories (e.g. a photo printer and a 
snowboard). Essentially, promotion-oriented 
consumers find the synergy of owning a set of 
compatible extensions, from the same 
manufacturer, to be a important information, 
while prevention-oriented consumers do not. 







Promotion-oriented consumers, versus 
prevention-oriented consumers, are more 
susceptible to temptation. However, the 
eagerness of promotion-oriented consumers 
to reach their positive goals also enables them 
to successfully resist such desires. The 
authors argue that promotion-oriented 
consumers come up with more approach 
strategies of desire-resistance (which 
mediates this effect) as compared to the 
number of such approach strategies that 
prevention-oriented consumers come up with. 
Hence promotion-oriented consumers are in a 
better situation to withhold from temptations. 






Given that motivated promotion-
oriented consumers are better at 
resisting temptation, promotion-
oriented consumers may have a 
lower U for a desirable product 
than will prevention-oriented 
consumers, if the situation 
demands that consumers resist 
temptation of purchasing that 
product. 
15. Yeo and 
Park 
(2006) 
Prevention-oriented consumers are more 
likely to have more favorable evaluation for 
brand extensions that are similar to the parent 
brand and less likely to have favorable 
evaluation for brand extensions 




Under conditions of brand 
extension that is similar to parent 
brand, the U for prevention-
oriented consumers may tend to 
move upwards. This effect will 
46 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Extant Literature Findings – Account Support & Range Limit Predictions 
 
  that are dissimilar to the parent brand. This 
effect will not occur with promotion-oriented 
consumers, and the level of similarity may not 
influence the evaluation of brand extensions in 
the case of promotion-oriented consumers. 
This is so because promotion-oriented 
consumer tend to grant a relatively higher 
weight to their hedonic association with parent 
brand, while prevention-oriented consumers 
tend to grant a relatively higher weight to the 
risks associated in the brand extensions. 
  not hold for promotion-oriented 
consumers given that they do 
not find brand extension similar 
to that of parent brand to be a 




When confronted with a transaction situation, 
buyers (sellers) are more likely to be inherently 
prevention (promotion) focused. Hence, buyers 
(sellers) will tend to have the loss side (gain 
side) of the prospect theory utility curve as 
their zone of reference, and hence will become 
susceptible to their relevant frames of 
reference. Thereby, under conditions of high 
involvement, for positive outcomes, buyers 
(sellers) will experience more positive affect in 
response to a non-loss (gain) than in response 
to a gain (non-gain). Further, under conditions 
of high involvement, buyers (sellers) will 
experience more-negative affect in response to 
a gain (non-gain) than in response to a 
response to a non-loss (loss). These findings 






















Sellers may have a higher 
expectation of buyer’s U in 
comparison to the actual U of 
buyers. Also, given buyers are 
more susceptible to loss frames, 
buyer’s U may drastically fall 
downwards, if they are 
presented the scenario in a loss 
frame. Level of involvement will 
further moderate this effect. 
17. Wang and Consumers actively create regulatory fit by  Regulatory- Under low levels of motivation, 
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 Lee (2004) preferentially seeking out and elaborating 
specifically on information that creates a 
regulatory fit condition, over information that 
creates a regulatory misfit. As such, this finding 
suggests support for the constructive 
preference view. However, the authors identify 
an important boundary condition. They find this 
effect to be supported only when participants 
were in a low-motivation condition, but not 
when participants were in a high-motivation 
condition. When consumers are (are not) 
motivated to elaborate deeply on all available 
information, then they will not (will) tend to rely 
solely on the affect generated by experiencing 
the regulatory-fit, in attitude formation. Further, 
regulatory fit effect on brand attitudes is 
mediated by perceived attractiveness ratings of 
promotion and prevention features. 
 Fit Account promotion-and-prevention oriented 
consumers experiencing 
regulatory fit, will tend to have a 
higher U than will promotion-and-
prevention oriented consumers 
under high level of motivation. 
Alternatively, under low levels of 
motivation, promotion-and-
prevention oriented consumers will 
focus only on that part of 
information available in the 
environment that helps them 
achieve regulatory fit. Such 
consumers (both promotion and 
prevention oriented) should 
specify a higher U. 
18. Chernev 
(2004 B) 
In extending the regulatory-fit concept to 
compatibility between regulatory orientation 
and product-attribute type, Chernev suggests 
that promotion (prevention)-oriented 
consumers are more likely to overweigh 
hedonic, performance and attractiveness 
(utilitarian, reliability) attributes of the products, 
and thereby achieve a regulatory goals, in 
shopping for that product. 
 Regulatory
-fit Account 
For Promotion and prevention 
oriented consumers, who are 
presented a goal-compatible 
product, the U may tend to move 
upwards. Under the condition of 
goal-attribute incompatibility, U 
may move downwards. 
19. Lee and 
Aaker 
(2004) 
Promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers are 
more likely to be positively influenced and 
persuaded by a message, when the 
 Regulatory
-fit Account 
Under regulatory fit conditions, as 
caused by the suggested 
compatibility, U may tend to 
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  message is presented in the gain (loss) frame. 
The authors propose that enhanced ease of 
processing the message (that is, processing 
fluency) created by this proposed compatible 
combination, leads to the consumers’ 
experiencing regulatory fit, and thereby causes 
enhanced persuasion. Alternatively, when 
people feel that they are vulnerable to a 
particular unfavorable outcome (due for a 
positive outcome), they are more likely to focus 
on the negative (positive) aspects of a situation. 
Loss-framed (gain-framed) messages highlight 
the benefits lost (benefits to be gained) and 
hence are more persuasive. 
  move upwards for both promotion-
and-prevention oriented 
consumers. Conversely, under 
conditions of regulatory misfit U 
may move downwards, across 





Promotion (Prevention)-oriented consumers are 
more likely to rely on their subjective affect 
towards (the substance of) the message in their 
evaluation judgments. Also, promotion 
(prevention)-oriented consumers will find 
affective response to (substance of) the 
message to be more diagnostic in evaluating 
the brand that the message is promoting. 
Further, while promotion-oriented consumers 
will find the affective association with the 
stimulus to be even more diagnostic when the 
stimulus is more attractive, prevention-oriented 
consumers will find the substantive claims of the 
stimulus to more diagnostic when the stimulus’ 
claims are weak. Importantly, other individual 
differences, such as level of motivation, mood 






substantive features of the product 
may cause U to move upwards for 
prevention-oriented consumers. 
This effect will not a hold for 
promotion-oriented consumers. 
Conversely, advertisements 
highlighting affective associations 
with the product may cause U to 
move upwards for promotion-
oriented consumers. This effect 
will not a hold for prevention-
oriented consumers. 
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Consumers with an independent (interdependent) 
self-construal are likely to harbor a promotion 
(prevention) orientation. As such, consumers with 
independent (interdependent) self-construal find 
promotion-focused (prevention-focused) 
information to be more diagnostic. Thus, 
consumers with independent (interdependent) self 
construal weighed gain-framed (loss-framed) 





For both the regulatory foci, under 
conditions of self-construal and 
framing match, U may tend to 
move upwards. Conversely, under 
conditions of self-construal and 
framing mismatch, U may tend to 
move downwards. 
22. Aaker  
and Lee 
(2001) 
When persuasive appeals have a match 
(mismatch) between the self-regulatory goal 
primed and persuasive appeal as suggested here, 
consumers are more (less) likely to recall contents 
of the message, and more (less) likely to be more 
scrutinizing towards the strengths of the 
arguments in an matching appeal. Finally, in a 
match (mismatch) condition, consumers will have 
more favorable (less favorable) attitudes towards 
the stimulus brand when the matching arguments 
are strong. The reverse will be the case in this 




For both the regulatory foci, under 
conditions of self-construal and ad 
persuasive appeal match, U may 
tend to move upwards, due to 
increased message-content recall. 
Conversely, under conditions of 
self-construal and ad persuasive 
appeal mismatch, U may tend to 
move downwards, due to reduced 




Consumers experience regulatory fit if they 
pursue a goal in a manner that helps them uphold 
(that is, reinforce) their regulatory goals e.g. 
eagerly if they are promotion-oriented, and 
vigilantly if they are prevention focused. 
Essentially, regulatory fit is about enabling 




When consumers experience 
regulatory fit then, the U may tend 
to move upwards, in comparison 
to when consumers experience a 
regulatory misfit. In the misfit 
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  in information processing. In regulatory-fit 
situation, consumers tend to have stronger 
evaluative reactions. Hence, both, promotion 
and prevention-oriented consumers, exhibit a 
higher willingness-to-pay (a transfer of value 
from the regulatory-fit experience to the stimulus 
is said to have taken place) for an object that 
has been evaluated in a manner so that they 
achieve a regulatory-fit, versus in a manner in 
which they achieve a regulatory-misfit. 






When a purchase is due very soon (off in 
future), consumers get concerned about 
ensuring that their prevention-related obligations 
are met (promotion-related fervor is achieved), 
thereby causing heightened sensitivity to pain 
anticipated from potentially not achieving the 
minimal goal (heightened sensitivity to pleasure 
in potentially achieving a maximal goal) of 
buying a gift for a loved one. In this condition, 
consumers will find prevention-framed 





When a purchase is imminent (off 
in future), U for that purchase may 
move upwards, if that product is 
presented in a prevention-frame 
(promotion-frame).  When a 
purchase is imminent (off in 
future), the U for that purchase 
may move downwards, if that 
product is presented in a 
promotion-frame (prevention-





Experiencing regulatory fit increases 
consumers’ confidence in their evaluative 
judgments, the importance of their reactions, 
and their engagement in their reactions 
(whether positive or negative). The authors 
argue that regulatory fit is independent of other 
influences such as hedonic outcome, mood and 




When consumers experience 
regulatory fit then, U may tend to 
move upwards. When consumers 
experience a regulatory misfit U 
will move downwards. 
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  arousal.    
26. Chernev 
(2004 A) 
Prevention (promotion)-oriented consumers are 
more likely to weigh the default option more (less) 
heavily. Hence, prevention-oriented people are 
more likely to overweigh the negative 
consequences of any potential departure from the 
status quo, then are promotion-oriented people. 
Thereby, prevention-oriented consumers are more 
likely to opt for the default option, and promotion-
oriented consumers are more likely to take up the 
non-default option. Further, prevention (promotion)-
oriented consumers are likely to feel more (less) 
regret for past-and-current choices that deviate 










Prevention-oriented consumers should 
have a higher U for a product that can 
be perceived as a default option or as 
retaining status quo, as compared to a 
product that is perceived as a deviant 
option. This will not be the case for 
promotion-oriented consumers. For 
example, if a bunch of consumers have 
been loyal to a brand of soap, which 
suddenly is in short supply, then 
prevention-oriented people among 
them may be willing to specify a higher 
U to acquire that brand of soap, than 
will their promotion-oriented 
counterparts. 
27. Chen, Ng 
and Rao 
(2005) 
Westerners (Easterners) who are promotion 
(prevention) focused will be more impatient when 
they are presented a message that emphasizes an 
opportunity fulfilling a promotion (prevention) goal, 
versus a message that emphasizes an opportunity 
fulfilling a prevention (promotion) goal. Further, 
given that people exert more cognitive resources in 
interpreting a message that emphasizes negative 
information, that authors argue that Westerners 
(Easterners), presented a message that 
emphasizes a promotion loss (prevention loss) 





Westerners (Easterners) will have a 
higher U, when they are presented a 
message that emphasizes an 
opportunity fulfilling a promotion 
(prevention) goal, versus a message 
that emphasizes an opportunity 
fulfilling a prevention (promotion) goal. 
Further, Westerners (Easterners), will 
have a higher U, if they are presented 
a message emphasizing avoiding a 
promotion loss (prevention loss) rather 
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  higher level of impatience than caused by a 
message that emphasizes a prevention loss 
(promotion loss) rather than a prevention gain 
(promotion gain). 







Jain, Agrawal and Maheswaran (2006) argue 
that a maximal claim like “brand A is superior to 
brand B”) signifies a move from the status quo 
and thereby conveys uncertainty to prevention-
oriented consumers (hence is not persuasive to 
prevention-oriented consumers), while 
conveying inspiration for eager strategies to 
promotion-oriented consumers (hence is more 
persuasive to promotion-oriented consumers). A 
minimal message (“Brand A is equivalent or 
similar to brand B”), on the other hand, is 
persuasive for prevention-oriented people, while 










consumers may have a higher U, 
when presented with a maximal 
(minimal) message. In the converse 








Given that prevention (promotion)-oriented 
consumers show a higher (lower) preference for 
consistency, prevention (promotion)-oriented 
consumers’ inter-brand ratings, that is, rating for 
the focal brand and the comparison-reference 
brand, will be negatively correlated 
(uncorrelated). Further, prevention (promotion)-
oriented consumers tend to evaluate the 
reference/comparison (focal) brand first and 
also tend to recall more details regarding the 
reference (focal) brand. As such, prevention-





If the situation is manipulated to 
have a relatively lower (higher) 
price and features for the reference 
brand, then the prevention-oriented 
consumers may have a lower 
(higher) U. In contrast, this effect 
will not hold for promotion-oriented 
consumers, who will tend to specify 
the L and U for the focal brand, 
based on their internal knowledge 
structures and on their affective 
associations with 
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  As some sort of point of reference, a tendency 
not seen in promotion-oriented consumers. 





The transfer from regulatory fit to increased 
monetary value can even be seen even when 
the regulatory fit is in the domain of locomotion 
and assessment orientation. Hence, participants 
experiencing fit when a book-light was chosen 
with a strategy that fit their regulatory focus (for 
example, assessment matched with full-
evaluation & location matched with progressive 
elimination) were ready to pay more than 40% 





Consumers experiencing a 
regulatory fit in the domain of 
locomotion and assessment (that 
is, assessment matched with full-
evaluation & location matched with 
progressive elimination) may have 
a higher relatively U. In the 





In the next section, we focus on deriving random-parameter models with additional predictors of the range of acceptable prices, 








CHAPTER 7  
 
ADDITIONAL PREDICTORS OF ACCEPTABLE PRICE RANGE 
 
So far, we have focused mainly on how the interaction between regulatory focus and 
consensus information condition impacts the upper and lower limits of the acceptable 
price range. However, this research also focuses on how predictors, such as decision 
ease and others, yet to be identified, influence price range beyond the influence of the 
specific 2 regulatory foci and 4 information conditions. To accomplish that, we will first 
execute a set of regression analyses with perceived diagnosticity of the information 
condition as the random factor. We will execute separate regression analyses with 
information diagnosticity as the random factor, for the two regulatory foci. The underlying 
assumption will be that the heterogeneity in the means of the model parameters is based 
on the diagnosticity of the information available. With that, we will be able to generalize 
the results of our analyses from the 4 distinct information conditions, to a population of 
information conditions. Doing that will enable us to draw broad behavioral implications in 
price acceptance, separately for promotion-oriented consumers and for prevention-
oriented consumers.  
 
However, we also desire to further generalize the findings of our study. Because, our 
study will be a 2 (regulatory focus) X 4 (information conditions) design, we have 8 cells 
and thereby 8 levels of interaction between regulatory focus and information conditions. 
We can thus execute another set of regression analyses with the interaction, between 
regulatory focus and information, as a random factor. The underlying assumption will be 
that the heterogeneity in the means of the model parameters is based on the interaction 
between diagnosticity of the information and regulatory focus. With that, we will be able 
to generalize the results of our analyses from the 8 distinct interactions between, 
55 
regulatory focus and information condition, to a whole population of such interactions. 
Executing such a regression analysis over the entire sample (which includes both 
promotion and prevention-oriented participants), will enable us to draw broad and 
general behavioral implications in price acceptance, for the consumer in general 
(irrespective of her regulatory focus, and irrespective of which information condition she 
has been exposed to). 
 
Hence, in this section we will focus on identifying other relevant predictors of willingness-
to-pay, which will then be used in the random-parameter regressions. Pricing and 
service-quality literature presents much evidence that increased purchase commitment 
influences consumer’s willingness to pay for the product (see Monroe 2003 for a concise 
review). Further, as discussed earlier, we expect the level of difficulty experienced by the 
consumer to be a predictor of the acceptable price range.  
 
Additionally, recent research in regulatory focus shows that promotion (prevention)-
oriented consumers tend to naturally construe an object at a relatively high-level or 
abstract-global (low-level or concrete-local) level (Keller, Lee and Sternthal). Forster and 
Higgins (2005) suggest that global (local) processing should be facilitated for people in a 
promotion (prevention) focus. Hence, promotion-oriented consumers tend to view the 
product as an overall entity and may evaluate it on its overall usability and benefits. In 
contrast, prevention-oriented consumers tend to perceive a product as a bundle of 
features, and may evaluate the product based on the fancy individual-product features.  
 
Recent research has shown that differences in the level of construal can lead to 
significant differences in people’s probability estimates (Wakslak and Trope 2008). A 
general finding in the Construal-level theory (Trope and Liberman 2003) is that when a 
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event is temporally distant, people tend to define their goals in a relatively abstract 
manner, but as the event nears, people tend to get more specific in their goals. In 
congruence with this, Lee and Ariely (2006), find that in a shopping context, consumers 
do think of their goals in rather abstract terms early in their shopping trip, but get more 
specific in their shopping goals later during their shopping trip. On similar lines, 
Liberman, Trope and Wakslak (2007) argue that consumers may have a wider range of 
acceptable prices if they take a distal perspective, while maintaining a narrower price 
range if they take an immediate perspective.  
 
Extending such finding from a temporal perspective, as outlined in the Construal Level 
theory, to product construal level, we conjecture that this difference between the two 
regulatory foci in the context of their levels of product construal may be another predictor 
of the differences in their willingness-to-pay.  Given this, we argue that the inherent 
differences in the level of product construal, across the regulatory foci, may affect the 
acceptable price range for a product. Prior literature does not, however, provide clear-cut 
guidance for making specific predictions on whether any of these distinct construals 
influence the upper or lower limit of the acceptable price range. Hence, we refrain from 
making any predictions and will rather rely on the results of our study to confirm these 
speculations.  
 
Given this discussion, we specify the following level-1 model as the predictors of 
acceptable price range: 
 
Price_range    = B0 + B1.purchase_commitment + B2.decision_ease + 




where e0 is a normally-distributed random error. 
 
The model (1) has individual-specific predictors (namely, purchase_commitment, 
decision_ease, low_level_construal, high_level_construal and regulatory_focus_level), 
of the acceptable price range. The study that we will be running has 4 distinct 
consensus-information conditions. Each participant will be placed in one of the 4 
information-conditions. Hence, we also introduce the diagnosticity of consensus 
information, under each of the 4 information conditions, as the level-2 predictor of the 
acceptable price range.  
 
The aim of this study is to generalize the influence of availability of different 
combinations of consensus-information beyond the 4 specific conditions that we will be 
manipulated in the study. Essentially, we want to generalize the influence of consensus-
information on price range, beyond just the 4 in this setup, to a population of consensus-
information conditions. Hence, we will be specifying the perceived diagnosticity of the 
consensus-information, in the 4 information conditions, as a predictor of the 
heterogeneity of the means of the coefficients of the predictors in model (1).  In this 
random-parameters model (Greene 2007, p.233), the heterogeneity in the mean values 
of each of the 6 coefficients (B0 through B5) is predicted by the diagnosticity perceived in 
the consensus information provided in the 4 information conditions.  
 
The random-parameters linear model for price range is specified as follows: 
 
Price_range = B00 + B01.purchase_commitment + B02.decision_ease + 
B03.low_level_construal + B04.high_level_construal + B5.Regulatory_Focus_Level + e0   
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such that,  
B00 = γ000 + γ001 consensus_diagnosticity + r00 
B01 = γ010 + γ011 consensus_diagnosticity + r01 
B02 = γ020 + γ021 consensus_diagnosticity + r02 
B03 = γ030 + γ031 consensus_diagnosticity + r03 
B04 = γ040 + γ041 consensus_diagnosticity + r04 
B05 = γ050 + γ051 consensus_diagnosticity + r05 
 
where,  
consensus_diagnosticity is the perceived diagnosticity of the consensus information, 
perceived by the individual given the cell that the individual is placed in. The 
diagnosticity that the individual perceives is dependent on which of the 4 consensus 
information-availability conditions is the individual is placed in.  
Further, error terms r00 through r05 are assumed to be normally distributed. We will refer 
to this model as model A.  
 
In this study, participants will be specifying the highest and the lowest prices they are 
willing to pay for a product. The acceptable price range will be calculated by subtracting 
the participants lowest offer price from their highest offer price.  As such, an important 
development in acceptable-price-range literature will be to understand how the lower 
limit of acceptable-price range influences the upper-limit of the acceptable price range, 
and vice versa. Given lack of much research in the acceptable price range domain, prior 
literature does not provide us guidance on what to expect in terms of how the upper and 
lower limits of the acceptable price range influence each other. This study attempts to 
take the first step towards that end.  
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Hence, we modify model A and now specify model B, with the upper limit of the 
acceptable price range as the dependent variable:  
 
Upper_Limit = B10 + B11.purchase_commitment + B12.decision_ease + 
B13.low_level_construal + B14.high_level_construal + B15.Lower_Limit + 
B16.Regulatory_Focus_Level + e1   
 
such that,  
B10 = γ100 + γ101 consensus_diagnosticity + r10 
B11 = γ110 + γ111 consensus_diagnosticity + r11 
B12 = γ120 + γ121 consensus_diagnosticity + r12 
B13 = γ130 + γ131 consensus_diagnosticity + r13 
B14 = γ140 + γ141 consensus_diagnosticity + r14 
B15 = γ150 + γ151 consensus_diagnosticity + r15 
B16 = γ160 + γ161 consensus_diagnosticity + r16 
 
where, upper_limit and lower_limit are the upper and lower limits of the acceptable price 
range respectively  
and, e1, and r10 through r15 are normally distributed error terms. 
 
Further, we modify model A and specify model C, with the lower limit of the acceptable 
price range as the dependent variable:  
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Lower_Limit = B20 + B21.purchase_commitment + B22.decision_ease + 
B23.low_level_construal + B24.high_level_construal + B25.Upper_Limit + 
B26.Regulatory_Focus_Level + e2   
 
such that,  
B20 = γ200 + γ201 consensus_diagnosticity + r20 
B21 = γ210 + γ211 consensus_diagnosticity + r21 
B22 = γ220 + γ221 consensus_diagnosticity + r22 
B23 = γ230 + γ231 consensus_diagnosticity + r23 
B24 = γ240 + γ241 consensus_diagnosticity + r24 
B25 = γ250 + γ251 consensus_diagnosticity + r25 
B26 = γ260 + γ261 consensus_diagnosticity + r26 
where, the error terms e2, and r20 through r26 are normally distributed. 
 
Further, we assume that both, the upper-and-lower limits of the acceptable price range, 
are censored in both directions. The reason for this is that a consumer buying a product 
in a retail store or online, will have many more substitutes to the chosen laboratory 
stimulus (Lucking-Reiley et al. 2000; Harrison, Harstad, Rutström 2004). Additionally, in 
reality, consumers shopping online or at a retail store will have much more knowledge 
on the target product and competitors than can be provided to participants in an 
experimental setup. Finally, researchers can never really be aware of all variables that 
can influence their acceptable price range. For example, some consumers may check 
product recommendations from Consumer Reports, in finalizing  their price-
acceptance decision-making. Given this, we argue that lack of the presence of these 
other influences (given that they cannot be replicated in an experimental or a survey 
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setup), induces the range of upper and lower limits of the acceptable price range to be 
censored in both directions.  
 
Given that the upper and lower limits of the acceptable price range are censored, we will 
be executing a random-parameters double-limit tobit regression for models B and C. As 
with model A, we will identify models B and C separately for the two regulatory foci and 
study the differences in the significance of predictors on the upper-and-lower limits of the 
acceptable price range. Given that models A, B and C are specified to be random over 
the diagnosticty of the information condition, the findings of these models are general 
(and pertinent beyond the 4 conditions in the experimental setup).  
 
It is important to note the results of models A, B and C will be used to understand the 
differences in price-acceptance behavior in promotion-oriented consumers versus in 
prevention-oriented consumers. Hence, we will identify the models A, B and C 
separately for the two regulatory foci. As such, we will first identify the models A, B and 
C for the sample of promotion-oriented participants (with consensus-information 
conditions as random). Then, we will identify models A, B and C for the sample of 
prevention-oriented participants (with consensus-information conditions as random). We 
will then compare the differences in significance of predictors across the two regulatory 
foci.  
 
However, in addition to studying price acceptance behavior of a promotion or of a 
prevention-oriented consumer, we also intend to understand a generic consumer’s price 
acceptance behavior (beyond specific levels of her regulatory focus). To enable us to 
understand a generic consumer’s price acceptance behavior, we will now specify model 
D, which is a modification of model A.  
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Because, our study has a 2 (regulatory focus) X 4 (information conditions) design, we 
have 8 cells and thereby 8 levels of interactions between regulatory focus and 
information conditions. Model D will be devised to generalize the influence of the 
interaction between regulatory focus and information conditions from the 8 in this study, 
to an entire population of interactions between regulatory focus and information 
conditions. Hence, rather than having level of regulatory focus as one of the predictors, 
model D will have the 2-way interaction between regulatory focus and information 
condition, as random factor. Hence, model D will be identified over the entire sample.  
 
Hence, Model D is specified as follows: 
Price_range = B30 + B31.purchase_commitment + B32.decision_ease + 
B33.low_level_construal + B34.high_level_construal + e3   
 
such that,  
B30 = γ300 + γ301 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r30 
B31 = γ310 + γ311 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r31 
B32 = γ320 + γ321 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r32 
B33 = γ330 + γ331 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r33 
B34 = γ340 + γ341 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r34 
 
where (regulatory_focus * consensus_diagnosticity) is the product of the regulatory 
focus level and perceived dignosticity of the consensus information 
and, the error terms e3, and r30 through r34 are normally distributed. 
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Similarly, we modify models B and C and present models E and F. Model E is specified 
as follows: 
Upper_Limit = B40 + B41.purchase_commitment + B42.decision_ease + 
B43.low_level_construal + B44.high_level_construal + B45.Lower_Limit + e4   
 
such that,  
B40 = γ400 + γ401 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r40 
B41 = γ410 + γ411 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r41 
B42 = γ420 + γ421 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r42 
B43 = γ430 + γ431 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r43 
B44 = γ440 + γ441 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r44 
B45 = γ450 + γ451 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r45 
where, e4, and r40 through r45 are normally distributed error terms. 
 
We specify model F as follows: 
Lower_Limit = B50 + B51.purchase_commitment + B52.decision_ease + 
B53.low_level_construal + B54.high_level_construal + B55.Upper_Limit + e5 
 
such that,  
B50 = γ500 + γ501 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r50 
B51 = γ510 + γ511 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r51 
B52 = γ520 + γ521 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r52 
B53 = γ530 + γ531 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r53 
B54 = γ540 + γ541 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r54 
B55 = γ550 + γ551 (regulatory_focus*consensus_diagnosticity) + r55 
where, the error terms e2, and r20 through r26 are normally distributed. 
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As with model D, models E and F too will be identified over the entire sample. In the next 
section, we present the details of the procedure and measures in our Study. 
65 





8.1 Participants and Stimulus  
Study 1 was undertaken to establish support for H1 over H1alternate or vice versa. A total 
of 175 undergraduate students from a major university in the south participated in the 
study. Given that the purpose of this study was to understand the predictors of the range 
of acceptable prices, we wanted to use a stimulus whose price was high enough so as to 
stimulate a reasonable acceptable price range, but not too high so as to induce an 
income effect. Additionally, we wanted to ensure that the stimulus was a product of 
interest, and was regularly being used by participants. A laptop computer fit this bill 
perfectly and most all undergraduate students actually owned their personal laptops. 
Given that the laptop has been used by Louro, Pieters and Zeelanberg (2005) earlier in 
regulatory-focus research, we finalized on the laptop as our stimulus.  
 
8.2 Procedure  
The study was conducted using Qualtrics software, which had the stimulus, options and 
other details preprogrammed in advance. Participants worked with the software in an 
interactive manner, such that the software presented the participants with information 
about the stimulus and other details such as available product information. After that 
participants responded to several items that were dependent measures, demographics 
questions etc. At the end of this exercise, participants were granted extra course credit, 
and were debriefed. The authors worked with participants in groups that ranged from 2 
to 14 people in size. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to either a primed-ideals (promotion) or a primed-
oughts (prevention) condition. Based on Pham and Avnet (2004), in the primed-ideals 
(oughts) condition, participants were asked to think about their past and current hopes, 
aspirations, and dreams (duties, obligations and responsibilities), and to list at least 3 of 
each.  After participants completed this task, they were then told to view two laptop 
computers, as a part of a purportedly different study.  
 
Participants were asked to review two HP notebook laptops. The first one was a target 
laptop for which participants were eventually going to specify their acceptable price 
range, while the second was a reference laptop whose price was to serve as the single-
point reference price for the target laptop. Participants were told that they were to 
imagine that they will be making potential purchase decisions and hence spend enough 
time viewing the details of the two laptops.  Participants were displayed pictures and 7 
features of the target laptop along with pictures and the same 7 features of the reference 
laptop. Participants were in a position to compare pictures and features of these two 
laptops, and spend as much time as required in understanding the details of the two 
laptops.  
 
Given that this study was intended to study effects of regulatory focus on choice, it was 
important to ensure that two laptop were neither perceived as too utilitarian (promotion 
concerns) nor viewed as too hedonic (prevention concerns). Brief discussions were 
undertaken with 8 middle-aged participants to assess this concern. Five of these 
participants felt that the target laptop was slightly higher on the hedonic dimension than 
was the reference laptop, while being comparable on the utilitarian dimension. The 
remaining three participants felt that the two laptops were balanced on both, hedonic 
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and utilitarian dimensions. Importantly, none of these 8 participants felt that both the 
laptops were neither too high nor too low on the utilitarian or on the hedonic dimension.  
 
To avoid overloading the participants with feature information (Malhotra 1982), we 
displayed only 7 features of both these laptop. We limited ourselves to displaying only 
those features of the laptops that are understood by most all student population (such as 
processing speed, memory size, hard drive size, modem type, screen size, screen-
resolution, and dual-layer multimedia CD/DVD drive). Further, we wanted to ensure that 
the target laptop and the reference laptop were fairly comparable, but not exactly the 
same. We thus had to ensure that the individual features were slightly different, even 
though overall, both these laptop were quite similar in their capabilities. As an example, 
we ensured that while the target laptop had a slightly faster microprocessor than the 
reference laptop, the reference laptop had slightly more hard drive space and slightly 
larger screen size than the target laptop. All the 8 pretest participants felt that the two 
laptops were generally comparable, in terms of their features and capabilities.  
 
Further, given that most laptop computers have now become commoditized, it is 
reasonable to assume that all 7 of the features of the laptop, may be viewed as generally 
utilitarian, especially given that the price level that the laptops are being presented at 
suggests almost entry level models. Additionally, prices of laptops have plummeted, 
even since this study was undertaken, just a few months ago. Moreover, the focus of this 
study was not to understand how consumers’ range of acceptable prices changes as the 
product-features change across product. Rather, it was to understand how consumers’ 
range of acceptable prices changes, as extrinsic substantive information about the 
product changes, for the same product.  
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Participants were told to imagine that they were planning to buy the target laptop on 
amazon.com, their favorite online store for purchasing electronics products. 
Unfortunately, the target laptop is not available at amazon.com. Participants were told 
that the target laptop was available for sale, on an Ebay-like website, with free shipping. 
Participants were then told that the key decision to be made was specifying an 
appropriate price to offer for the target laptop. The participants were further informed that 
incidentally the reference laptop was available for sale on amazon.com for $694.99, with 
free shipping. 
 
Popular online webstores such amazon.com provide consumers access to product 
reviews that prior consumers have presented. We have observed that these customer 
reviews focus mainly on whether the target product met their needs. Most often, these 
reviews compare the target product with competing products across different or within 
the same umbrella brand.  Amazon.com also provides information on the proportion of 
consumers who buy a particular product after viewing it and on the proportion of 
consumers who bought competing products after viewing the target product. Hence, in 
order to remain close to what is implemented on amazon.com, we presented our 
participants with extrinsic information on the product, depending on information condition 
that they were allocated to. In the favorable-only information condition, participants were 
informed and asked to elaborate on, “Your study of customer reviews on the HP artist on 
amazon.com suggested that 4 out of 5 customers find that the HP Artist (the target 
laptop) may be better suited to customer needs than is the HP Pavilion (the reference 
laptop) and as such is overwhelmingly chosen by customers”.  In this study, HP Pavilion 
(the reference laptop) serves to provide a reference price for the HP Artist (the target 
laptop). The HP Pavilion also provides a context for the competing product, in the 3 
conditions where extrinsic information on the product is present.  
69 
 
In the unfavorable-only product-information conditions, participants were informed, “Your 
study of customer reviews on the HP artist on amazon.com suggested that 4 out of 5 
customers find that the HP Pavilion (the reference laptop) may be better suited to 
customer needs than is the HP Artist (the target laptop) and as such is overwhelmingly 
chosen by customers” It is important to note that the level of favorableness and 
unfavorableness of the extrinsic information on the product were maintained at the same 
level across these two conditions.  
 
In the condition where participants were presented both, favorable and unfavorable 
extrinsic information on the product, participants were informed, “Your study of customer 
reviews on the HP artist on amazon.com suggested that 4 out of 5 customers find that 
the HP Artist (the target laptop) may be better suited to customer needs than is the HP 
Pavilion (the reference laptop) and as such is overwhelmingly chosen by customers at 
amazon.com. However, your study of customer reviews on the HP artist on bestbuy.com 
suggested that 4 out of 5 customers find that the HP Pavilion (the reference laptop) may 
be better suited to customer needs than is the HP Artist (the target laptop) and as such 
is overwhelmingly chosen by customers at bestbuy.com.” 
 
Finally, participants in the “absence of extrinsic information on the product” condition 
were not provided any information. Participants in this condition were simply informed 
that market-intelligence information is not available to them. This condition was to serve 
as the control condition.  
 
Participants then responded to a series of dependent variable items, and demographic 
questions. After that, they were debriefed and granted course credit for participation.   
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8.3 Measures Details  
Regulatory-Focus Manipulation Check Measure  
To check for the manipulation effect of the regulatory-focus manipulation, participants 
were asked to respond to two items from Pham and Avnet’s (2004) manipulation check 
items. They are, “If I had to choose right now, I would prefer to do” on a 1 (what others 
expect of me) through 7 (what I want to do) scale, “If I had to choose right now, I would 
rather” on a 1 (go wherever my heart takes me) to 7 (do whatever it takes to fulfill my 
responsibilities) reverse coded and “If I had to choose right now, I would prefer to do” on 
a 1 (take a trip around the world) through 7 (pay back my loans) reverse-coded scale.  
 
Information-Condition Diagnosticity Manipulation Check Measure  
Given a lack of an exact scale for this, we created two items that were modifications of 
two items from Lastovicka’s (1983) advertisement relevance scale. The items were, “I 
found the available information on the opinions in the reviews, to be relevant in 
specifying the price range for the HP ARTIST laptop” and “I found the available 
information on the opinions in the reviews, to be very helpful in specifying the price 
range for the HP ARTIST laptop” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.  
 
Highest & Lowest Acceptable Price  
 
Participants specified their highest-acceptable price by responding to the item, “What is 
the highest (i.e. maximum) price (in dollars) that you would be willing to pay for the HP 
Artist laptop?” Participants specified their lowest-acceptable price by responding to the 
item, “What is the lowest (i.e. minimum) price (in dollars) that you would be willing to pay 
for the HP Artist laptop?”.  We specifically informed our participants that if they specified 
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a lowest acceptable price that is too low, then the seller from the Ebay-like website may 
not accept it and hence they might not win the laptop. Additionally, we also warned our 
participants that if they specify a very low lowest price and the seller accepts it, then it 
can potentially mean that the laptop is of suspect quality and hence the seller agreed to 
sell it a low price. Finally, we informed our participants that the lowest acceptable bid 
price they specify should such that they will not regret one bit if that specific price was 
not acceptable to the seller even though a slightly higher lowest price could have been 
acceptable to the seller. 
 
We believe that this character of our procedure makes the concept of a lower limit of the 
acceptable price range a more tangible one and will induce our participants to truly hold 
a meaningful lower price limit. This was the entire reason for our informing our 
participants that they were bidding for the laptop on an Ebay-like website and not on 
Ebay itself, given that in reality, Ebay does not require bidders to specify a lowest 
acceptable bid price.  
 
The acceptable price range will be calculated by subtracting the participants’ lowest offer 
price from their highest offer price.  
 
Decision Ease  
Two decision ease items were created by adapting items in Park, Jun and MacInnis 
2000. The items were, “Given this situation, I believe that most people like me will find it 
easy to come up with their maximum and minimum prices for the HP Artist laptop.” and 
“It took me a lot of mental effort, to come up with an acceptable price range (i.e. 
maximum and minimum prices) for the HP Artist laptop (reverse coded)” on a 1 (strongly 
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disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. This item was a modification of the decision ease 
item used in Park, Jun and MacInnis (2000)..  
 
Purchase Commitment  
We used two modified items from purchase intention scale from Dodds, Monroe and 
Grewal (1991). They were, “I specified the price range (i.e. maximum and minimum 
prices) for the HP Artist as if I am very likely to purchase it.” and “I specified the price 
range (i.e. maximum and minimum acceptable prices) for the HP Artist, believing that 
purchasing it is the correct decision for me.”  on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree) scale.  
 
High-Level Product Construal: 
The high-level (i.e. global) construal of the target laptop was measured with the item 
“When specifying the price range (i.e. the maximum and minimum prices), I emphasized 
on how useful will the HP Artist laptop be as a comprehensive computing equipment, 
rather than simply focusing on how useful is each of its individual features.” on a 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.  
 
Low-Level Product Construal:  
The low-level (i.e. concrete) construal of the target laptop was measured with the item 
“In coming up with the price range (i.e. the maximum and minimum prices), I also 
emphasized on the benefit of each individual feature in the HP Artist.” on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.  
 
It is important to note that we did not interpret the level of product construal on a bipolar 
scale. We believe that there is a distinct possibility that high-level product construal and 
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low-level product construal are not necessarily polar opposites. As such, we leave open 
the possibility that consumers may construe a single product simultaneously at a high 
and at a low level. This may hold true, especially for product experts.  
 
Appendix B presents the instrument used in this study. 
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CHAPTER 9  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
9.1 Manipulation Checks  
Manipulation Checks  
We executed a two-factor ANOVA on the Regulatory-Focus Manipulation Check 
Measure, where regulatory focus and information condition were the two factors. The 
main effect of regulatory focus marginally significant (M’s 13.2 Vs. 12.09; F=4.78; 
p<0.05). Based on this, we infer that the regulatory focus manipulation has worked.  
 
Next, we executed a two-factor ANOVA on the information-condition manipulation check 
measure. As expected, the main effect of the information condition is significant (F=75.2; 
p<0.05). The mean values for perceived diagnosticity under the conditions of favorable-
only information, unfavorable-only information condition, both favorable and unfavorable 
information condition, and absence of information condition were 8.17, 8.06, 4.85 and 
0.016 respectively. This suggests that the 3 information conditions where extrinsic 
information was present did tend to utilize that  
 
Next, we discuss the results of the ANOVA analysis that we executed on the upper and 
lower limits of the acceptable price range, and on the acceptable price range. The 











































































































































































































9.2 Upper Limit of The Acceptable Price Range (Highest Acceptable Price)  
The main effects of regulatory focus and that of the information condition were not 
significant. Neither was the interaction effect significant. For promotion-oriented 
participants, none of the contrasts on the highest acceptable price, across the 4 
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information conditions, taken two at a time, were significant for the upper limit of the 
acceptable price range. Essentially, the highest acceptable price levels, for promotion-
oriented participants across the 4 information conditions, was essentially similar.  
 
For prevention-oriented participants, the upper price limit of the  acceptable price range 
for the condition where only favorable extrinsic information is present is significantly 
higher than that for the condition where extrinsic information was absent (M’s 957.61 
vs.793.76; F=4.21; p <0.05). Further, the upper price limit for the acceptable price range 
for the condition where both favorable and unfavorable extrinsic information is present is 
also significantly higher than that for the condition where extrinsic information was 
absent (M’s 958.05 vs. 793.76; F=3.91; p < 0.05). Other contrasts were not significant. 
These results for the upper limit of the acceptable price range suggest support for the 
“asymmetric-elaboration account, over the “regulatory-fit” account.  
 
9.3 Lower Limit of The Acceptable Price Range (Lowest Acceptable Price)  
The main effect of regulatory focus and information condition were not significant. 
Neither was the interaction effect significant. For both, promotion-oriented participants, 
none of the contrasts across the 4 information conditions, taken two at once, were 
significant even for the lower limit of the acceptable price range. Essentially, the lowest 
acceptable price, for promotion and prevention-oriented participants across the 4 
information conditions, was essentially similar.  
 
The lowest acceptable price across all the 8 cell conditions was clearly much above $0 
and hence it may be assumed that our procedure was successful at eliciting a 
meaningful lower limit for the acceptable price range.   
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9.4 Width of Acceptable Price Range  
The main effect of regulatory focus was significant (F=4.72; p <0.05). The main effect of 
information condition was not significant. Neither was the interaction effect significant. 
For promotion-oriented participants, none of the contrasts across the 4 information 
conditions, taken two at once, were significant for the acceptable price range. 
Essentially, the acceptable price range, for promotion-oriented participants, across the 4 
information conditions, was essentially similar.  
 
As suggested earlier, the primary focus of this research is to understand the difference in 
means for the dependent variable for the condition where extrinsic information is absent 
and the means for the other information conditions. In this context, for prevention-
oriented participants, the mean value of the acceptable price range width for the 
condition where extrinsic information is absent is not significantly different from the mean 
value for any of the other 3 information conditions.  
 
The other contrasts between mean values for acceptable price range are less relevant. 
Nevertheless, we find that for prevention-oriented consumers, mean value of the 
acceptable price range when only unfavorable information is present is significantly 
smaller than in the condition when both favorable and unfavorable information are 
present (M’s 305.83 Vs. 435.83; F=3.2; p<0.05). Further, we find that the mean value of 
the acceptable price range when only unfavorable information is present is marginally 
smaller than in the condition when only favorable information is present (M’s 305.83 Vs. 
421.19, F= 3.61; p=0.06).  
 
Finally, making the naive assumption that the average of the upper and lower limit of the 
acceptable price range resembles the single-point reference price, we find interesting 
78 
implications. The averages of the upper and lower limit, for promotion-oriented 
participants across the 4 information conditions, were not statistically significant from 
one another. For prevention-oriented participants, the average for the condition where 
only favorable extrinsic information is present is significantly higher than that for the 
condition where extrinsic information was absent (M’s 747.02 vs. 611.16; F=4.29; p 
<0.05). Further, the average for the condition where both favorable and unfavorable 
extrinsic information is present is marginally higher than that for the condition where 
extrinsic information was absent (M’s 740.13 vs. 611.16; F=3.58; p =0.06). Other 
contrasts were not significant. Hence, the results for the average value of the price 
follows a trend similar to the one noted for the upper limit of the acceptable price range. 
 
 
9.5 Decision Ease  
The main effect of regulatory focus is significant. Participants under promotion-
orientation did indeed find the task of specifying the acceptable price range to be easier 
than did participants under prevention-orientation (M’s 10.23 vs. 9.50; F=64.17; p <0.05). 
Other effects were not significant. Promotion-oriented participants did experience higher 
ease in specifying the acceptable price range to be easier than that experienced by 
prevention oriented people.  
 
Overall, our results suggest that for promotion oriented consumers, the mean values for 
all the three key dependent variables (namely, highest acceptable price, lowest 
acceptable price and the acceptable price range) do not vary when different 
combinations of extrinsic information on the product are present, in comparison when 
such information is absent. Further, none of the contrasts of means across the 4 
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information conditions for any of the 3 dependent variables was significant for promotion 
oriented consumers.  
 
In contrast, in the context of the primary focus of this research, we find that for 
prevention-oriented participants, the mean values of the highest acceptable price varies 
systematically across the other 3 conditions, where extrinsic information on the product 
is present, in comparison to when such information is absent. Hence, our results display 
clear support for hypothesis H1alternate over that for hypothesis H1, in the contexts of the 
highest acceptable price.  
 
Additionally, the changes in the levels of uncertainty in the quality of the product caused 
by the presence of different types of extrinsic information on the product, was diagnostic 
only in the context of the highest acceptable price of prevention-oriented. Hence their 
highest acceptable price varied systematically across the 4 information conditions. In 
contrast, the changes in the levels of uncertainty caused by the presence of different 
types of information were not diagnostic in the context of the lowest acceptable price of 
prevention-oriented participants. Hence, their lowest did not vary systematically across 
the 4 information conditions. Given these results a reasonable guess would have been 
that the range width too would have varied systematically in following the same trend as 
the highest acceptable price. However, our range width contrast results don’t lend 
support for this notion.  
 
A study of the significance of contrasts of the mean values of the highest acceptable 
price across information conditions for prevention-oriented participants can provide us 
some interesting implications. We find that for prevention-oriented consumers, the mean 
for the highest acceptable price when no information is present is not significantly 
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different from the mean for the condition when only unfavorable condition is present. 
Additionally, the mean for the highest acceptable price when no extrinsic information is 
present is significantly lower than those in the conditions when only favorable 
information is present and when both favorable and unfavorable information are present. 
Hence, for prevention-oriented participants, it seems that not being exposed to any 
extrinsic information on the product is essentially the same as being exposed ton only 
unfavorable extrinsic information on the product, in the context of their influence on their 
highest acceptable price. Further, for prevention people, it seems that only the presence 
of favorable information, irrespective of the presence or absence of concurrent 
unfavorable information, holds the capability of pushing the highest acceptable price 
upwards in comparison to when information on the product is absent. Overall, for 
prevention-oriented participants, the presence of favorable information seems to trump 
the presence of unfavorable information. For prevention-oriented participants, the mean 
of the highest acceptable price in the presence of both favorable and unfavorable 
information is statistically not different from the mean of the highest acceptable price in 
the presence of only favorable information.  
 
The managerial implication of this finding should be clear. The absence of any extrinsic 
information on the product has the same influence as the presence of unfavorable 
extrinsic information on the product, on prevention-oriented consumers’ highest 
acceptable price. Further, for prevention-oriented consumers, the presence of both 
favorable and unfavorable extrinsic information on the product has the same influence 
as does the presence of only favorable extrinsic information on the product. Favorable 
information can raise prevention-oriented consumers’ highest acceptable price by itself, 
and even in the presence of unfavorable extrinsic information. Given this, we can draw 
the general implication that managers need to ensure that when it comes to prevention-
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oriented consumers, the shopping environment for a specific product has to present 
favorable information on that product.  
 
In the context of the lower price limit of prevention-oriented participants, our results 
suggest that 2 of 3 contrasts between the means of the lower price limit for the control 
condition and the 3 information conditions are marginally significant. Given that these 
contrasts for the lower price limit are not statistically significant, we do not bestow much 
weight to that result. Further, none of these 3 contrasts for the lower price limit are even 
marginally significant in study 2 data.  
 
In the context of the width of acceptable prices of prevention-oriented consumers, we 
find that certain contrasts are indeed significant. However, from the perspective of the 
primary focus of this research, we do not find systematic differences for prevention-
oriented consumers’ width of the range of acceptable prices. Essentially, their range 
widths do not vary systematically across the 3 information-availability conditions in 
comparison to the control condition where information was absent.  
 
9.6 Results – Model A, B and C  
The results of Models A, B and C are presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8 respectively. We 
identified all the models based on the measures that have been laid out in the measures 
section. For regulatory focus level and perceived diagnosticity of consensus information 
measures, we used the manipulation check measures laid out for the regulatory focus 
and consensus-information conditions.  
 
82 
9.6.1 Model A Results  
Model A results appear in Table 3. The results showed that for promotion-oriented 
consumers, per expectations, decision ease, purchase commitment level and the high-
level of product construal were all significant predictors of the range of acceptable price. 
In line with expectations, perceived diagnosticity of consensus information was not a 
significant predictor of price range for promotion-oriented participants.  
 
For prevention-oriented consumers, per expectations, regulatory focus level, decision 
ease and perceived diagnosticity of the consensus information are significant predictors 
of the price range. However, counter to expectations, low-level construal of the product 
and purchase commitment were not significant predictors of the price range for 
prevention-oriented consumers. Additionally, the interaction effect between decision 
ease and perceived diagnosticity of consensus information was a significant predictor of 














Model A Results 
 







Intercept 327.1 931.67 * 
Regulatory Focus Level 16.65 -55.52 * 
Decision Ease -41.17 * -98.65 * 
Purchase Commitment 28.33 * 14.62 
Low Level Construal -3.25 0.7 
High Level Construal 43.31 * 2.27 
Consensus Information Diagnosticity 10.77 -131.9 * 
Regulatory Focus Level * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
1.87 15.35 * 
Decision Ease * Consensus Information 
Diagnosticity 
3.92 15.03 * 
Purchase Commitment * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
-2.61 -2.51 
Low Level Construal * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
-5.8 4.26 
High Level Construal * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
3.71 .03 
Sample Size 117 112 
Log Likelihood -719.02 -754.35 
AIC 12.54 13.73 




9.6.2 Model B Results  
Model B results appear in Table 4. In line with expectations, for promotion-oriented 
participants, decision ease, purchase commitment, high-level construal of the product 
and the lower limit of the price range are significant predictors of the upper limit of the 
price range. Also, in line with expectations, the perceived diagnosticity of consensus 
information is not a significant predictor of the upper limit for promotion-oriented 
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participants. Additionally, the interaction between decision ease and perceived 
diagnosticity of consensus information, and the interaction between lower limit of price 
range and perceived diagnosticity of consensus information were significant predictors of 
the upper limit.  
 
Table 4 
Model B Results 
 
 
Model B: Dependent Variable: Upper Limit of Acceptable Price Range 
(The upper limit is assumed to be censored above $1100 and below $650. $1100 and 
$650 are the extremities for the middle 90% of the distribution of specified lower limit.) 
 












Intercept 8.9 * 8.86 * 
Regulatory Focus Level 0.03 -0.44 * 
Decision Ease -0.62 * -0.4 * 
Purchase Commitment 0.157 * 0.12 
Low Level Construal -0.2 0.34 * 
High Level Construal 0.41 * 0.07 
Lower Limit 0.66 * 0.08 
Consensus Information Diagnosticity -0.61 -0.88 * 
Regulatory Focus Level * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
0.017 0.147 * 
Decision Ease * Consensus Information 
Diagnosticity 
0.096 * 0.055 
Purchase Commitment * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
0.000 -0.01 
Low Level Construal * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
-0.06 -0.02 
High Level Construal * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
0.045 (p = 0.09) -0.01 
Lower Limit  * Consensus Information 
Diagnosticity 
-0.09 * 0.05 * 
Sample Size 117 112 
Log Likelihood -198.46 -228.33 
AIC 3.76 4.39 
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Most all predictors were measured on a 1 to 7 scale, while upper and lower limits were in 
100’s.  Hence, to avoid problems in model identification due to difference in scales 
between different predictors and dependent variable, the upper and lower limits of price 
range were recoded by dividing them by 100 for models B, C, E and F.  For example, a 
price of $700 was recoded as $7. Models B, C, E and F were identified using the 
recoded upper and lower price limits. 
 
For prevention-oriented participants, in line with expectations, the level of regulatory 
focus, decision ease, purchase commitment, low-level construal of the product and the 
diagnosticity of the consensus information are significant predictors of the upper limit of 
the price range. Additionally, the interaction effect between regulatory focus level and 
perceived diagnosticity of consensus information and the interaction between the lower 
price limit and perceived diagnosticity of consensus information were significant 
predictors of the upper limit of the price range. 
 
9.6.3 Model C Results  
Model C results appear in Table 5. For promotion-oriented participants, only the upper 
limit of the price range was a significant predictor of the lower limit of the price range. 
Additionally, the interaction between the upper price limit and the perceived diagnosticity 
of consensus information was a marginally significant predictor of the lower price limit. 
However, counter to our expectations, decision ease, purchase commitment and the 
high-level construal of the product were not significant predictors of the lower limit of the 





   
 
Table 5 
Model C Results 
 
Model C: Dependent Variable: Lower Limit of Acceptable Price Range 
(The lower limit is assumed to be censored above $700 and below $100. $700 and $100 
are the extremities for the middle 90% of the distribution of specified lower limit.) 








Intercept 0.56 -5.69 * 
Regulatory Focus Level 0.08 -0.53 * 
Decision Ease 0.55 (p = 0.06) -0.22 
Purchase Commitment -0.42 -0.19 
Low Level Construal 0.12 0.54 * 
High Level Construal -0.17 0.133 
Upper Limit 0.79 * 0.68 
Consensus Information Diagnosticity -0.2 1.5 * 
Regulatory Focus Level * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
-0.067 -0.137 * 
Decision Ease * Consensus Information 
Diagnosticity 
-0.096 -0.001 
Purchase Commitment * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
0.069 0.08 * 
Low Level Construal * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
-0.02 -0.197 * 
High Level Construal * Consensus 
Information Diagnosticity 
0.09 -0.06 
Upper Limit  * Consensus Information 
Diagnosticity 
-0.09  (p=0.09) -0.06 (p =0.06) 
Sample Size 117 112 
Log Likelihood -225.8 -207.32 
AIC 4.15 4.00 






For prevention-oriented participants, in line with expectations, the level of regulatory 
focus, low-level construal of the product and the perceived diagnosticity of the 
consensus information are significant predictors of the upper limit of the price range. 
However, counter to expectations, decision ease and purchase commitment did not 
significantly predict the lower limit of the price range. This may, however, be mitigated by 
the observation that the interaction between purchase commitment and perceived 
diagnosticity of consensus information was a significant predictor of the lower limit. 
Further, the interaction between regulatory focus and perceived diagnosticity of 
consensus information and that between low-level construal and perceived diagnosticity 
of consensus information were significant predictors of the lower limit of price range. 
Additionally, the interaction between the upper price limit and perceived diagnosticity of 
consensus information is a marginally-significant predictor of the lower limit of price 
range.  
 
9.7 Discussion – Models A, B and C  
The models A, B and C, which were aimed at generalizing the results to consumers 
within each of the two regulatory foci (but, irrespective of information condition that they 
are in), provide interesting findings. Overall, we find that these results generally support 
our expectations. We note some important implications though. Decision ease influences 
the acceptable price range for both the regulatory foci. However, our results show that 
decision ease significantly influences only the upper price limit and not and lower limit, 
for both the regulatory foci.  
 
Additionally, we find that purchase commitment is a significant predictor of the price 
range and the upper and lower limits, but mainly for promotion-oriented consumers. It 
seems that prevention-oriented consumers tend to specify acceptable price levels 
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independently of their levels purchase commitment. However, we do note that purchase 
commitment’s interaction with perceived diagnosticity of consensus information is a 
significant predictor of the lower price limit for prevention-oriented consumers. Other 
than that, we could not find any other evidence to suggest that purchase commitment 
has any influence on prevention-oriented consumers’ price range.  
 
The results generally support the notion that high-level construal of the product is an 
important determinant of the acceptable price range and its limits for promotion-oriented 
consumers. In contrast, the low-level construal of the product is an important 
determinant of the limits of the acceptable price range for prevention-oriented 
consumers. Further, it is important to note that as expected regulatory focus level, was 
not a predictor of the price range and of upper and lower limit, for promotion-oriented 
consumers.  
 
The managerial implication of this finding on product construal should be clear. As an 
example, if it is known that a particular product is specifically targeted at a segment of 
consumers that can are promotion-oriented or are situationally primed to get promotion-
oriented, then managers should highlight the high-level versatility and 
comprehensiveness of the product, in order to induce the customer to pay the highest 
amount possible. For example, it is known that trucks, manufactured by US auto firms, 
such as Ford etc. are typically purchased by people who live in the US and hence have 
a strong independent self construal. Such independent people tend to be 
overwhelmingly promotion-oriented (Aaker, Lee and Gardner 2001). Hence, Ford has to 
design advertising that induces such people to construe the product at a high level and 
also highlight the high-level aspects of the comprehensive vehicle, in order to raise their 
upper price limit. This may be possible by highlighting the overall effectiveness of Ford 
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trucks in their advertising, rather than providing a litany of individual features as is done 
in some of their advertising.  
 
Further, these results seem to suggest that the upper and lower limits of the acceptable 
price range are complements to each other and they mutually influence each other, 
either directly or through an interaction with the consensus-information condition. They 
influence each other positively, however, in interactions with consensus-information 
condition, they may even influence each other negatively.  
 
Finally and importantly, in line with Hypothesis H1alternate, we find that consensus-
information condition has a direct effect on the price range and upper and lower limits 
only for prevention-oriented and not for promotion-oriented consumers. These results 
are in line with the results of the ANOVA analyses. However, going beyond what the 
ANOVA analyses, the random-parameter regression analyses show that information 
conditions have the potential to interact with other variables and significantly influence 
price range and the upper and lower price limits for both promotion and prevention-
oriented consumers.  
 
 
9.8 Results – Models D, E and F 
The results of Models D, E and F are presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8 respectively.  
 
9.8.1 Model D Results  
For the entire sample, decision ease, purchase commitment and high level construal of 
the product were significant predictors of the price range. The 3-way interaction between 
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decision-ease, regulatory focus level and consensus information diagnosticity was also a 






Model D Results 
 
Model D: Dependent Variable: Price Range 
Predictor Coefficient 
Intercept 533.73 * 
Decision Ease -73.34 * 
Purchase Commitment 7.72 * 
Low Level Construal 5.7 
High Level Construal 5.16 * 
(Regulatory Focus * Consensus Diagnosticity) -3.36 
Decision Ease * (Regulatory Focus * Consensus 
Diagnosticity) 
1.91 * 
Purchase Commitment * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
0.31 
Low Level Construal * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
-0.3 
High Level Construal * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
-1.2 (p=0.6) 
Sample Size 229 
Log Likelihood -468.65 
AIC 4.26 
* indicates p-value of 0.05 or lower 
 
 
9.8.2 Model E Results  
For the entire sample, per expectations, decision ease, low-level construal of the 
product, and the lower limit of the acceptable price limit were significant predictors of the 
upper limit of the acceptable price range. Additionally, the 3-way interaction between 
purchase commitment, regulatory focus level and consensus information dignosticity 
was significant predictors of the upper limit. Finally, the 3-way interaction between high-
level product construal, regulatory focus level and consensus information dignosticity 




Model E Results 
 
Model E: Dependent Variable: Upper Limit of Acceptable Price Range  
(The upper limit is assumed to be censored above $1100 and below $650. $1100 and 
$650 are the extremities for the middle 90% of the distribution of specified upper limit.) 
Predictor Coefficient 
Intercept 6.66 * 
Decision Ease -0.38 * 
Purchase Commitment 0.034 
Low Level Construal 0.22 * 
High Level Construal 0.154 
Lower Limit 0.269 * 
(Regulatory Focus * Consensus Diagnosticity) -0.009 
Decision Ease * (Regulatory Focus * Consensus 
Diagnosticity) 
0.008 * 
Purchase Commitment * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
0.004 * 
Low Level Construal * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
-0.0052 
High Level Construal * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
0.0123 * 
Lower Limit  * (Regulatory Focus * Consensus 
Diagnosticity) 
0.0013 
Sample Size 229 
Log Likelihood -452.68 
AIC 4.11 
* indicates p-value of 0.05 or lower 
 
 
9.8.3 Model F Results  
For the entire sample, per expectations, decision ease, low-level construal of the 
product, and the upper limit of the acceptable price limit were significant predictors of the 
lower limit of the acceptable price range. Additionally, the 3-way interaction between 
lower limit, regulatory focus level and consensus information dignosticity was significant 
predictor of the upper limit.  
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Table 8 
Model F Results 
 
Model F: Dependent Variable: Lower Limit of Acceptable Price Range  
(The lower limit is assumed to be censored above $700 and below $100. $700 and $100 
are the extremities for the middle 90% of the distribution of specified lower limit.) 
Predictor Coefficient 
Intercept -2.99  (p = 0.1) 
Decision Ease -0.55 * 
Purchase Commitment -0.105 
Low Level Construal 0.097 * 
High Level Construal 0.03 
Upper Limit 0.76 * 
(Regulatory Focus * Consensus Diagnosticity) 0.101 
Decision Ease * (Regulatory Focus * Consensus 
Diagnosticity) 
-0.013 (p = 0.09) 
Purchase Commitment * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
0.002 
Low Level Construal * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
-0.001 
High Level Construal * (Regulatory Focus * 
Consensus Diagnosticity) 
0.007 
Upper Limit  * (Regulatory Focus * Consensus 
Diagnosticity) 
0.011 * 
Sample Size 229 
Log Likelihood -468.65 
AIC 4.25 





9.9 Discussion – Models D, E and F 
The models D, E and F, which were aimed at generalizing the results to the consumer in 
general (irrespective of their regulatory focus and the information that is available to 
them), provide some unique inputs. An important finding is that the price range is 
influenced by the level of ease experienced in specifying the price limits and by the high-
level construal of the product. Additionally, both the limits of the price range are 
influenced by the low level construal of the product and by the level of ease experienced 
by the consumer. Finally, just as in the case with models A, B and C, we again find that 
the two limits of the price range mutually influence each other.  
 
There is plenty of evidence in prior literature that the level of purchase commitment and 
likelihood affects willingness to pay. Hence, our finding that purchase commitment 
influences consumers’ price range is not surprising and is not unexpected. We believe, 
however, that this research is the first in outlining other new and unique insights to 
pricing literature. Based on our literature review, we speculated that individual 
differences may exist in the level of difficulty experienced by consumers in specifying 
their price range and willingness-to-pay. The results of models D and E provide general 
support to this conjecture.   
 
Finally, this research is also unique in pointing out that the two end limits of consumers’ 
acceptable price range influence each other. This finding suggests that consciously or 
subconsciously, consumers seem to be aware of what their lowest acceptable price is, 
when specifying their highest acceptable price, and vice versa.  
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CHAPTER 10  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we attempt to understand the influence of regulatory focus and availability 
of external information in the environment, on consumers’ acceptable price range. Our 
literature review indicates divergent hypotheses. Certain evidence in literature in 
regulatory focus theory points to the regulatory-fit account. If this holds, then both 
promotion and prevention-oriented consumers should find relevant aspects of external 
information, which helps them achieve a regulatory-fit, to be diagnostic in specifying their 
acceptable prices. In contrast, other evidence in extant regulatory focus theory literature 
points to the asymmetric-elaboration account. If this holds then only prevention-oriented 
consumers should find all external information diagnostic in specifying their price 
acceptance, while promotion-oriented consumers should disregard external information. 
Our results suggest support for the asymmetric-elaboration account. 
 
Further, we review literature that indicates that the same product can be construed at 
different levels under the influence of different regulatory foci. We conjecture that these 
differences in product construal may be influencing price acceptance. Our results show 
that for promotion oriented consumers, only high-level construal of the product 
influences the acceptable price range and its limits. Conversely, we find that for 
prevention-oriented consumers, only their low-level construal of the product influences 
the acceptable price range and its limits. 
 
In this research, we reviewed findings in regulatory-focus theory that pointed to divergent 
hypotheses. Beyond focus of the current research on diagnosticity of information, we 
also find other evidence of seemingly-contradictory findings in regulatory-focus research. 
For example, Chernev (2004 A) proposes that prevention-oriented consumers are more 
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likely to opt for the default option and retaining status quo, than are promotion-oriented 
consumers. Yet, Louro, Pieters & Zeelenberg (2005) find that despite their higher levels 
of satisfaction with their current suppliers, prevention-oriented consumers are less likely, 
than are promotion-oriented consumers, to shop from the same supplier. Normatively 
speaking, we argue that shopping from the current supplier would have been the status 
quo, especially when if prior experiences with that supplier have been highly satisfactory. 
Given this, it should have been prevention-oriented consumers who retain the current 
supplier that they are satisfied with. As such, Louro et al. findings are not exactly in line 
with those made by Chernev’s (2004 A).  
 
Similarly, Mourali, Bockenholt and Laroche (2007) argue that promotion (prevention) 
oriented consumers are more (less) likely to be sensitive to the presence of a dominant 
brand in their consideration set. As such Mourali et al. argue that promotion (prevention)-
oriented consumers will likely (not)  choose the dominant brand, given that promotion-
oriented (prevention-oriented) consumers tend to (tend not to) undertake heuristic 
processing. Again, we consider this proposition to be in disagreement with normative 
expectations in regulatory focus theory. Normatively speaking, we argue that a dominant 
brand, given that it is well established should be perceived to be less risky and viewed 
as the default option. Hence, prevention-oriented consumers should actually opt for the 
dominant brand, over the non-dominant brand, if Chernev’s proposition holds. 
 
Further, Wang and Lee (2006), propose that consumers should actively seek only that 
information which helps them achieve regulatory fit, provided their levels of motivation is 
low. Given this, perhaps, an explanation for the lack of support for the regulatory-fit 
account in our study may lie in the unexpected outcome that the participants in our study 
had higher levels of motivation, despite that we did not manipulate motivation or 
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involvement. However, Wang and Lee also propose that under higher levels of 
motivation, consumers should find substantive information diagnostic, irrespective of 
their regulatory focus. However, our results are not in line with this either. Our results 
suggest that only prevention-oriented consumers found the external consensus 
information to be diagnostic, while promotion-oriented consumers disregarded it, when it 
came to specifying their acceptable price range.  
 
Additionally, Monga and Zhu’s (2005) findings are in contrast to those by Wang and 
Lee’s. Monga and Zhu find that consumers accomplish regulatory-fit only if their level of 
motivation is high, but not when their level of motivation is low. However, these 
diametrically contrasting findings by Monga and Zhu too can be explained on the basis 
of the fact that in Monga and Zhu’s case, regulatory focus was situationally-aroused, 
while Wang and Lee had primed regulatory focus. Additionally, Monga and Zhu’s studies 
included framing manipulations which could have had their own influence, while Wang 
and Lee’s studies did not include framing manipulation.  
 
An alternative explanation may be able to reconcile the differences in the propositions 
made by Monga and Zhu (2005) and Wang and Lee (2004). Perhaps, an inverted-U 
relationship may exist between the level of motivation and regulatory-fit. What Wang and 
Lee (2005) refer to as low and high levels of motivation may actually be low and 
moderate levels of motivation. Additionally, what Monga and Zhu refer to low and high 
levels of motivation may actually be moderate and high levels of motivation. As such, 
this reconciliation purports that regulatory fit is experienced under low and high levels of 
motivation, but not under moderate levels of motivation.  
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This discussion suggests that further research is needed in regulatory focus in order to 
produce empirical generalizations. Our take is that current research in regulatory focus 
seems to be producing exciting findings, but which are manipulation, situation or 
circumstance specific.  
 
Pham and Higgins’ (2004) discussion of Zhou’s (2002) work may be relevant in this 
case. Pham and Higgins refer to prior work by Zhou (2002) who studied how 
participants’ regulatory focus influenced their choices in the presence of tricky choices. 
In his studies, Zhou offered his participants choices such that the less risky option was 
not clearly the one that offered a clear-cut opportunity to prevent losses. Such choices 
could be tricky and difficult for prevention-oriented participants to appreciate. Such tricky 
choices may potentially lead to unexpected results. Zhou’s manipulations also lay out 
similar tricky options where the riskier option is not the one that helps them achieve high 
gains. Again, such options can be potentially difficult for promotion-oriented consumers 
to interpret and hence can lead to unexpected outcomes. Our take is that Pham and 
Higgins propose that researchers need to lay out a detailed analysis on how their 
participants will interpret such cues and then make propositions.  
 
As laid out by Pham and Higgins, we made an effort to anticipate the reason for 
differential diagnosticity of consensus information as was predicted in the asymmetric 
elaboration account. We therefore added the decision ease measures in our 
questionnaire to confirm if indeed the participants in the two distinct regulatory foci 
indeed experienced different levels of difficulty in specifying their acceptable price range.  
 
Further, the random-parameters models that we implemented also provide important 
implications. As discussed earlier, the level of product construal was found to be an 
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important predictor of the acceptable price range and its limits. In that regard, the results 
of our random-parameter models are in line with those outlined by Keller et al., who 
propose that consumers develop more favorable attitudes towards the stimulus, when 
the stimulus is described at a level that fits the consumers’ regulatory focus. Our results 
suggest that for promotion (prevention) oriented consumers, high (low) level construal of 
the product that significantly predicts these dependent measures. What was different 
about our study was that, participants were not provided any specific level of product 
construal, as was the case with Keller et al’s manipulations. Our participants were free to 
construe the product at the level that they felt was appropriate. In fact, our study enabled 
participants to specify their intensity for both high and low level product construals. Yet, 
our participants chose to dwell on the construal level that fit their regulatory focus. 
Hence, our findings are an extension of those forwarded by Keller et al.  
 
Secondly, the results of the random-parameters model suggest that the level of product 
construal may just be as relevant a predictor of acceptable price range and its limits, as 
is the level of purchase commitment. Our results suggest that product construal level 
was significant in the predicting these dependent measures, in the presence of purchase 
commitment. Given that much research already exists on the relationship between 
purchase commitment and price acceptance, we exhort future research to delve into the 
relationship between product construal level and price acceptance.  
 
Finally, the results of random-parameters models suggest that in the general population 
of consumers, lower limit and upper limit of price acceptance have a mostly positive-
direct relationship with each other. This may present another important managerial 
implication. If a product manager intends to renders strategic moves to push her 
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product’s upper acceptable price limit upwards, it may be important for her to ensure that 
the product’s lower price limit is pushed upwards as well.  
 
10.1 Additional Managerial Implications  
Consumers exposed to advertising messages that highlight independent 
(interdependent) selves are likely to harbor promotion (prevention) tendencies (Hamilton 
and Biehal 2005). Hence, given the findings of our paper, we argue that advertising 
messages that induce promotion tendencies through inducing independent self may not 
be effective in shaping such consumers’ acceptable price range, if such ads highlight 
substantive information such as consensus information as a means of persuasion. Pham 
and Avnet (2004) propose that promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers find affective 
association with (substantive information about) the stimulus more appealing. Based on 
this, one may argue that promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers should have a 
higher willingness to pay for products high on aesthetics and affect (utilitarian aspects), 
thus even pushing the upper limit of the price range upwards. Hence, in lines with Pham 
and Avnet (2004), such advertising may be more effective at influencing the acceptable 
price range if it includes attractive visual imagery. In contrast, we argue that advertising 
messages that induce prevention tendencies may be effective in shaping such 
consumers’ acceptable price range, if such ads have substantive information such as 
consensus information as a means of persuasion. 
 
Further, our finding that the level of construal of the product impacts price range and 
limits, too has important implications. High-level construal of the product is an important 
determinant of the acceptable price range and its limits for promotion-oriented 
consumers. In contrast, the low-level construal of the product is an important 
determinant of the acceptable price range and its limits for prevention-oriented 
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consumers. Given this, managers will be wise if they cater their advertising messages in 
line with this paradigm. We thus argue that advertising messages that induce promotion 
tendencies may be more likely to influence consumers’ acceptable price range if they 
also highlight the product’s overall abilities rather than highlighting its nitty-gritty features. 
In contrast, advertising messages that induce prevention tendencies may be more likely 
to influence consumers’ acceptable price range if they highlight the product’s feature 
detail rather than its overall capabilities. For instance, insurance advertisements may 
situationally induce prevention concerns in the consumers. Such an advertisement may 
be more effective at increasing upper price limit, if it also highlights key individual 
features of the insurance policy, rather than highlighting the overall summary of the 
insurance policy.  
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PART TWO  
 
HOW CONSUMER CHOICES DIFFER OVER A SERIES OF GAINS OR LOSSES: A 




CHAPTER 11  
 
INTRODUCTION TO PART 2 
 
Prior research in regulatory focus theory delves mainly on behavioral differences in one-
time gain versus one-time loss situations.  Lee and Aaker (2004), for instance, propose 
that people in promotion (prevention) mode, perceive themselves to be less (more) 
susceptible to negative outcomes, and more (less) susceptible to positive outcomes, and 
hence find positively-framed (negatively-framed) messages to be more persuasive. An 
important aspect of such framing is that the initial starting anchors do not vary across the 
frames. On similar lines, Idson, Liberman and Higgins (2000) propose that the pleasure 
from achieving a maximal goal (the standard that one wants to achieve) will be 
experienced more intensely by promotion oriented participants, versus prevention 
oriented participants. Likewise, they find that the pain from the failure to achieve the 
minimal goal is felt more intensely by prevention oriented participants versus promotion 
oriented people. However, such instances of distinction between persuasive powers of 
differential framing have invariably been studied in instances where only one-time losses 
or gains are involved. In contrast, the current research focuses on how regulatory-focus 
differences lead to disparity in choices that involve a series of losses or gains.  
 
Extant research proposes that differences in regulatory foci, should lead to differences in 
consumers’ value function. Based on differences in shapes of their value curve, we 
propose that people, under distinct regulatory foci, will display systematic differences, in 
their likelihood of integrating multiple gains versus segregating multiple gains. We then 
delve into the main focus of this paper – how differences in the shape of the value 
functions due to differences in regulatory focus, interact with option framing. In the 
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additive (subtractive) option frame, consumers are presented with a base (fully-loaded) 
model and are asked to add (delete) options that they want (don’t want). Option framing 
literature proposes that consumers should choose higher number of (fewer) options 
when the product is presented in the subtractive (additive) frame. An important 
distinction of this paradigm, in the context of option frames, is that option framing leads 
consumers to have varied initial anchoring points. In additive (subtractive) frame, 
consumers are presumed to anchor at the options present in fully-loaded (base) model.  
 
We find that prior research has separately probed the individual influence of option 
framing (Park, Jun and MacInnis 2000) and of regulatory focus (Lee and Aaker 2004) on 
consumer choice and persuasion. However, a study dedicated to understanding the 
influence of the interaction between these two, is lacking. The current research attempts 
to fill this void. Our research goes beyond Park et al.’s seminal work on the effect of 
regret manipulation and option frame interaction, mainly on the number of options 
chosen. While Park et al. chiefly focus on the main effects of option framing, we firstly 
study the effect of the interaction between regulatory focus and option frame on 
additional dependent variables such as the amount of time taken and decision difficulty 
etc. Secondly, we study the effect of the other covariates, such as task enjoyment, value 
perceived in options chosen and purchase commitment on the amount of time taken to 
make the decision and on the number of options chosen, in the presence of option 
framing and regulatory focus. Thirdly, in addition to a linear ANCOVA model, we also 
model a non-linear two-step model of the influence of the endogenous covariate, time 
taken to make the decision, and other covariates, such as value perceived in options 
chosen, task enjoyment and purchase commitment, on the number of options chosen. 
Finally, we demonstrate that the value perceived in the options chosen, mediates the 
relationship between regulatory focus and purchase commitment.  
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This paper is laid out as follows. At first, we review literature on regulatory focus and 
how people’s regulatory focus and differences in goal orientation can lead people to 
perceive the same outcome differently. We then present a framework on how the 
suggested differences in the shapes of the value functions lead consumers to display 
different likelihoods of integrating (segregating) losses (gains).  Further, we review 
literature on framing in general, and more specifically on options framing. We focus the 
rest of the paper on one specific illustration of this phenomenon, namely, the interaction 
between regulatory focus and option framing. We present several hypotheses on the 
influence of this interaction on key dependent variables. Additionally, we present a two-
step estimation model on the influence of time taken to make the decision, and other key 
predictors, on the number of options chosen. We utilize this estimator in improving the 
estimates of our ANCOVA analyses. Finally, we detail the results of two studies that we 
undertake to find support for the hypotheses. We end with managerial implications of the 





LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES  
 
 
12.1 Regulatory Focus Theory  
Research in regulatory focus effects has become influential in understanding how 
people’s goal motivation influences their strategy and choices. Regulatory focus theory 
(Higgins 2000) proposes that people have two broad strategies of cognition, namely, 
promotion focus and prevention focus. Extant research suggests that specific levels of 
regulatory foci can be chronically instilled (Lockwood, Jordan and Kunda 2002), or can 
be situationally primed (Zhou and Pham 2004). Promotion focus emphasizes eager 
pursuit of the desired state in order to reach the final goal, while prevention focus 
emphasizes vigilant avoidance of undesired states in reaching the final goal. Current 
research in Social Psychology (see Higgins 2006 for a review) and consumer research 
(Lee and Aaker 2004; Keller 2006 etc.) suggests that these two self-regulatory strategies 
of reaching the final goal instigate people to undertake distinct approaches in decision-
making.  
 
12.2 Goals as Reference Points  
Heath, Larrick and Wu (1999) argue that people’s goals serve to identify their reference 
points, and thereby help systematically alter the perceived value of outcomes. For 
instance, consider a person who sets a goal of achieving a score of 90 in a test, ends up 
scoring 87 points. In contrast, a second person, who sets a goal of achieving the highest 
possible score, ends up scoring 83. Note that the first person is in the loss domain of her 
value function, while the second person is in the gains domain of her value function. 
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Given this, the second person will experience a higher level of satisfaction, despite 
scoring lower than the first person. 
 
The evidence presented by Heath et al. suggests that the goal that an individual sets for 
herself identifies the reference point of her value function. If that individual’s actual score 
is below (above) her targeted score, she lies in the loss (gains) domain. By relying on 
prospect theory’s value function, we can gain insight into the level of (dis)satisfaction 
that this individual experiences, and how much marginal effort will she put in achieving 
her goal target. We will rely on this finding in the context of option framing, where being 
in the additive frame is expected to establish the options available in the base model as 
point of reference, while being in the subtractive frame is expected to establish the 
options available in the fully-loaded model as the point of reference. 
 
12.3 The Compounded-Differential-Utility Framework  
Chernev (2004) argues that promotion-oriented (prevention-oriented) people’s utility 
curve should have a steeper (gentler) slope on the gain side because they give higher 
(lower) weight to the gains involved, when evaluating a prospect. Conversely, 
prevention-oriented (promotion-oriented) people’s utility curve should have a steeper-
negative (gentler negative) slope on the losses side, given that they give higher (lower) 
weight to the losses involved, when evaluating a prospect. In other words, prevention-
oriented consumers should have a stronger focus on averting possible losses, in 
comparison to promotion-oriented consumers. Based on this, we infer that promotion 
(prevention)-oriented people, versus prevention (promotion)-oriented people, perceive 
relatively bigger increases (decreases) in utility in actions that are associated with 
positive (negative) outcomes.  
 
112 
Taking this further, we argue that whenever a problem-solving approach involves a 
series of steps involving varied levels of gains and losses, promotion-oriented and 
prevention-oriented people will perceive different levels of overall gains and losses. We 
refer to this structure as the Compounded-Differential-Utility framework. 
 
For instance, a promotion-oriented person will perceive the utility of a particular amount 
of gain (say, $100) to be more than that perceived by the prevention-oriented person. 
The prospect of going through this $100 gain twice, provides a total utility, which is 
perceived by the promotion-oriented person to be much larger, than that perceived by 
the prevention-oriented person. Hence, the difference between the total utilities 
perceived by the promotion-oriented person and prevention-oriented person is larger 
when both undergo a $100 gain twice than when they both undergo a $100 gain once.  
 
An important distinction is that the difference between the utilities due to a single-small 
gain or losses may not be significantly different for promotion and prevention-oriented 
consumers.  However, if this insignificant difference is repeated multiple times as 
happens in the case of a prospect that has multiple steps, this insignificant difference will 
implode and become perceptible. In other words, if both these persons undergo a series 
of similar gains, at some stage, we can infer that promotion-oriented people will perceive 
a significantly larger utility than will prevention-oriented people. The exact reverse 
prediction can be made in the case of a series of losses. Given this, we expect 
promotion (prevention)-oriented people, versus prevention (promotion)-oriented people, 




We argue that this aspect of differential levels of utility has important implications in 
consumer research. Specifically, we identify three areas where such effects provide 
important managerial implication, namely, integration versus segregation and multiple 
versus single-price change (Thaler 1985; Mazumdar and Jun 1993), and additive and 
subtractive options framing (Park, Jun and MacInnis 2000). In the following sections, we 
discuss each of these three areas of study. 
 
12.4 Integration versus Segregation – A Regulatory Focus Perspective  
Given Heath et al.’s assertion that goals help identify reference points, it is reasonable to 
suggest that differences in regulatory-foci goal orientations lead consumers to have 
distinct reference points, when under promotion focus versus under prevention focus. 
 
Thaler’s (1985) hedonic-editing hypothesis proposes that people tend to segregate gains 
and integrate losses. In other words, Thaler proposes that people experience higher 
utility when they gain $25 twice, versus winning $50 once. However, based on the 
compounded-differential-utility framework, we infer that promotion-oriented people, 
versus prevention -oriented people, will experience larger utility due to the two individual 
$25 gains. Hence, promotion-oriented people should experience higher utility in gaining 
$25 twice rather than winning $50 once, in comparison to that experienced by 
prevention-oriented people. Putting these together, we conclude that promotion-oriented 
people are more likely to adapt segregation of gains, when compared to prevention-
oriented people.  
 
Thaler’s hypothesis also suggests that people will experience a higher sense of loss and 
disutility, if they lose $25 twice, as compared to losing $50 once. Hence, using similar 
lines of argument as was done for the gains, we propose that prevention-oriented people 
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should experience higher disutility due to two individual $25 losses rather than losing 
$50 once, in comparison to that experienced by promotion-oriented people. Hence, we 
conclude that prevention-oriented people are more likely to adapt integration of losses, 
when compared to promotion-oriented people.  
 
Mazumdar and Jun (2003) extend Thaler’s (1985) hypothesis to the context of single 
versus multiple price increase and decreases. Mazumdar and Jun argue that multiple 
price increases (decreases) are seen as multiple losses (gains), and hence are 
repeatedly integrated (segregated). Consumers will generally respond more positively 
(negatively) if they see multiple price decreases (increases) in comparison to when they 
see a single price decrease (increase) of equal amount. Hence, multiple price increases 
are perceived as multiple losses, while multiple price decreases are perceived as 
multiple gains. Extending this multiple-gain multiple-loss paradigm to regulatory foci, we 
argue that the magnitude of total gains (due to multiple price drops) for promotion-
oriented consumers exceeds that for prevention-oriented consumers. Likewise, we 
expect the total magnitude of total losses (due to multiple price increases) for 
prevention-oriented consumers to exceed that for promotion-oriented consumers.   
 
Hence, we argue that a significantly larger proportion of promotion-oriented people, 
versus a proportion of prevention-oriented group of people, to have a favorable opinion 
on multiple price decreases. Said differently, we expect promotion-oriented people, 
versus prevention-oriented people, to have a more favorable attitude towards multiple 
price decreases. In contrast, we argue that a significantly larger proportion of prevention-
oriented people, versus a proportion of promotion-oriented group of people, to have an 
unfavorable opinion on multiple price increases. Likewise, we expect prevention-oriented 
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people, versus promotion-oriented people, to have a relatively less-favorable attitude 
towards multiple price increases.  
 
We thus propose the hypothesis: 
H1:When faced with multiple gains (losses) or increases in gains (losses), promotion 
(prevention)-oriented participants, versus prevention (promotion)-oriented people, will 
show higher likelihood to segregate (integrate) multiple gains (losses), in general and in 
specific situations such as multiple price increases or reductions. 
 
Next, we delve into the main focus of this paper – how differences in value functions due 
to differences in regulatory focus, interact with option framing. First, we identify what 
option framing denotes and what the main findings in this domain of research are. We 
then examine the influence of the interaction between regulatory focus and option 
framing, on consumer choice, and present hypotheses on key dependent variables. 
 
12.5 Option-Framing Becoming More Pervasive? 
We propose that with the proliferation of new distribution media and of new product trim 
lines, option framing may be becoming a more relevant concern now, than it was in the 
past. For example, car salespersons initiate customer interactions starting off either with 
a fully-loaded car model and enabling customers to strip down options, or with a base 
model and enabling customers to add options. Certain computer manufacturers’ 
websites (e.g. Dell, HP etc.) that enable buyers to customize the computer that they 
want to buy online, generally start with a base-model computer configuration and then 
append the price of each additional option that the customer adds to the base model.  
New home salespersons too start off by first discussing the price of a home with base-
level amenities, and then append the price of each extra amenity chosen, to the price of 
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the base model home. On the other hand, model homes that are on display generally 
are fully-loaded and are used to entice new-home buyers into buying a home with more 
amenities in them. Hence, we believe that option framing has become fairly ubiquitous, 
and hence it is important to understand that effects of option framing on consumer 
choices. 
The main focus of this research is studying the combined influence of option framing 
effects and regulatory focus on the number of options chosen and other key dependent 
measures. Do prevention-oriented consumers, who are presented a fully-loaded model 
(base model) and then asked to delete (add) options that they don’t want (want), select 
more (fewer) number of options than do promotion-oriented consumers in the same 
situations? If so, does one group take more time than the other, to arrive at their final 
choice decision? Do both these groups of consumers perceive the same amount of 
value in their final products? This research is aimed at answering such research 
questions. We start of by distinguishing option framing from other types of framing.  
 
12.5.1 Valence Framing Types  
Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) have classified framing effects as Risky Choice 
Framing, Attribute Framing and Goal Framing.  
 
Risky choice framing descends directly from Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). In Risky-Choice framing, researchers aim to study people’s choice between risky 
options (e.g. there is a particular level of probability that all will be saved, while a 
different level of probability that no one will be saved) versus a sure-thing option (e.g. a 
100% probability that specific proportion of people will be saved for sure) in positive 
frame. In the negative frame, researchers offer participants a choice between risky 
option (e.g. there is a particular level of probability that that no one will die, while a 
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different level of probability that all will die) versus a sure-thing option (e.g. a 100% 
change that a specific proportion of people will die for sure). The two choices in the 
positive frame and in the negative frame are mirror images of each other. A fundamental 
finding of Risky-Choice framing is that people tend to opt for the sure-thing option in the 
positive frame, but opt for the risky choice when presented in a negative frame.  
 
In studying attribute framing, researchers attempt to understand the differences in 
people’s evaluation of a product when it is presented in a positive frame (e.g. 75% lean) 
versus in a negative frame (e.g. 25% fatty). A fundamental finding of this type of framing 
has been that people tend to provide higher evaluations when the product is presented 
in the positive frame, versus in the negative frame.  
 
With Goal framing effects, researchers attempt to understand the level of persuasion 
that is triggered by a message in a positive frame (e.g. attain a gain; evade a loss) vis-à-
vis the level of persuasion that is triggered by a message in a negative frame (e.g. 
forego a gain; incur a loss). Again, the choices in the positive and negative are mirror 
images of each other.  
 
Biswas and Grau (2008) argue that option framing, which is the focus of the current 
research, be classified as a type of goal-framing. In option framing, the additive-option-
frame condition where consumers add options to a stripped-down base model (that is, a 
product with bare-minimal options in it) and the subtractive-option-frame condition where 
consumers exclude options from a fully-loaded model may be considered mutual 
reflections of each other. Hence these two conditions are viewed as two distinct frames. 
Park, Jun and MacGinnis (2000) refer to the condition where options are added to the 
base model as additive-option frame (+OF), and to the condition where options are 
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excluded from the fully-loaded model as subtractive-option frame (-OF). Levin, 
Schreiber, Lauriola and Gaeth (2002) refer to additive framing as “screening in” or as 
“Build Up” condition. They refer to subtractive framing as “screening out” or as “Scale 
Down” condition.  
 
12.6 Additive and Subtractive Option Framing  
Park, Jun and MacInnis (2000) and Biswas and Grau (2008) argue that consumers, who  
are presented a product under subtractive-option frame are more likely to choose a 
higher number of overall options and to end up with a higher-priced final product, then 
will consumers, who are presented a product package under additive-option frame. The 
differences in reference point changes and loss aversion have been offered as an 
explanation for this phenomenon. Relying on Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979), these authors explain this result by proposing that in the case of subtractive 
frame (i.e. where consumers delete options from a fully-loaded product), consumers 
anchor at the fully-loaded model as their point of reference. Conversely, in the additive 
frame (that is, where consumers add options to a base-product), consumers anchor at 
the base-model as their point of reference. 
 
Given such differences in the reference points, participants in different option-frame 
conditions (i.e. subtractive versus additive) are said to harbor different levels of loss 
aversion in both the loss of benefits incurred in deleting options from their product and 
the loss of money involved in paying for the option. Because consumers in the 
subtractive-frame condition anchor at the fully-loaded model, they are said to experience 
endowment effect in the context of the various options that are preloaded in the fully-
loaded model. Hence, such consumers will endure higher levels of loss for each option 
that they delete from the fully-loaded model. In contrast, because consumers in the 
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additive-frame condition anchor at the base model, they do not experience any 
endowment effect.  
 
Based on the principles of loss aversion, consumers, in the subtractive frame, are more 
likely to be sensitive to the loss of options, rather than to monetary gain incurred in 
deleting options (Park et al. 2000). Hardie, Johnson and Fader (1993) have shown that 
loss aversion experienced for product options is stronger than the loss aversion 
experienced in paying for retaining those options (for which endowment effect is 
experienced in subtractive frame). Hence, one can infer that consumers in the 
subtractive frame are relatively more averse to deleting options from the fully-loaded 
product. Essentially, under the subtractive frame, the tendency to avert losses causes 
consumers to focus on avoiding utility loss, if the number of options is reduced. 
Consequently, consumers, in the subtractive-frame condition, end up retaining most 
options, which existed in the fully-loaded product, in their final product.  
 
In contrast, consumers in the additive frame are more likely to be sensitive to monetary 
loss incurred in paying for an option, rather than to the utility gain incurred by having that 
option (Park et al. 2000). Consumers in the additive frame do not feel endowed with any 
option features, and hence do not experience subsequent loss aversion for such options. 
Hence, such consumers may be relatively more objective in deciding whether the 
incremental utility that each added option provides is worth the money that they will need 
to pay for it. Essentially, under the additive frame, the tendency to avert losses causes 
consumers to focus mainly on avoiding monetary loss involved, if options are added. 
Consequently, consumers, in the additive-frame, end up adding only those options, 
which they find worth paying for, to the base product. The net outcome is that the 
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number of options finally chosen by consumers in additive frame is lower than the 
number of options chosen by consumers in the subtractive frame.  
 
Park et al. (2000) and Biswas & Grau (2008) forward yet another explanation for this 
effect. They propose that the cause for this difference is that people under the additive 
frame, versus people in the subtractive frame, harbor different levels of sensitivity to the 
price of each option. Biswas and Grau refer to this explanation as the price-differential 
explanation. Consider a situation where a fully-loaded model of a hypothetical product 
costs $5000, while its base model costs $3500. An option that is priced at $350 costs 
7% in the context of the price of fully-loaded model, while costing 10% in the context of 
the base model. Given that consumers, who are presented the product in the 
subtractive-frame condition, anchor at the fully-loaded price of $5000, and thereby 
become relatively less sensitive to the price of the option which is priced at 7% of their 
reference price. In contrast, consumers, who are presented the product in the additive-
frame condition, anchor at the base model price of $3500, and thereby become more 
sensitive to the price of this same option, which now is priced at 10% of their reference 
price.  
 
12.7 Interaction Between Option Framing And Regulatory Focus 
We now extend the findings of Park et al. into the domain of regulatory focus.  As 
suggested earlier, under the subtractive frame, the tendency to avert losses causes 
consumers to focus on the product-benefits loss if the number of options in the fully-
loaded product is reduced. In contrast, under the additive frame, the tendency to avert 
losses causes consumers to focus mainly on the monetary loss involved if more options 
are added. However, the Compounded-Differential-Utility Framework suggests that 
prevention-oriented consumers have a higher inherent tendency to be more loss averse 
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than are promotion-oriented consumers. Hence, their higher tendency for loss aversion 
should lead prevention-oriented consumers under subtractive frame, to heuristically 
retain a relatively higher number of options (and thereby actualize reduced product utility 
loss) than will be done by promotion-oriented consumers under subtractive frame. 
Likewise, their higher tendency for loss aversion will also lead prevention-oriented 
consumers under additive frame, to heuristically add fewer options (and thereby 
actualize a reduced monetary loss) than will be done by promotion-oriented consumers 
under additive frame. 
 
Based on the compounded-differential-utility framework, we infer that under subtractive-
option framing scenario, prevention-oriented consumers, versus promotion-oriented 
consumers, are more likely to be sensitive to the repeated reduction in utility caused by 
the deletion of options from the fully-loaded model. Hence, managers, who present a 
product in subtractive-option frame to prevention-oriented consumers, versus promotion-
oriented consumers, are more likely to be successful at making a bigger overall sale 
through a higher final-product price. In this situation, prevention-oriented consumers are 
more likely to retain a higher number of overall product options then will promotion-
oriented consumers. 
 
Conversely, under the additive-option framing scenario, promotion-oriented consumers, 
versus prevention-oriented consumers, are more likely to be sensitive to the repeated 
increase in product utility that is caused by addition of options to the base model. Hence, 
managers, who present a product in additive-option frame to promotion-oriented 
consumers, versus to prevention-oriented consumers, are more likely to be successful at 
making a bigger overall sale through a higher final-product price. In this situation, 
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promotion-oriented consumers are more likely to add a higher number of overall product 
options then will prevention-oriented consumers.   
  
Further, prior literature suggests that promotion-oriented people tend to avoid errors of 
omission (Higgins and Spiegel 2004). This suggests that promotion-oriented people will 
tend to deviate more from the number of options that are offered in the original product 
presented. Hence, when presented with a base (fully-loaded) model, promotion-oriented 
people will tend to add (remove) more options per se. In contrast, prevention-oriented 
participants focus on avoiding errors of commission. Prevention-oriented will tend to stay 
closer to the original number of options that are offered in the original product presented. 
Conversely, when presented with a base (fully-loaded) model, prevention-oriented 
people will tend to add (remove) fewer options. 
 
Prior research also suggests that prevention-oriented participants have a stronger 
preference for default option, as compared to promotion-oriented people (Chernev 
2004). In the subtractive (additive) frame, the fully-loaded (base) product may be viewed 
as the default. A preference for default option suggests that prevention-oriented people 
will add fewer options in the case of additive frame (and stay as close as possible to the 
base model), and retain more options in the case of subtractive frame (and stay as close 
as possible to the fully-loaded model). In contrast, given their lack of preference for the 
default option, promotion-oriented people will tend to deviate from the default option, and 
hence will add relatively more options in the additive frame, and retain relatively fewer 
options in the subtractive frame.  
 
Hence, the hypothesis: 
123 
H2: When presented with a task of adding (deleting) options to (from) a base model 
(fully-loaded model), promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers, versus prevention 
(promotion)-oriented consumers, are more likely to add (retain) more options and end up 
with a higher-priced final product.  
 
This hypothesis is aligned with Park et al.’s hypothesis that participants presented with 
option framing will have wider differences in the number of options chosen when asked 
to anticipate regret, as opposed to when not asked to anticipate regret. However, there 
are key differences between the regret manipulation undertaken by Park et al. and the 
regulatory-focus manipulation that we undertake. Park et al. manipulated regret by 
informing their participants to assume that the manufacturer does not allow option 
choices to be changed following purchase. This manipulation led all of Park et al.’s 
participants to focus entirely on the course of action. As has been laid out earlier, the 
course of action was for participants to avert losses in product benefits when under 
subtractive frame, and to avert monetary losses when under additive frame.  
 
In regret, the chosen course of action (or inaction) is said to be compared with what 
could have been (Zeelenberg et al. 1998). In the context of regulatory focus theory, 
promotion-focus manipulation causes participants to compare the course of action and 
what could have been, and thereby undertake the most expansive course of action. 
Likewise, prevention-focus manipulation causes participants to compare the course of 
inaction with what could have been, and thereby undertake the most conservative 
means of inaction. Promotion-oriented consumers are inherently hardwired to guard 
against post-decisional regret in relation to errors of omission, while prevention-oriented 
consumers tend to guard against post-decisional regret in relation to errors of 
commission (Pham and Higgins 2005). By placing both promotion and prevention-
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oriented consumers, under both additive and preventive option frames, we believe that 
we may have achieved a cleaner implementation of the overall regret manipulation 
effect.  
 
Additionally, there are differences between the focus of this paper, and Park et al’s 
(2000) work. Firstly, the current paper focuses on how regulatory focus differences 
interact with option framing to influence multiple dependent variables such as the 
number of options selected, final product price, reference price, time taken to make 
decision and decision difficulty, value perceived in options chosen and purchase 
commitment. Part et al. focus chiefly on option framing main effects on various 
dependent measures. Additionally, Park et al., in contrast, focus mainly on how the 
interaction between regret anticipation manipulation and option framing influences two 
specific dependent measures, namely, number of options chosen and final product price. 
Finally, Park et al. actually manipulate regret, while we rely on median splitting 
participants’ chronic regulatory-focus scores.  
 
12.8 Perceived Reference Price  
In the context of this paper, we denote reference price to mean an estimate of the 
consumer’s final product price. We argue that if the consumer retains fair levels of 
information-processing resources, then her reference price for the final product should 
be fairly close to the actual final price of the product.  
 
Given that prevention-oriented consumers, under subtractive frame, retain higher 
number of options in their final product choice, we expect them to infer a relatively higher 
reference price than will promotion-oriented consumers under subtractive frame. This is 
so as, in the subtractive frame, given that prevention-oriented consumers retain more 
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options, they will tend to shift relatively less downwards from the price of the fully-loaded 
model, in establishing their reference price for their final choice, in comparison to 
promotion-oriented consumers.  
 
On similar lines, under additive frame, given that promotion-oriented consumer add 
higher number of options in their final product choice and hence shift relatively more 
upwards above the price of the base model, we expect them to infer a relatively higher 
reference price than will prevention-oriented consumers.  
 
Hence, the hypothesis: 
H3: In additive (subtractive) frame, promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers will have 
a higher reference price for the final product, than will prevention (promotion)-oriented 
consumers.  
 
12.9 Decision Time & Decision Difficulty  
Decision Time & Decision Difficulty  
We now turn to the issue of how much time consumers spend in finalizing the number 
options that they add (when presented with additive-option framing condition) or the 
number of options that they retain (when presented with subtractive-option framing 
condition).  
 
Park, Iyer and Smith (1989) argue that when consumers are not under time pressure at 
a retail store, they will undertake increased deliberations on purchase volume. Though 
consumers will have carried out prior deliberations on the volume of purchase to be 
undertaken, the bulk of final deliberations on the purchase volume are presumed to be 
undertaken right at the store. By reversing this line of reasoning, we argue that if a 
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consumer spends more time in making purchase volume deliberations, then, one may 
infer that she may be undertaking increased levels of purchase-volume deliberations. In 
the context of this research, we propose that if a consumer spends more time in deciding 
how many options to add or to retain, then it may be a result of the increased levels of 
deliberations undertaken as a result of increased difficulty in this decision-making. And, 
this increased amount of time required for purchase-volume deliberation, may be a result 
of the conflict involved in finalizing which and how many options to add or to retain.  
 
Park, Jun and MacInnis (2000) suggest that, consumers specifically subjected to 
subtractive framing (in comparison to those subjected to additive frame), face increased 
amounts of difficulty in decision making, thereby leading to higher levels of deliberations 
and increased time in finalizing choice. Further, as has been discussed earlier, 
prevention-oriented consumers, versus promotion-oriented consumers, are more 
sensitive to the loss in utility incurred due to deletion of each option in subtractive 
framing.  
 
Hypotheses H2 states that in the subtractive frame, promotion-oriented consumers tend 
to delete more options from the fully-loaded model, in comparison to the prevention-
oriented consumers. We make the reasonable assumption that the more the options that 
consumer has to delete from the fully-loaded model, the more the time will be required. 
Further, given the potential for a conflict on which options to delete, the more options 
that a consumer decides to delete, the more difficult will the task be perceived. Given 
this, in the subtractive frame, promotion-oriented consumers should require relatively 
more time and perceive more decision difficulty, than will prevention-oriented 
consumers, in finalizing their choice of options.  
 
127 
In contrast, in the additive frame, promotion-oriented consumers tend to add more 
options to the base-model. Hence, in the additive frame, promotion-oriented consumers 
should require relatively more time and perceive more decision difficulty, than will 
prevention-oriented consumers, in finalizing their choice of options.  
 
Being in the additive frame, should lead consumers to experience a clash between utility 
gain and monetary loss, while subtractive frame leads consumers to experience a clash 
between utility loss and monetary gain (Park et al. 2000). In such a context, consumers 
are expected to be more sensitive to utility loss than they are to monetary loss (Hardie , 
Johnson and Fader 1993). As such, consumers should experience more conflict and 
hence higher level of difficulty, when making choices under subtractive frame, than 
under additive frame (Park et al. 2000). On similar lines, hiring managers find rejecting 
qualified job candidates to be more difficult than hiring them (Huber, Neale and 
Northcraft 1987). Additionally, because people inherently conceptualize decision-making 
as choosing rather than as rejecting (Shafir 1993), rejecting options (as is done in 
subtractive frame) is expected to be more difficult than adding options (as is done in 
additive frame).  
 
Given this, we propose that the differences in time taken and difficulty perceived 
between promotion and prevention-oriented people, will be necessarily statistically 
significant in the case of subtractive frame. If rejecting options is hard, then rejecting a 
larger number of options (as is done by promotion-oriented consumers) is bound to be 
much harder than is rejecting fewer options (as is done by prevention-oriented 
consumers). However, we don’t expect that differences in the difficulty and time 
differences to be significant in the case of additive frame. Given that adding options is 
not that difficult a task, adding more options (as is done by promotion-oriented 
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consumers) is not expected to be that much harder than adding fewer options (as is 
done by prevention-oriented consumers). Hence the hypotheses: 
 
H4: In subtractive frame, promotion-oriented consumers will take significantly more time 
in finalizing the option choices, than will prevention-oriented consumers 
H5: In subtractive frame, promotion-oriented consumers will perceive significantly higher 
level of difficulty in finalizing the option choices, than will prevention-oriented consumers 
 
12.10 Perceived Value  
In this context of this paper, value is assumed to explicate how the benefits provided by 
the options chosen in the final product compare to what was paid for those options. We 
anticipate that since the subtractive frame stimulates prevention-oriented consumers to 
choose relatively more options, they should perceive relatively more benefits in their final 
product, in relation to promotion-oriented consumers. However, in evaluating the value 
perceived in the options chosen, the question that arises is whether consumers use the 
price of fully-loaded model in subtractive frame and the price of the base model in the 
additive frame, to assess the price standard of assessment of the value in the product. 
Or, do the customers consciously or preconsciously estimate the final price of the 
product and use this estimate (that is, reference price) as the price standard of 
assessment of the value perceived in the product? Further, it is entirely plausible that 
participants rely on one of these standards for evaluating value under one condition of 
option frame and regulatory focus, while relying on some other standard when under 
other conditions.  
 
If one assumes that both prevention and promotion oriented consumer use the price of 
the fully-loaded product under subtractive frame, then both prevention and promotion 
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oriented consumers will be using the same price standard for evaluation the value in the 
final product. However, given that prevention-oriented consumers retain more options 
than do promotion-oriented consumers, and given that price standard for assessing 
value is the same for both these consumer groups, we argue that prevention-oriented 
consumers should perceive higher value than promotion-oriented participants, under 
subtractive framing. 
 
Exactly reverse will be the situation in the additive frame. In the additive frame, 
promotion oriented consumers add more options than are added by prevention oriented 
consumers. However, given the assumption that under the additive frame, consumers 
utilize the price of the base model to assess perceived value, we can conclude that 
promotion-oriented consumers should perceive higher value in than prevention-oriented 
consumers. 
 
Hence we present the hypothesis: 
H6: In the additive (subtractive) frame, promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers will 
perceive higher value in their final option choice than will be perceived by prevention 
(promotion)-oriented consumers.  
 
In contrast to this, if it is presumed that consumers utilize their reference price (that is, 
their estimate of the final product price given the number of options that they had chosen 
as their price standard of assessing value, then the inference suggested in the prior 
paragraph, will not hold. Based on the hypotheses H3 and H2, we know that in the 
additive frame, promotion-oriented consumers will have a higher reference price and will 
choose more options in the final product, in relation to prevention-oriented consumers. If 
consumers utilize their reference price then, in the additive frame, the higher number of 
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options that promotion-oriented consumers choose will adjust for their relatively higher 
reference price. Likewise, the lower number of options that prevention-oriented 
consumers choose will adjust for their lower reference price. As such, there may not be 
any significant difference between the perceived value of options chosen by prevention 
and promotion-oriented consumers, under the additive frame. We would expect a similar 
outcome of the subtractive frame. 
 
Hence, we present the hypothesis: 
H6alternate1: In additive and subtractive frames, promotion-oriented consumers and 
prevention-oriented consumers will perceive relatively equal value in their final choice of 
options.  
  
It is important to note however that there may still be another perspective that might be 
presented when it comes to how consumers will perceive value. In this perspective, the 
logic presented in hypothesis H6alternate1 for the additive frame may not hold in the 
subtractive frame. Recall that under the subtractive frame, the tendency to avert losses 
causes consumers to focus on avoiding utility loss. As we have discussed earlier, 
prevention-oriented consumers are especially sensitive to losses that they are focused 
on avoiding, and are extremely proactive in averting losses. Since prevention-oriented 
participants become very averse to the losses in benefits, they may tend to almost-
heuristically retain most options in the fully-loaded product, including the ones that they 
may not benefit much from. This will end up raising the final product price and the 
reference price for the product for prevention-oriented consumers. Hence, we believe 
that prevention-oriented consumers in the subtractive frame may tend to retain even 
those options that they may not benefit from and yet will end up with a relatively high 
final product price.  
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As against this, promotion-oriented participants are less keen on avoiding losses and 
may not fall prey to this tendency.  As pointed out in Hypothesis H4, promotion-oriented 
consumers will also spend more time than prevention-oriented consumers in deciding 
which options to retain and will go through a more stringent (that is, systematic) 
decision-making process in which options to retain. As such, we expect that promotion 
oriented consumers in subtractive frame to retain only those options that they need, and 
yet pay a relatively lower final product price. Hence, in the subtractive frame, promotion-
oriented participants will perceive higher value in the options chosen and in the final 
product than will be perceived by prevention-oriented consumers.  
 
We not expect the reverse of this prediction, in the additive frame. Loss-sensitive 
prevention-oriented consumers tend to naturally choose the fewest options under 
additive frame.  
  
 
Hence, we present the hypothesis: 
H6alternate2: In the subtractive frame, promotion-oriented consumers will perceive higher 
value in their final choice of options than will be perceived by prevention-oriented 
consumers. In additive frame, promotion-oriented consumers and prevention-oriented 
consumers will perceive relatively equal value in their final choice of options. 
 
12.11 Mediation Relationship  
As has been discussed earlier, given that consumers retain more options in subtractive 
frame than are added in additive frame, reference price of the product will be perceived 
to be higher under subtractive versus in additive frame. However, consumers are said to 
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focus on prices when product purchase commitment is low, but not when category 
commitment is high (Monroe 2003). Based on this, Park et al. argue that the influence of 
option framing on the number of options chosen should fade away if consumers harbor a 
high product category commitment.   
 
Park et al. study product category commitment by manipulating it and checking its 
influence specifically on the number of options selected. In contrast to Park et al., we 
take a slightly different approach to studying the effect of option framing on commitment. 
We study product purchase commitment as a dependent variable. We examine the 
changes in promotion-or-prevention-oriented consumer’s purchase commitment for a 
product that is presented in subtractive or additive option frame. We argue that the 
interaction of regulatory focus and option framing itself can lead to changes in product 
purchase commitment.  
 
Much prior research in retailing has shown that value perceived in the product is the 
antecedent of purchase-commitment intentions (Zeithaml 1988). Higher value 
perceptions (considering the product utility and product quality in relation to its price) is 
said to lead to higher purchase commitment (in the form of increased purchase 
intentions and purchase likelihood and reduced intentions to search at alternative stores 
or search for alternative products). For example, Grewal, Monroe and Krishnan (1998) 
find that higher acquisition value and transaction utility, perceived in a product, leads to 
increased willingness to buy the product and reduced search intentions at other stores. 
Dodds, Monroe and Grewal (1991) find that perceived value lead to increased 
willingness to buy from the store. On similar lines, Grewal, Krishnan, Baker and Borin 




In the prior section, we hypothesized that the interaction between regulatory focus and 
option framing may influence the value perceived by consumers in options chosen and 
thereby in the product. Further, as discussed in the prior paragraph, value perceptions 
are the primary drivers of purchase commitment. Hence, we argue that perceived value 
mediates the relationship between regulatory-focus-and-option-frame interaction and 
purchase commitment.  
  
Hence, the hypothesis:  
H7alternate1: Perceived value mediates the linear relationship between purchase 
commitment and the interaction between regulatory focus and option framing.  
 
We will conduct two two-way ANOVA/ANCOVA analyses with regulatory focus and 
option frame as the factors. The first will have perceived value as the dependent variable 
and the second will purchase commitment as dependent variable. If the main effect of 
option frame on value perceptions and on purchase commitment is not significant, while 
the main effect of regulatory focus on value perceptions and purchase commitment is 
significant, we can infer that option frame may not be entering this mediation relationship 
(assuming that mediation tests show that perceived value significantly mediates the 
relationship between regulatory focus and purchase commitment, and that  the 
interaction between regulatory focus and option framing is not significant). If this 
condition holds, then we specify the following hypothesis: 
H7alternate2: Perceived value mediates the linear relationship between purchase 
commitment and regulatory focus.  
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In contrast, if the main effect of regulatory focus on value perceptions and on purchase 
commitment is not significant, while the main effect of option on value perceptions and 
purchase commitment is significant, we can infer that regulatory focus may not be 
entering this mediation relationship (assuming that mediation tests show that perceived 
value significantly mediates the relationship between option frame and purchase 
commitment, and that the interaction between regulatory focus and option framing is not 
significant). If this condition holds, then we specify the following hypothesis: 
H7alternate3: Perceived value mediates the linear relationship between purchase 
commitment and option framing.  
 
Given that option frame scenario has to be manipulated and hence cannot be measured 
on a continuous scale, we will rely on conducting a series of ANOVA and ANCOVA 
analyses to test which one of these three mediation hypothesis holds.  
 
12.12 Modeling Influence Of Time Taken On Number Of Items Chosen  
Much prior research suggests that the amount of time that consumers spend in a retail 
store positively influences their purchase volume. The Mehrabian-Russell model has 
been applied to the context of store environment in terms of how it affects consumer 
behavior, the amount of time they spend at the store and the number of items they buy 
(Donovan and Rossiter 1982). This model states that pleasure and arousal mediate 
consumers’ behavioral approach-avoidance responses to their environment. In a retail 
situation, these two variables have been proposed to be antecedents of the amount of 
time taken by participants and the number of items purchased. Research in retailing has 
found support for this model. For example, Tsai and Huang (2002) find that customers’ 
in-store positive mood positively influences the amount of time that consumers spend in 
a store. On similar lines, Sherman, Mathur and Belk (1997) find that store arousal 
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positively influences the amount of time that consumers spend in the store and the 
number of items that they buy. Donovan, Rossiter, Marcoolyn and Nesdale (1994) too 
find that pleasure and arousal experienced in a store lead to extra time spent in a store 
and to unplanned purchase.  
 
Extending these findings to the context of this research, we assume that task enjoyment 
(that is, pleasure) and value perceived in the options chosen (that is, arousal) are 
predictors of the amount of time that participants spend in their decision-making and of 
the number of options they chose.  
 
Further, as has been discussed earlier, decision difficulty predicts the amount of taken to 
make the decision choice. We also conjecture that purchase commitment may influence 
the number of options chosen as well. Consumers who have a high purchase 
commitment for a product may have pre-decided the number of options that they are 
going to add/retain to/in the product (Park et al. 2000). Further, we argue that the 
purchase commitment that consumers harbor can also affect the amount of time that 
they spend in their finalizing their options. On one hand, committed consumers can be 
assumed to spend more time in finalizing the options they want to have in their product, 
given that they are serious about actually buying the product. On the other hand, 
committed consumers may actually spend relatively less time in finalizing which options 
to choose, as committed consumers are assumed to have already made that decision in 
advance (Park et al. 2000). Given this, the models for the amount of time spent in 
arriving at the option choice decision, and the number of items chosen are: 
 
Time_Taken    = B10 + B11.task_enjoyment  + B12.perceived_value + 
B13.purchase_commitment + B14.decision_difficulty + e1           _____(1) 
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Num_Options = B20 + B21.task_enjoyment + B22.perceived_value + 
B23.purchase_commitment +                                     e2          _____(2) 
 
Further, prior research has shown that the amount of time that participants spend in a 
store itself influences the volume of purchase (Park, Iyer and Smith 1989). Tsai and 
Huang find that the more time consumers spend inside a store, the more items they tend 
to purchase, given the more product information they gather. Given this evidence, we 
augment model (2) by adding time_taken as an endogenous predictor of the number of 
options chosen. Hence, we can rewrite model (2) as model (3): 
 
Num_Options = B20 + B21.task_enjoyment + B22.perceived_value + 
B23.purchase_commitment + B23.time_taken          +e2          _____(3) 
 
Model 1 is a duration model, while model 2 is count model. A FIML (full information 
maximum likelihood) estimation is not possible in this case given that it is not possible to 
identify a joint of distributions used in duration and count models . Hence, we will rely 
on two-step maximum likelihood estimation, also referred to as LIML (limited information 
maximum likelihood) estimator. Since we will be relying on a rather-complex two-step 
maximum likelihood estimation method, we prefer to select the simplest possible 
individual models for the duration and for the count dependent variables. Hence, we 
selected the exponential model for duration and the poisson model for count. We will run 
an exponential regression for the time duration required for participants to finalize their 
options in model 1. Further, we will run a poisson regression for the number of options 
chosen, in model 2.  
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Given that time_taken is endogenous in the context of this system of equations, the 
predictions for time_taken from model 1 are appended to the predictors in model 3, as is 
done in two-step estimation. The Murphy and Topel (1985) method involves 
programming efforts to correct the variance covariance matrix of the coefficients of 
model 3. Details of how the correction was programmed are provided in Appendix A.  
 
In the next section, we present details of Study 1. Study 1 was designed to explore 







We tested the validity of hypotheses H1A and H1B with145 undergraduate marketing 
students at a business school at a public university in the south.  
 
13.1 Procedure  
Participants were determined to be promotion or prevention oriented based on a median 
split of their scores on 18 items of the chronic regulatory focus scale (Lockwood, Jordan 
and Kunda 2002).   
 
13.2 Method  
We presented the students with two scenarios and asked them to provide inputs on 
which frame they preferred.  
 
Scenario 1  
Mr. A was given 3 tickets to lotteries involving the World Series. He won $500 in the first 
lottery and then $250 in the second, and then $1000 in the third. Mr. B was given a ticket 
to a single, larger World Series lottery. He won $1750. 
Who is happier? Mr. A or Mr. B.  
 
A cross tabulation analysis shows that of 72 promotion-oriented participants, 51 
indicated that A is happier, while 21 indicated that B is happier. Among 73 prevention-
oriented participants, 39 indicated that A is happier, while 34 indicated that B is happier. 
The Pearson chi-square is significant (p<0.05).  
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Scenario 2  
Products C and D, are two comparable products, and both were initially priced at $1,450. 
Product D's price increased by $100 two weeks ago, by another $90 a week ago, and 
finally increased further by $60 yesterday. Product C's price increased to $1,700 a few 
days ago. Which product do you consider more appealing? Product C or Product D? 
 
The analysis showed that all 72 promotion-oriented participants and all 73 prevention-
oriented participants indicated that product C was more appealing. Anticipating such an 
outcome, we further asked the participants to respond to the follow-up question “What is 
the difference between the appeals of product C and product D?”, anchored at 1 (Not 
much difference) and 7 (a lot of difference). A between-group T test on this interval 
measure showed that the prevention-oriented participants found a marginally larger 
difference in the appeal between C and D, in comparison to prevention-oriented 
participants (M’s 4.08 vs. 3.48, p = 0.09).  
 
Based on this, we infer that we have preliminary support for hypotheses H1A and H1B. 
Next, we describe study 2, the main focus of this research. Study 2 was designed to 








For study 2, we undertook a 2 (additive versus subtractive option framing) X 2 
(promotion versus prevention orientation) design.  
 
14.1 Participants & Stimulus  
A total of 174 undergraduate students from a major university in the south participated in 
the study. Based on prior work by Park et al. (2000), we decided to use automobile as 
the stimulus for the first study. The feature options that are available in cars are 
understood by most people, and consumer aspects of cars are pretty well understood by 
the population in general. Keeping in line with Park et al., and to reduce the influence of 
brand on the results, we referred to the stimulus car brand as the ABC car.  
 
A set of 12 product options, which are most-commonly chosen from when buying a new 
car, were selected as the feature options in this study. The included options were air-
conditioning, power steering, power windows, power door locks, tilt wheel, cruise control, 
audio package, back-up sensor, GPS, six cylinder engine, premium trim and sunroof. 
Options were priced ranging from $450 to $1200. The options and their prices were 
gathered from www.edmunds.com and www.honda.com so as to impart external validity.  
 
14.2 Procedure  
The study was conducted using Metacard software, which had the stimulus, options and 
other details preprogrammed in advance. Participants worked with the software in an 
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interactive manner, such that the software presented the participants with information 
about the stimulus and other details, and then asked the participants to make choices on 
the number of options that they would like to either add or retain, depending on the 
condition. After that participants responded to several items that were dependent 
measures, demographics questions etc. The authors worked with participants in groups 
that ranged from 2 to 14 people in size.  
 
Participants were informed that they should consider themselves to be in a car-buying 
situation. Participants in the additive frame were informed that the price of the base 
model of the ABC car is $17,555 and that they have to decide which of the 12 options 
they would like to add into the car. On the next screen, the software displayed each of 
the 12 options and their individual price. Participants could select as many of these 12 
options as they wanted, by clicking a check box next to the option. The final price of the 
ABC car of the participant was calculated (but not displayed to participants) by adding 
the total price of all the options chosen to the base price of $17,555.  
 
In contrast, participants in the subtractive frame were informed that the price of the fully-
loaded model of the ABC car is $25,909 and that they have to decide which of the 12 
options they would like to retain, as their final choice. The price of all the 12 options put 
together was $8,354, which is the difference between the price of the fully loaded model 
($25,909) and the base-model ($17,555). On the next screen, the software displayed 
each of the 12 options and their price. In this condition, the 12 options were pre-selected 
(i.e. the check box next to the option was in a pre-checked condition, for all the 12 
options). Participants could delete as many of these 12 options as they wanted, by 
unchecking the check box next to the option. The final price of the ABC car of the 
participant was calculated (but not displayed to participants) by subtracting the total price 
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of all the deleted options from the fully-loaded model price of $25,909. A screenshot of 











Given that this study was intended to study effects of regulatory focus on choice, it was 
important to ensure that the options available were evenly spread between hedonic 
(promotion concerns) and utilitarian (prevention concerns) features. We made an 
attempt to strike a balance in the types of options that we used in the study. A brief 
pretest with 6 participants suggested that the first 6 options (namely, air conditioning, 
power steering, power windows, power door locks, tilt wheel and cruise control) were 
perceived as more utilitarian options. In contrast, the second 6 options (namely, 
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advanced audio, backup sensors, GPS, six-cylinder motor, premium trim and sunroof) 
were perceived to be more hedonic options.  
 
Finally, participants responded to the 18-item chronic regulatory focus scale by 
Lockwood, Jordan and Kunda (2002). Participants were classified as promotion or 
prevention oriented by median splitting them based on their score on this scale. 
 
14.3 Dependent Measures 
Number of Options & Final Price 
The software program calculated the final car price and maintained a tally of the number 
of options that each participant had added or retained in his/her final choice. 
 
Reference Price 
The reference price for the car with the final choice of options was captured by eliciting 
response to the item, “Given the options that you selected, roughly how much do you 
expect to pay for your ABC car?” which was adapted from Park et al. (p.192). 
 
Decision Time  
The software program calculated the amount of time (to the accuracy of millisecond) that 
each participant spent on the screen where participants finalized their choice of the 
number of options they’d like to have in their ABC car. We found that 12 participants had 
spent fewer than 15 seconds on this screen. We made the supposition that these 12 
participants lacked motivation, and hence spent so little time on this critical screen 
because they were not serious about participation in this study.  As such these 
participants were deleted from the data, reducing our final sample size to 162.  
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Decision Difficulty  
Two Decision difficulty items were created by adapting the items in Park et al. The first 
item was “Overall, it was easy for me to make the option-choice decisions for my ABC 
car” (reverse coded) and the second was “Given this situation, I believe that most people 
will have to think very hard, in finalizing their choice of options, for the ABC car” on a 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. The two items  were summed to form a 
composite scale. 
 
Perceived Value  
Participants’ perception on value in their final product (which is inclusive of the value in 
their final choice of options) was measured using four items. The items “The option 
choices that I finalized, represent .... “ on a 1(very little value) to 7 (a lot of value) and 
“The options that I chose for my car, represent a poor choice.” (reverse coded) on a 
1(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale, were adaptations of the items used by 
Park et al. We added two more items, namely, “It was important for me to settle only on 
meaningful options in the car” and “Overall, I am very satisfied with my final car, 
specifically in terms of choice of options” on a 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly 
disagree) scale. The four items were summed to form a composite scale. 
 
Purchase Commitment  
Participants’ purchase commitment was measured using four items. The first two items 
were based on the likelihood of purchasing the ABC car and on the extent of information 
search on other brands, before committing to buy the ABC car. These items were 
adaptations of the items used by as a purchase commitment manipulation checks used 
by Park et al. The items were worded, “Given the options that I ended up selecting, there 
is a high probability that I will buy the ABC car” and “Before committing to purchasing the 
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ABC car, I am very likely to look for information on other car manufacturers, if this were 
possible” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. We added two more 
items. They were, “I am certain that buying the ABC car, with the options that I settled 
on, is the correct decision for me” and “I am likely to recommend the ABC car, with the 
options that I selected, to a close friend” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
scale. The four items (cronbach alpha = 0.67) were summed to form a composite scale. 
 
Task Enjoyment 
On the lines of Park et al., we measured task enjoyment, as an aspect of participants’ 
attitudinal reactions. Three items were used, namely, “I found the task of choosing 
options for my car, to be enjoyable”, “I found the task of choosing options for my car, to 
be interesting” and “I found the task of choosing options for my car, to be pleasant” on a 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) scale. The three items (cronbach alpha = 
0.8) were summed to form a composite scale.  
 




RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 
We will first study the results of the ANOVA analysis with the many dependent variables 
that we have identified. The detailed results for the ANOVA analyses are presented in 
Table 9.  
 
15.1 Number of Options & Final Price  
We first conducted two ANOVA analyses. The first was on the number of options chosen 
and the second was on final price respectively, as the dependent variables. For the 
number of options chose, the main effect of option framing is significant F=30.68 (p<.01) 
but the main effect of regulatory focus is not significant (F = .024; p>0.05). The 













  Additive Frame Subtractive Frame 










Regulatory Focus .025 
Options Frame 30.64* 
# of 
Options 
Chosen Interaction 12.67* 
8.7 7.54 9.38 10.65 
Regulatory Focus .096 
Options Frame 34.76* 
Interaction 5.47* 














    
Regulatory Focus .112 




23,563.00 22,721.85 23,937.54 24,949.52 
Regulatory Focus .2 




23,371.81 21,736.23 22,172.75 24,427.13 
Regulatory Focus 1.76 
Options Frame .082 
Time 
Taken(A
NOVA) Interaction 4.25* 
45.05 47.22 50.28 40.30 
Regulatory Focus .805 
Options Frame .204 
Interaction 3.97* 












Decision Difficulty 11.23* 
    
Regulatory Focus .54 




6.58 6.35 6.89 6.54 
Regulatory Focus 5.49* 




22.76 22.76 23.38 21.26 





For final car price, the main effect of option framing is significant F=26.33 (p<.01) but the 
main effect of regulatory focus is not significant (F = .112; p>0.05). The interaction 
between option framing and regulatory focus is significant (F = 13.353; p<0.01).  
 
The implication of this finding is that, in contrast to that for prevention-oriented 
consumers, for promotion-oriented consumers, option-framing may not be influencing 
the number of options chosen or the final price of the product. Promotion-oriented 
consumers, given their eagerness to maximize advancement, sway too far from the 
initial starting options of both the option frames. The net outcome is a neutralization of 
the effects of additive and subtractive frame effects when it comes to promotion-oriented 
consumers.   
 
Going beyond the main and interaction effects on the number of options chosen, it is 
important to check the influence of covariates (specifically, task enjoyment, perceived 
options value, purchase commitment and time taken, based on the theorization 
forwarded when presenting model 2) in the presence of the factors, namely, regulatory 
focus and options frame. Hence, we conducted a linear ANCOVA analysis with the 
specified covariates, on the number of options chosen as the dependent variable. Later, 
we will compare the results of this linear ANCOVA on the number of options chosen, 
with the results of the non-linear ANCOVA based on model 3.     
 
As shown in Table 9, in addition to the interaction term (which the ANOVA had shown to 
be significant), the linear ANCOVA results show that the covariates task enjoyment, 
perceived options value and time taken are significant predictors of the number of 
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options chosen. Managers should find this result pertinent. Based on this result, we can 
infer a managerial implication that despite the presence of option framing, which 
managers can control, other variables (such as task enjoyment, perceived value in 
options chosen and the amount of time needed to make the option choice decision) are 
also relevant in influencing the number of options chosen by consumers. Managers may 
be able to control these other variables as well, in order to positively influence the 
number of options chosen by consumers. 
15.2 Reference Price 
For the reference price, the main effect of option framing is not significant (F=1.61; 
p=.28) and the main effect of regulatory focus is not significant (F = .2; p=0.65). The 
interaction between option framing and regulatory focus is significant (F = 7.89; p<0.01).  
 
15.3 Time Taken  
For the amount of time taken to make the decision, the main effect of option framing is 
not significant (F=0.08; p=.775) and the main effect of regulatory focus is not significant 
(F = 1.76; p=0.18). The interaction between option framing and regulatory focus is 
significant (F = 4.25; p<0.05).   
 
In line with hypothesis H4, we find that when the task was presented in a subtractive 
frame, promotion-oriented participants took significantly more time than did prevention-
oriented participants (M’s 50.28 vs. 40.30, F = 5.81, p<.05). In contrast to that, but as 
was expected in the additive frame, promotion-oriented participant took almost the same 
time as did prevention-oriented participants (M’s 45.05 vs. 47.22, F = .27, p = 0.6).  
 
Going beyond main and interaction effects on time taken, it is important to check the 
influence of covariates (specifically, task enjoyment, perceived options value, purchase 
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commitment and decision difficulty, based on the theorization forwarded when 
presenting model 1) in the presence of the factors regulatory focus and options frame. 
Hence, we conducted a linear ANCOVA analysis with the specified covariates, on time 
taken as a dependent variable. Later, we will compare the results of this linear ANCOVA 
on the amount of time taken, with the results of the non-linear ANCOVA based on model 
2.   
 
As has been shown in Table 10, in addition to the interaction effect (which the ANOVA 
had shown to be significant) even decision difficulty is a significant predictor of the 
amount of time taken. However, in a departure from what prior theory was pointing to, 
task enjoyment and perceived option value do not influence the amount of time taken, in 
the presence of option framing. 
 
It is important to note that the ANCOVA model we conducted is a linear regression-
based ANCOVA. However, given that time taken is a duration variable, it should 
appropriately be modeled using a duration regression. We chose the simplest duration 
model, namely the exponential model for this purpose. We modeled the main and 
interaction effects by implementing effect codes in exponential regression. The 
exponential regression on time taken with effect codes implemented is essentially an 
ANCOVA analysis, using the appropriate non-linear regression analysis. The results are 
presented in table 10. The exponential-regression ANCOVA suggests that only the 
interaction between regulatory focus and option frame and decision difficulty are 
significant, while other factors and covariates are not. Hence, the inferences made by 
using the appropriate exponential regression-based ANCOVA, are the same as those 
made by running a linear ANCOVA (though the coefficient estimates across the 
inappropriate linear ANCOVA and the appropriate non-linear ANCOVA models were 
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different). As such, we are reassured to learn that the inferences that were made based 
on the linear ANCOVA, were robust.  
 
Table 10 
Exponential Model Results for Time Taken  
 
 
Coefficent Exponential Model 
For Entire Sample 






Regulatory Focus Main Effect .04 
Option Frame Main Effect .015 
Regulatory Focus X Option Frame Interaction Effect -.067* 
Log likelihood -81.04 
AIC 1.11 
                          * suggests significance at 0.05 or lower 
 
 
15.4 Decision Difficulty  
For the level of difficulty in arriving at a choice decision, the main effect of option framing 
is not significant (F=0.45; p=.5) and the main effect of regulatory focus is not significant 
(F = 0.55; p=0.46). Neither is the interaction between option framing and regulatory 
focus significant (F = 0.22, p=0.88).   
 
An analysis of contrasts suggests that, as expected, when the task was presented in a 
subtractive frame, promotion-oriented participants did find the task to be more difficult 
than did prevention-oriented participants. However, this difference was not significant 
(M’s 6.89 vs. 6.54, F = 0.4, p=0.52). It is not clear why we do not find statistical 
significance for this result and thus do not find support for H5. Perhaps, the items we 
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used for measuring decision difficulty may not be capturing an essential facet of this 
construct. Future research should delve into this further. When the task was presented in 
an additive frame, promotion-oriented participants perceive the decision to be more 
difficult (but not significantly more) than do promotion-oriented participants (M’s 6.58 vs. 
6.35; F = .173, p = 0.67).   
 
15.4 Perceived Value  
For the value perceived in the final product (i.e. in the final choice of options selected), 
the main effect of regulatory focus is significant (F=5.5; p<.05) but the main effect of 
option framing is not significant (F = .934; p=.33). The interaction between option 
framing and regulatory focus is significant (F = 5.5; p<0.05).  
 
An analysis of contrast in additive frame showed that when the task was presented in an 
additive frame, the value perceived by prevention and promotion-oriented participants  
was almost the same (F = .0, p = 0.99). Further an analysis of contrasts showed that 
when the task was presented in a subtractive frame, prevention-oriented participants 
perceived significantly less value than did promotion-oriented participants (M’s 21.26 vs. 
23.38, F = 11.1, p<.01). We thus find support for hypothesis H6alternate2. These results 
hence suggest that prevention-oriented participants in subtractive frame become averse 
to losing the benefits of options even at the expense of overpaying in order to retain 
them. In contrast, promotion-oriented participants chose fewer options and they deem 
that they paid relatively less for those options and hence perceive relatively more value.  
 
Given that we do not find support for hypothesis H6, we infer that consumers do not use 
the price of the base model (in the case of additive frame) or the price of the fully-loaded 
model (in the case of subtractive frame). Rather, consumers may be consciously or 
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preconsciously calculating the final price of the product given the options that they had 
chosen. 
 
15.4.1 Mediation Analysis  
We hypothesized that the effect of regulatory focus on purchase commitment operates 
through the level of value that consumers perceive in the options that they have chosen.  
 
To test support for hypothesis H7, we undertook a mediation analysis, by implementing 
the procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). The results of the ANOVA on 
perceived value suggest that the main effect of regulatory focus on perceived value in 
options is significant, while the main effect of option frame on perceived value is not 
significant. The interaction between regulatory focus and option framing, on perceived 
value in options chosen is significant. In the context of the mediation analysis, these 
results suggest that though perceived value in options chosen is influenced mainly by 
regulatory focus effects, option frame may have some influence on perceived value 
through the interaction. Further, the results of the ANOVA on purchase commitment 
shows that purchase commitment for the final product, the main effect of option framing 
is not significant (F=0). The main effect of regulatory focus is significant (F=3.8; p=0.05). 
Additionally, the interaction between option framing and regulatory focus is not 
significant (F = 0.11).   
 
Hence, the main effect of option frame is not significant for both perceived value and for 
purchase commitment, while the main effect of regulatory focus is significant for both 
perceived value and purchase commitment. The interaction effect is significant for 
perceived value, but not significant for purchase commitment. Given this, we infer that 
that regulatory focus provides the main thrust behind the path from the interaction effect 
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to perceived value and further on to purchase commitment. Further, we infer that option 
frame may have only a mild influence on the relationship, if at all. 
 
Finally, we conducted an ANCOVA analysis with purchase commitment as the 
dependent measure and perceived value as a covariate. If the mediation relationship is 
to hold, we expect the covariate, perceived value, to be significant, while the main effect 
of regulatory focus to become insignificant. Per our expectations, the ANCOVA analysis 
shows that perceived value is a significant covariate (F = 36.17; p < 0.01), while the 
main effect of regulatory focus is not significant (F = 1.02; p > 0.05). Additionally, the 
interaction between regulatory focus and option framing is also not significant (F=2.17; p 
>0.05).  
 
Though an ANCOVA regression is essentially a regression analysis, given that the 
Baron and Kenny (1996) test of mediation is conducted in the context of regression 
analysis and not ANOVA, we conducted a regression-based test for mediation. A 
regression analysis first showed that the effect of chronic regulatory-focus score on the 
value perceived by participants in the options chosen, was significant (B=18.13, p< .01). 
A second regression analysis showed that chronic regulatory-focus was a significant 
predictor of purchase commitment (B=17.18, p<.01). A third regression showed that the 
value perceived in the options chosen was a significant predictor of purchase 
commitment (B=8.15, p<.01). Finally, when both chronic regulatory focus score and 
value perceived in options were together included as predictors of purchase 
commitment, the coefficient of chronic regulatory score was not significant (B=0.49, 
p=0.22) but the coefficient of value perceived in the options was still significant (B=8.15, 
p<0.01). Hence, we find that our mediation hypothesis holds true (Baron and Kenny 
1996). Hence, we find support for hypothesis H7alternate2.  
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15.5 Two-Step Estimator  
It is important to note that the ANCOVA analysis, that was discussed earlier, was 
conducted using linear regression mode. Given that time taken is a duration model, and 
the number of options is a count model, a linear ANCOVA is an inappropriate model. 
Essentially, the linear ANCOVA regression estimates are biased. To arrive at the 
unbiased model estimates, we specifically analyzed the combination of models 1 and 2, 
as model 3 using the two-step estimation method. Further, we also implemented 
Murphy-Topel correction for model 3. Table 11 provides the unbiased estimates for the 
model 3 (in column 1).  
 
However, model 3 does not model cell conditions. To overcome that, we included 
dummy variables in the two-step model 3. We implemented 3 dummy variables in model 
3 (assuming the cell with promotion-oriented participants under additive frame as the 
reference cell). The results (Table 11 column 2) show that cell 4 (promotion-oriented 
participants with subtractive framing) has a significantly different intercept than the other 
three cells.  
 
It is important to note further, that the two-step Model 3 with cell condition dummies does 
not model the main and interaction effects between regulatory focus and option frames. 
Hence, we model the main and interaction effects by implementing effect codes in the 
two-step model 3 (results are presented in Table 11 column 3). Essentially, the two-step 
model 3 with effect codes is a nonlinear ANCOVA analysis, using the appropriate non-
linear regression analysis. Hence, the two-step model 3 with effect codes is a non-linear 
ANCOVA analysis with unbiased coefficient estimates. Given that the two-step based 
non-linear ANCOVA provides unbiased coefficient estimates and significance, we put 
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higher credence in its results. The linear ANCOVA (results specified in table 9) 
suggested that the coefficient of perceived option value, task enjoyment and time taken 
are significant covariates of the ANCOVA on the number of options chosen. However, 
the non-linear ANCOVA suggests that the coefficients of perceived options value and 
task enjoyment are not significant. Time taken is the only significant covariate per the 
non-linear ANCOVA on the number of options chosen. 
 
However, the results of the linear ANCOVA and the nonlinear ANCOVA are in unison in 
regards to significance of factors. Both of these analyses suggested that the main effect 
of regulatory focus was not significant, while the main effect of option frame and the 



















Estimates for Model 3 Variations 






















Dependent Variable: Time_Taken 
   
Intercept 3.05* 3.05* 3.05* 
task_enjoyment -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 
Perceived_options_value .011 .011 .011 
purchase_commitment .0079 .0079 .0079 
decision_difficulty .0427* .0427* .0427* 
Log likelihood -83.81 -83.81 -83.81 
AIC 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Model 2: 
Dependent Variable: Num_Options 
   
Intercept 2.737* 2.657* 2.695* 







purchase_commitment 0.012 0.0107 .0107 
time_taken -0.0149* -0.016* -0.161* 
Cell 2 (promotion & subtractive frame)  0.094  
Cell 3 (prevention & additive frame)  -0.127 
(p=0.067) 
 
Cell 4 (prevention & subtractive 
frame) 
 0.187*  
Regulatory Focus Main Effect   0.008 
Option Frame Main Effect   -0.1023* 
Regulatory Focus X Option Frame 
Interaction Effect 
  0.055* 
Log likelihood -374.79 -365.34 -383.8 
AIC 4.68 4.609 4.609 






In this research, we present initial support for the general proposition that, in the face of 
a series of gains and losses, promotion-oriented consumers display a higher tendency to 
segregate gains, than do prevention-oriented consumers. Likewise, prevention-oriented 
consumers display a higher likelihood to integrate losses than do promotion-oriented 
consumers. The differences in shape of the value function of promotion and prevention-
oriented peopled, is purported to be the foundation of this effect.  
 
We then delve into how differences in the shape of the value functions due to differences 
in regulatory focus, interact with option framing, which forms the main focus on this 
paper. Study 2 results presents us with several interesting findings on interactions 
between option framing and regulatory focus. We find that the interaction between 
option-framing and regulatory focus impacts the number of options chosen and the 
consumers’ reference price. We find parallel results for participants’ reference price for 
the final product that they chose. Further, we find that the interaction between regulatory 
focus and option frame has significant effects on the time taken to make the decision, 
difficulty experienced in making the option selection choice and value perceived in the 
final choice.  
 
Theoretical and Managerial Contributions: 
In this research, we test and find support for a significant interaction between regulatory 
focus and option framing, on a number of key dependent variables. Going beyond the 
findings of Park et al., we firstly show that other dependent variables such as the amount 
of time taken to make decision, decision difficulty and perceived value in the options will 
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also vary systematically in the context of the interaction between regulatory focus and 
option framing. Secondly, we show that participants’ value perception of the options they 
chose mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and purchase commitment. 
Finally, we estimate a two-step maximum likelihood model to understand the influence of 
endogenous covariate, the amount of time taken to make the option-choice decision, 
and other covariates, on the number of options chosen. 
 
Based on our findings, we argue that a manager, who is concerned with maximizing the 
size of the deal, should focus on option frame. However, the fact that we find support for 
hypothesis H6alternate2 suggests that prevention-oriented consumers in subtractive frame, 
perceive relatively lower value in the options they choose. This can potentially cause 
such consumers to get dissatisfied. This can eventually affect future sales to such 
consumers. Given this, managers will have to make a judgment call on whether to 
implement a sale under the subtractive frame, when it comes to prevention-oriented 
consumers. If the product under consideration is one where the consumer has to make 
frequent repeat-purchases (for example, renewing a one-year cell phone service plan), 
then the manager may be better of not presenting the cell-phone plan in the subtractive 
frame. This will enable the manager to hedge in favor of not getting that customer 
dissatisfied and hence rendering a repeat purchase next year. However, if the product 
under consideration is a car, then, the manager may want to present the product in the 
subtractive frame, given that consumers do not purchase cars very frequently.  
 
As compared to consumers who are prevention-focused, our findings suggest that things 
should be less complicated with promotion-oriented consumers. Also, our results also 
suggest that promotion-oriented consumers are not likely to perceive reduced value in 
the options that they choose in the final product, under any condition. The implication is 
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that managers need not be concerned about presenting the product under any specific 
option frame, when it comes to westerners in general.  
 
However, the mediation analysis results suggest that perceived value fully mediates the 
relationship between regulatory focus and purchase commitment. Hence, managers may 
not be at complete liberty to totally overlook the value perceived by consumers in the 
chosen options. Managers need to focus on raising perceived value in chosen options, if 
influencing purchase commitment is the objective they are targeting. Even when dealing 
with the less-challenging promotion-oriented consumers, managers have to ensure that 
such consumers perceive value in the options that they choose, so as to render an 
increased likelihood of purchase. This result, however, presents a particularly acute 
managerial challenge, when dealing with prevention-oriented consumers. Such 
consumers, under subtractive frame, tend to innately perceive low value in the chosen 
options.  
 
In the context of the two-step estimation procedure, we argue that implementing the non-
linear ANCOVA on the number of options chosen, provides as much a managerial 
implication as a methodological contribution. In terms of methodology, we believe that 
this is the first implementation in marketing, of a two-step estimator, where the first step 
is a duration model, and the second step is a count model. We utilize the two-step model 
to implement a non-linear ANCOVA analysis. We find that some aspects of the results of 
the non-linear ANCOVA are in contrast with those of the linear ANCOVA. Given that the 
non-linear ANCOVA model utilizes the appropriate distributions, while the linear 
ANCOVA does not, we bestow higher trust in the non-linear ANCOVA results. In line 
with non-linear ANCOVA, we thereby assume that value perceived in options chosen, 
does not influence the number of options chosen.  
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The managerial implication of the non-linear ANCOVA is that task enjoyment positively 
impacts the number of options chosen. Additionally, the negative coefficient, of the 
amount of time taken to choose options, suggests that the more time consumers spend 
in finalizing the number of options, the fewer options they chose. Further, the level of 
difficulty encountered in finalizing the options, influences the amount of time required to 
finalize options. The implication is that managers need to figure out a way to ensure that 
consumers do not dwell on option-choice decision, for too long. Simultaneously, 
managers need to make the task of choosing options, an enjoyable experience. This 
suggests that managers need to be adept at quickly educating their customers, so that 
the customers can smoothly make option choice decisions without dwelling too long on 
it, and yet find this to be a fun task. Overall, our findings present a tall order for a 
manager, who wants to utilize option framing, to achieve her goals.  
 
As we have noted earlier in the paper, prevention-focused people have a steeper value 
function on the loss side, and a flatter function on the gain side. One potential research 
question that arises from this research is what happens to the difference in value 
functions of promotion vs. prevention-focused persons as one goes “further out”. For 
example, do the differences between prevention versus promotion-oriented people still 
matter when each of the losses (or gains) in the series of multiple losses (or gains) hit 
large values such as $100,000 etc. Future research can delve into this. We speculate 
that at such large individual steps, the value function will have flattened out for individual 
loss (or gain) for both prevention and promotion-oriented consumers, though at different 
levels. Hence, we expect that a single $100,000 loss may be lie at point (say, L2) on a 
prevention-oriented consumer’s value function, and at point (say, L1) on a promotion-
oriented consumer’s value function. Yet loss level L2 will be larger than loss level L1, 
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even though the value functions may have flattened out for both promotion and 
prevention-oriented consumers. Hence, we conjecture that a series of $100,000 losses 
may still yield the same results that we have proposed in this research.  
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CHAPTER 17  
 
INTRODUCTION TO PART 3 
Consider the situations with two Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), A and B. Both, A and 
B are in a meeting with their respective board of directors. CEO A proposes to her board 
that she has a gut feeling that their firm will be able to achieve much higher levels of 
scale and scope efficiencies if they were to acquire firm Y. CEO A’s of the cuff remark 
immediately resonates with her board of directors, who in turn strongly back her 
assertion on acquiring firm Y. As a result of this quick buttressing of her gut-feel, CEO A 
now believes that it is worthwhile paying goodwill of upto 50% above firm Y’s current 
market value, in order to acquire firm C. In contrast, in his meeting with his board, CEO 
B proposes that he has a gut feeling that firm Z may actually be overvalued by the stock 
market, and as such may be a good target for acquisition at a below-market price, once 
firm Z’s impending sub-par quarterly results are announced in the next couple of months. 
CEO B’s board also backs his gut feel in a gesture displaying strong solidarity behind 
their CEO’s notions. As such, CEO B now believes that he should be paying less than 
firm Z’s current market value, in acquiring firm Z.  
 
The question that we attempt to resolve in this research is whether the predetermination 
on the values of the respective target firms, will change the method and styles of 
information processing of both of these CEOs. We propose that in order to justify their 
currently-vested gut feels, which have now become commitments, these two CEOs will 
undertake vastly different motivated-processing styles, which will serve in achieving their 
goal of arriving at their predetermined answers. In this study, we explore specific 
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theoretical implications of the influence of such prior commitments on their goal means, 
in the domain of regulatory focus.  
 
Just as is possible with goals, an appropriate regulatory focus for pursuing goals can 
also be activated preconsciously (Higgins, Roney, Crowe and Hymes 1994). We extend 
this stream of research by proposing that consumers can preconsciously and 
consciously self-regulate by picking a goal means, so as instigate either a regulatory fit 
or a misfit as is required by the consumer’s commitments, irrespective of whether the 
consumer is promotion oriented or prevention oriented. 
 
Prior research has shown that consumers’ motivation level determines whether 
regulatory fit occurs. Wang and Lee (2006) propose that, under low levels of 
involvement, consumers actively seek experiencing a regulatory fit by preferentially 
seeking out and elaborating specifically on information that renders a regulatory fit 
condition, over information that renders a regulatory misfit. However, under high levels of 
involvement, consumers give relatively high weight to substantive information, rather 
than preferentially seeking that information that helps them achieve regulatory fit. Extant 
research, however, lacks insight into whether consumers are also like to render a 
regulatory misfit under specific conditions, just as they are able to render a regulatory fit 
under specific conditions. This research is dedicated to filing this void in extant literature. 
We argue that committing to a goal is decisive in determining goal means. This research 
purports that when consumers commit themselves to a predetermined evaluation that is 
above (below) the market value of the stimulus, then they will automatically undertake 
processing strategies that instigate a regulatory fit (a regulatory misfit), irrespective of 
whether they are promotion or prevention oriented. 
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In this research, we study the effect of the interaction between motivated cognition and 
regulatory focus on decision-making strategies and self-regulation. We will begin with a 
review of relevant concepts in regulatory-fit theory. Next, we will review relevant aspects 
of goal pursuit and goal means literature. Finally, we propose how people self regulate 
their goal means (and hence trigger either a regulatory fit or a regulatory misfit), so as to 
consciously or subconsciously self justify the predetermined value for the stimulus. 
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When people pursue a goal in a manner that positively echoes, fits and reinforces their 
current regulatory-focus (either promotion or prevention focus) and thereby upholding it, 
they are said to experience regulatory-fit (Avnet and Higgins (2006). In contrast, when 
people pursue a goal in a manner that subdues their current regulatory-focus (either 
promotion or prevention focus), thereby attenuating it, they are said to experience a 
regulatory misfit. For example, Avnet and Higgins (2006) manipulate regulatory-fit by 
asking promotion (prevention)-oriented participants by asking their participants to 
evaluate the stimulus on the basis of their affective responses (cognitive) responses 
toward it. A regulatory-misfit was produced by asking promotion (prevention)-oriented 
participants to evaluate the stimulus on the basis of their cognitive (affective) responses 
toward it. The underlying reason was that prior research by Pham and Avnet (2004) had 
shown that promotion (prevention)-oriented people tend to naturally evaluate stimuli 
based on affective-eagerness-based (cognitive-vigilance-oriented) association with it.  
 
This manipulation is an example of process-based approach of producing regulatory fit 
(Aaker and Lee 2006), induced by directly asking participants to undertake a specific 
style of processing.  
 
Additionally, Higgins et al. (2003) asked their participants to provide their choice 
between a mug and a pen (the mug is designed to be overwhelmingly chosen over the 
pen) and subsequently provide their price-estimate for the chosen object, by 
manipulating the gain/loss frame. Promotion (prevention)-oriented participants who were 
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asked to think in terms of what they would gain by choosing the mug/pen (what they 
would lose by not choosing the mug/pen) provided a higher price estimates for the 
chosen mug, given that these participants had experienced regulatory fit. On the other 
hand, hand promotion (prevention)-oriented participants who were asked to think in 
terms of what they would lose by not choosing the mug/pen (what they would gain by 
choosing) the mug/pen  provided significantly lower price estimates for the chosen mug, 
given that these participants had experienced regulatory misfit.  
 
The regulatory fit manipulation procedure used by Higgins et al. (2003) is an example of 
outcome-based approach of regulatory fit (Aaker and Lee 2006), induced by 
manipulating the salience of the outcomes to which people with distinct regulatory goals 
are sensitive.  
 
For the purpose of this research, we assume that the two approaches of triggering 
regulatory fit or regulatory misfit (namely, process-based and outcome-based), are 
equivalent. Hence, we argue that if promotion (prevention)-oriented participants 
experienced regulatory fit by elaborating on a gain-framed (loss-framed) stimulus-
message as would have been done in outcome-based approach, then these participants 
were likely evaluating that message based on their affective (cognitive) associations to it, 
as would have been done in the process-based approach, and vice versa.  
 
Experiencing regulatory-fit leads participants to achieve a “feeling-right” state (Avnet and 
Higgins 2006), which in turn instills participants to have increased confidence in their 
decisions. This, in turn, further translates into increased evaluations for the stimulus 
(Avnet and Higgins 2006). This induces participants to specify a relatively higher price or 
and willingness-to-pay for the stimulus (Aaker and Lee 2006; Higgins et al. 2003). In 
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contrast to that, in the case of a regulatory misfit, because of the mismatch, participants 
are unable to experience increased confidence and thus do not achieve a “feeling-right” 
state. In this situation, people specify a relatively lower willingness-to-pay because they 
lack the confidence that is induced when regulatory-fit is experienced. Avnet and Higgins 
(2006) argue that regulatory-fit effects offer a cleaner explanation to these findings than 
do alternative explanations, such as value transfer due to hedonic outcomes, mood 
effects etc.  
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CHAPTER 19   
 
GOAL PURSUIT AND GOAL MEANS 
 
Currently, there is a consensus among social psychologists that motivation and cognition 
are mutually dependent on each other, and hence social psychology is gradually moving 
towards the conceptualization of motivation as cognition, also referred to as motivated 
cognition (Higgins 1987; Kruglanski et al. 2002). Once a goal has been activated, it can 
automatically keep increasing the motivation to meet the goal, till it is finally fulfilled 
(Gollwitzer and Bargh 2005).  
 
Kruglanksi et al. (2002) proposed goal-systems theory as a means of providing an 
explanation for motivated cognition in goal pursuit and associated behavioral choices. 
Goal-system theory proposes that for a specified goal, the goal means that provides the 
greatest expediency in achieving the goal is the one with the highest probability of being 
chosen. Shah and Kruglanski (2003) define a goal means as “any activity, event, or 
circumstance perceived as likely to contribute to the attainment of a goal. Going by this 
definition, a behavioral strategy targeted at advancing one’s objective would qualify as 
means (Parks, Gollwitzer Oettingen 2007). Kruglanski (2006) also refers to a closely 
related concept of process goals. For the purpose of the current research, we refer to 
goal means and to process goals as being synonymous, and recognize them to be 
information processing style undertaken when attempting to achieve the activated goal.  
 
An individual may have several choices of behavioral-goal means in order to pursue a 
goal. However, goal-systems theory predicts that undertaking a specific goal mean 
should come at the expense of activation of alternative means. Thus, for example, in 
174 
order to achieve top-notch physical stamina (current goal to be attained), an athlete may 
focus mainly on exercising heavily (goal mean 1) over focusing on developing a healthy 
dietary pattern (alternative means), though both these means are a part of the athlete’s 
goal implementation plan. Further, goal implementation intentions also specify which 
behaviors could potentially obstruct goal pursuit and therefore need to be suppressed. 
Hence, an athlete may suppress excess consumption of alcoholic drinks so as to stay on 
the path of achieving top-notch stamina. The athlete may thus ignore beer commercials 
as a behavioral goal means, so as to assist her goal pursuits.  
 
Traditionally, goal-pursuit theories have emphasized conscious guidance of behavior on 
a moment-to-moment basis. Once people decide on a higher-order goal, it is assumed 
they are motivated to work hard to successfully regulate many aspects of their thought 
and behavior. However, given that self-control is a limited resource, extant literature 
tends to suggest that self regulation in the context of achieving a higher-order goal, 
mainly occurs without the need of conscious direction (see Fitzsimons and Bargh 2004 
for a review).  We refer to self-regulation as an individual’s attempt to guide thoughts and 
cognitions so as to assist the process of achieving the higher-order goal. Hence in the 
current context, self regulation refers to the selection of the most goal-relevant mean 
over the selection of goal-irrelevant means. Once people consciously make a specific 
choice (that is, commit to a higher-order goal), they consciously and nonconsciously 
regulate many aspects of their behavior and cognitions (that is, subconsciously regulate 
their goal means). People are instinctually led to pursue activities and low-level 
cognitions that are in harmony with their higher-order goals.  
 
The current thought in extant social psychology is that goals may be activated either 
consciously or non-consciously. Further, such goals, no matter how they are activated, 
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can elicit both conscious and automatic action and provide guidance in ongoing 
situational and behavioral demands that can help achieve the goal expediently (Bargh et 
al. 2001). Additionally, environmental cues can, outside of awareness, highlight which 
actions are relevant to the goals, and thereby assist the pursuit of those specific actions. 
Further, Bargh et al. argue that the automatic adoption of the relevant goal means, so as 
to assist the goal is not an outcome of learned habitual response. Rather, such behavior 




CHAPTER 20   
 
SELF REGUTLATION AND GOAL MEANS  
 
We extend these findings in the goal pursuit and goal means literature to the domain of 
regulatory focus. The higher-order-attainment goal, in the current research, is the 
stimulus’ predetermined evaluation, which the individual has already committed to. The 
goal means is the upward or downward self-regulation (that is, an information processing 
strategy), undertaken by the individual, so as to ensure that the predetermined 
evaluation of the stimulus can indeed be self-justified.  
 
Goals can be activated and regulated when an individual senses (consciously or 
preconsciously) an inconsistency between what she perceives her current state as and 
what she strives for her state to turn out as (Moskowitz 2002). In the context of this 
study, participants in the overvalued (undervalue) condition sense that they are 
committed to evaluating the stimulus higher (lower) than its market valuation. The 
inconsistency that needs to be resolved is the difference between the market value and 
the precommited valuation for the stimulus.  
 
We propose that consumers have a nonconscious intuitive sense that they must need to 
experience regulatory fit when evaluating a stimulus, if they are already committed to a 
predetermined high value for the stimulus. Thus, if a consumer is pre-committed to 
paying a price for a product, which was higher than its market value, then, per Bem’s 
(1967) self-perception theory, the consumer will infer that she must have evaluated the 
stimulus very positively and will experience a steep sense of victory if she is able to own 
that product. Conversely, our theorization is that consumers have an intuitive sense that 
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they need to have experienced a regulatory misfit, if they are committed to 
predetermined lower-than-market value for the stimulus. Hence, if a consumer senses 
that she is willing to pay a price that is lower than its usual market price of the product, 
then, that consumer will infer that she must have held a low evaluation for the stimulus 
and will not experience a steep sense of loss if she were unable to own that product.  
 
As such, in a reversal of the process of regulatory fit, we argue that consumers will 
regulate their processing style, and thereby, their levels of regulatory focus, in order to 
achieve regulatory fit or regulatory misfit, depending on whether their offered price was 
above or below the market value respectively.  
 
To explore these issues, we will undertake a 2 regulatory focus (promotion orientation 
vs. prevention orientation) X 2 predetermined evaluation (overvalued vs. undervalued) 
experiment. We predict that promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers, who are 
committed to a predetermined overvaluation of the stimulus, will voluntarily self regulate 
by picking a goal mean so as to trigger a promotion (prevention) based regulatory fit. In 
this case, we thus predict that participants will voluntarily undertake information 
processing strategies that lead to strengthening of their promotion (prevention) 
tendencies.  
 
Conversely, promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers, who are committed to 
predetermined undervaluation for the stimulus, will self regulate by picking a goal means 
so as to trigger a regulatory misfit. Such participants will voluntarily undertake 
information processing strategies that weaken prevention (promotion) tendencies. As 
such, these participants will voluntarily trigger a regulatory misfit.  
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Kruglanski (2006) proposes that regulatory fit may be viewed as conditions for which the 
manner of goal pursuit matches the goal means involved, and regulatory misfit 
conditions as those for which it does not match. Though the motivation for the current 
research is based on Kruglanksi’s (2006) goal-system theory based explanation of 
regulatory fit, we depart from Kruglanksi’s reasoning, in two important respects. First, 
goal systems theory describes a goal means as multifinal if it serves several objectives. 
A goal means is described as unifinal if it serves only one objective. Kruglanski (2006) 
proposes that experiencing regulatory fit represents a situation where a multifinal goal 
means has been adopted, given that participants meet both, the focal goal assigned by 
the experimenter (e.g. choosing between the pen and the mug in the case of Higgins et 
al. 2003) and the background goal (e.g. satisfaction of the regulatory focus process goal 
or another type of process goal). Kruglanksi (2006) further seems to suggest (p.12, 13) 
however, that a situation in which participants self-regulate downwards, necessarily is 
the one where the participant relies on a unifinal means. Though the reasoning behind 
Kruglanski’s unifinal-goal-means interpretation in the downward self-regulation case is 
not clear to us, it is probably because a supposedly negative goal is said to not have had 
matched with a desired process goal, for downward self regulation to occur.  
 
In contrast, we believe that when participants voluntarily self regulate either upwards or 
downwards by using specific goal means, given an attainment goal, then that goal 
means has to be multifinal. Irrespective of whether participants are in the condition 
where they self regulate upwards or in the condition where they self regulate 
downwards, participants are still fulfilling both, the task assigned to them by the 
researcher, and the background goal (e.g. experiencing regulatory fit or misfit depending 
on whether they are precommited to overvaluing or undervaluing the stimulus).  
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Secondly, in contrast to Kruglanksi’s assumption, we do not subscribe to the notion that 
a goal has to be viewed negatively by the participant when participants voluntarily self 
regulate downwards. Rather, we argue that because participants willingly undertake 
specific processing means so as to trigger a regulatory misfit, it must be that they 
invariably perceive their higher-order attainment goal undervaluing the stimulus in 
positive light.  We suggest however, that the researcher has to conduct appropriate 
priming to ensure that participant is indeed firmly committed to her goal (in this case, 
commitment to the predetermined price for the stimulus).  
 
Importantly, this research is not aimed at understanding whether the adoption of the 
goal-relevant means is preconscious or occurs within the realm of conscious choice. As 
is customarily presumed in the goal-pursuit and goal-means literature, and in the goal-
systems theory, we assume that the choice of the goal means may well be occurring 
outside of people’s conscious awareness. However, in line with the emerging consensus 
in Social Psychology (Bargh et al. 2001 etc.) we acknowledge that perhaps, this process 
of choosing the appropriate goal mean may be a result of a combination of conscious 
and preconscious cognition. Further, we argue that the aftereffects of participants’ self 
regulation continue to linger (Avnet and Higgins 2006). Hence, promotion-oriented 
participants who are committed to overvaluing (undervaluing) the stimulus will display 
higher (lower) levels of promotion tendencies and “feeling right” confidence at the end of 
the exercise. By the same token, prevention-oriented participants who are committed to 
overvaluing (undervaluing) the stimulus will display higher (lower) levels of prevention 
tendencies and “feeling right” confidence at the end of the exercise.  
 
Ferguson and Bargh (2005) have shown that goal-relevant objects are automatically 
evaluated in a friendly manner during active goal pursuit. Goal-relevant objects receive a 
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higher evaluation either because positive thoughts about that object are made more 
accessible, or negative thoughts about that object are suppressed, or both. Ferguson 
and Bargh also find support for the hypothesis that the importance of the goal should 
moderate how highly will the goal pursuit influence the positive evaluation of the object. 
If the goal is very important, then the object will be evaluated very positively.   
 
Higgins et al. (2003) generated a regulatory fit in their participants by asking promotion 
(prevention)-oriented participants to think in terms of what they would gain by choosing 
the mug/pen (what they would lose by not choosing the mug/pen).Hence, relying on the 
findings by Ferguson and Bargh, we propose that consumers will focus on the relevant 
outcomes so to ensure that they achieve their goals. Hence, we argue that in the 
overvaluation condition, promotion (prevention) oriented consumers will voluntarily think 
in terms of what they will attain if they get to own (what they will lose if they do not get to 
own) the stimulus, in contrast to such consumers in the undervaluation condition who will 
not.  
 
Further, we argue that promotion (prevention) oriented consumers in the undervaluation 
condition will voluntarily try to suppress thinking in terms of what they will attain if they 
get to own the stimulus (what they lose if they do not get to own the stimulus) .Rather 
such consumers focus on what they will lose if they do not own the stimulus (what they 
will attain if they get to own the stimulus), in contrast to promotion (prevention)-oriented 
consumers in overvaluation condition who will not.   
  
Hence, overall, we expect that consumers in the overvaluation condition will realize a 
regulatory fit and evade a regulatory misfit. Conversely, we expect consumers in the 
undervaluation condition to realize a regulatory misfit and evade a regulatory fit.  
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20.1 Dependent-Measure Details  
Promotion (prevention)-oriented consumers tend to naturally construe an object at a 
more abstract-global level (concrete-local level) (Forster and Higgins 2005; Keller, Lee 
and Sternthal 2008). Further, Avnet and Higgins (2006) argue that the experience of 
feeling right, as an outcome of undergoing a regulatory fit, need not be applicable to the 
evaluated stimulus to have an effect on decision value. This suggests that once 
regulatory fit is experienced not only the target stimulus, but any other objects will be 
evaluated positively. In other words, once a particular goal-means strategy is undertaken 
when experiencing regulatory fit, then that goal means strategy persists even in the case 
of evaluating a non-stimulus object might, given that all objects become game for 
undertaking that same goal-means strategy.  
 
Given this, we use the Navon task (Navon 1977) to check whether our participants are 
visually processing at an abstract-global or concrete-local level. Promotion-oriented 
participants in the overvalued condition will have a higher tendency to process 
information at an abstract-global level, as compared to promotion-oriented participants in 
the undervalued condition. Likewise, prevention-oriented participants in the overvalued 
condition will have a higher tendency to process information at a concrete-local level, as 
compared to promotion-oriented participants in the undervalued condition.  
 
In visual perception research, Gasper and Clore (2002) have used the Navon task 
successfully to measure the levels of concrete vs. abstract processing. A different 
version of Navon task has also been used in regulatory focus research by Forster and 
Higgins (2005). The Navon task stimuli we use are based on the ones used by Gasper 
and Clore (2002), whereby the same objects are sometimes the global and sometimes 
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the local stimulus. Participants will see an overall shape (e.g. square) made up of 
smaller geometric figures (e.g. squares), on the top. Participants are requested to 
respond to which one of the lower two shapes is more similar to the shape on the top. 
For the Navon figure shown in the figure 2, if participants are visually processing 
information at a concrete-local level, they will tend to answer the shape on the bottom-
left as being more similar to the shape on the top (shape matching occurring at the 
smaller, local, constituent figures).However, participants, who are visually processing 
information at an abstract-global level, will tend to answer the shape on the bottom-right 
as more similar to the shape on the top (shape matching occurring at an overall outer 
profile shape).  
 
We will display 8 Navon-task figures to participants. Figure 2 shows an example of a 
Navon-task figure. The number of times the participants matches the shapes on the 
basis of their global form rather than their local details, will be calculated. This score will 
be used as a dependent measure. The higher (lower) the score the participant on this 










We predict that promotion-oriented participants, who are pre-committed to higher-than-
market-value price for the product, will have a significantly HIGHER score on Navon 
task, than promotion-oriented participants who are pre-committed to a lower-than-
market-value price for the stimulus. Conversely, we predict that prevention-oriented 
participants, who are pre-committed to higher-than-market-value price for the product, 
will have a significantly LOWER score on the Navon task than prevention-oriented 
participants who are pre-committed to a lower-than-market-value price for the stimulus.  
 
We will also administer the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989) as a means of measuring their tendency construe actions in low- versus high-level 
terms. The BIF scale has 25 binary-response items. Keller, Lee and Sternthal (2008) 
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have successfully used the BIF scale to measure the participants’ level of construal. The 
BIF scale measures whether an action (e.g., reading) is construed at a low-level as 
“following lines of print”, or at a high-level as “gaining knowledge”. The BIF scale uses 25 
such binary items of classifying behaviors into low-or-high levels of construal. As is done 
by Kellar et al. we will sum scores of each participant across the 25 items (coding high-











21.1 Participants and Stimulus  
A total of 183 undergraduate students from a major university in the south participated in 
the study. Our aim was to use a stimulus that the student participants could understand. 
Secondly, given that we were going to prime participants to substantially overvalue or 
undervalue the stimulus, this study required that the stimulus’ price not be entirely 
explicit. Since we wanted to have strong manipulations, we were planning on 
manipulating the valuation factor by specifying offered prices that were roughly 33% 
above (for the overvalued condition) and 33% below (for the undervalued condition) the 
marked price of the product.  
 
Utilitarian products tend to have prices that can be specified fairly accurately. In contrast, 
hedonic products tend to have prices that are not explicit. Further, the experiential 
benefits of hedonic products cannot be clearly quantified in terms of price. This causes 
people to be more prone to severely overvaluing or undervaluing a hedonic product, in 
comparison to a utilitarian product. Hence, in order to confer external validity and to 
enable us to have strong effects of the valuation condition, we finalized on a hedonic 
product as our best option for stimulus. We chose the Movado Men’s Moderno 
(#0604230) watch as the stimulus for this study. Movado is among the well known 
brands of Swiss watches.  
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This study is a 2 regulatory focus (promotion orientation vs. prevention orientation) X 2 
predetermined evaluation condition (overvalued vs. undervalued) design. 
 
21.2 Procedure  
The study was conducted using Metacard software, which had the pictures of the 
stimulus, and other manipulation details preprogrammed in advance. Participants 
worked with the software in an interactive manner, such that the software presented the 
participants with information about the stimulus and other details, and then asked the 
participants to make choices on the Navon task, BIF and demographic measures. The 
authors worked with participants in groups that ranged from 2 to 14 people in size. 
Participants were presented with 2 pictures of the Movado Mens Moderno (#0604230) 
watch and were asked to take a few moments to review it.  
 
The overvaluation condition was manipulated by specifying to the participant that he/she 
has finalized on the Movado Moderno (#0604230) as a gift for his/her father on his 
upcoming birthday. Further, given that his/her father is a connoisseur of Swiss watches, 
the participant has decided to bid $395 on Ebay for that Movado watch, which is 
normally priced at $295 but not available on amazon.com. In an effort to confer external 
validity to the scenario, we provided more background information about why the 
participant has decided to bid $395 for the Movado, when it was priced for $295, on 
amazon.com.  
 
People would rather not buy hedonic gifts for themselves; however, people like to 
receive hedonic items as gifts (Okada 2005; Thaler 1980). Hence, buying the Movado as 
a gift for the father was seen as the appropriate scenario for the overvaluation condition. 
However, given the findings by Okada and Thaler, presenting a scenario involving 
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buying the Movado as gift for himself/herself, lent itself better for the undervaluation 
condition.  
 
Hence, the undervaluation condition was manipulated by specifying to the participant 
that she has finalized on the Movado Moderno (#0604230) as a gift for himself/herself. 
Further, given that the participant does not yet have a job in this bad economy, the 
participant has decided to bid $195 on Ebay for that Movado watch, which is normally 
priced at $295 but not available on amazon.com. Again, in an effort to confer external 
validity to the scenario, we provided more background information about why the 
participant has decided to bid only $195 for the Movado, when it was priced for $295, on 
amazon.com. The details of the manipulation are provided in appendix D, which 
presents the instrument used in this study. 
 
Participants then responded to two valuation manipulation check items, “I focused 
mainly on why overvaluing the Movado, when submitting my bid on Ebay, is the right 
decision for me” (that is, the “overvaluation focus” item) and I focused mainly on why 
undervaluing the Movado, when submitting my bid on Ebay, is the right decision for me” 
(that is, the “undervaluation focus” item )on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Next, the participants then responded to the 25 item Behavioral Identification Form (BIF; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) scale. After that, participants responded to 8 navon figures.  
 
The participants then responded to the 18-item chronic regulatory focus scale by 
Lockwood, Jordan and Kunda (2002). Participants were classified as promotion or 
prevention oriented by median splitting them based on their score on this scale. The 
participants finally responded to some demographic items, and were granted credit for 




RESULTS and DISCUSSION 
 



















5.39 2.23 5.45 2.7 
Undervaluation 
Focus 
2.66 5.2 2.47 4.9 
BIF score 16.55  15.14 14.88 16.8 
Navon task 
scores 
5.74 4.79 4.9  5.4 
 
 
22.1 Manipulation Checks  
First, we conducted manipulation checks. For the “overvaluation focus” item, the main 
effect of the valuation condition factor is significant (F=391.8; p <0.01). A test of 
contrasts showed that participants had significantly higher focus on overvaluation of the 
stimulus in the overvaluation condition, in comparison to in the in the undervaluation 
condition (M’s 5.43 vs. 2.46; F=187.5; p<0.01). The regulatory focus main effect and the 
interaction effect are not significant. 
 
Likewise, for the “undervaluation focus” item, the main effect of the valuation condition 
factor is significant (F=127.7; p <0.01). A test of contrasts showed that participants had 
significantly lower focus on undervaluation of the stimulus in the overvaluation condition, 
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in comparison to in the undervaluation condition (M’s 2.56 vs. 5.05; F=127.7; p<0.01). 
The regulatory focus main effect and the interaction effect are not significant. 
 
22.2 BIF Scores  
For BIF scores, the interaction between regulatory focus and valuation condition is 
significant (F=7.04; p<0.01). A test of contrasts showed that as expected, for people who 
were promotion oriented, those in the overvaluation condition had a higher (but not 
statistically significant) BIF score in comparison to those in the undervaluation condition 
(M’s 16.55 vs. 15.14; F = 2.015; p = 0.15). For prevention-oriented people, those in the 
overvaluation condition had a significantly lower BIF score in comparison to those in the 
undervaluation condition (M’s 14.88 vs. 16.8; F = 5.41 ; p = 0.09).  The main effects of 
regulatory focus and valuation condition were not significant.  
 
2.3 Navon-Task Scores 
For Navon task scores, the interaction between regulatory focus and evaluation condition 
is significant (F=4.19; p<0.05). A test of contrasts showed that as expected, for people 
who were promotion oriented, those in the overvaluation condition had a higher  score in 
comparison to those in the undervaluation condition (M’s 5.74 vs. 4.79; F = 3.93; p < 
0.05). For prevention-oriented people, those in the overvaluation condition had a lower 
(but not statistically significant) score in comparison to those in the undervaluation 
condition (M’s 4.9 vs. 5.4; F = 0.86 ; p =0.36). The main effects of regulatory focus and 





In this paper, we argue that if consumers commit themselves to a predetermined level of 
evaluation for the stimulus, then they will process information pertaining to the stimulus 
using only specific processing strategies. In this study, we explore support for this 
general principle in the domain of regulatory focus. When consumers commit 
themselves to a predetermined evaluation that is above (below) the market value of the 
stimulus, then they will automatically undertake processing strategies that instigate a 
regulatory fit (a regulatory misfit). This happens for both, promotion-oriented and 
prevention-oriented consumers.  
 
Using Navon task, we find marginal evidence that in the overvaluation condition, both 
promotion and prevention oriented participants actually instigated a regulatory fit. 
Additionally, in the undervaluation condition, we find marginal evidence that both 
promotion and prevention oriented participants instigated a regulatory misfit.  
 
Based on the Navon task, we can imply that the regulatory fit or misfit instigated tends to 
linger beyond the target object and, temporally, at least for some time after the 
commitment to the overvaluation or undervaluation of the target object has been made. 
 
Much research in regulatory focus has focused on how regulatory fit can be generated 
by having participants undertake specific goal means or by asking participants to think in 
terms of specific outcomes (Aaker and Lee 2006). However, we believe that ours is the 
first research that experimentally shows that motivated consumers will consciously or 
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nonconsciously chose specific goal means or will think in terms of specific outcomes, so 
as to instigate a regulatory fit or a regulatory misfit.  
 
Shah and Kruglanski (2002) and Kruglanski et al. (2002) and others investigate the goal-
mean link, which implies a spread of activation from goals to means. That research 
stream suggests that in the motivational hierarchy, goals are at the top of the chain. 
Activation of a specific attainment goal leads to the subsequent activation of the most 
expedient goal means. Such a hierarchy is termed as “top-down”. We argue that the 
self-regulation effect, which is the focus of the current research, seems to be an example 
of this top-down condition.  
 
However, research by Shah and Kruglanski (2003) also suggests a different hierarchy. 
Their research suggests a reverse direction of activation is also possible, and hence it is 
referred to as “bottom-up”. Their claim is that a goal will automatically be activated based 
on the goal mean that the individual undertakes. We argue that regulatory-fit as is 
generated by using process means or outcome means (Aaker and Lee 2006) are 
examples of the bottom-up condition. In this condition, participants undertake a specific 
goal means (for example, participants are asked to mainly focus on affective association 
or on cognitive reasoning, as was done in Pham and Avnet 2004) leads to the activation 
of a specific goal (for example, evaluating the stimulus positively).  
 
The current research establishes the foundation that some aspect of undertaking the 
goal means to instigate either a regulatory fit or misfit may be occurring outside of 
consciousness. Future research should focus on whether there are any specific goal 
means or outcomes which can occur fully under conscious control or fully under 
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nonconscious control. Further, future research could focus on how long the effects, of 
the regulatory fit and misfit instigated by consumers, linger.  
 
23.1 Managerial Implication  
Given the outcomes with the Navon task score this research has established that the 
effects of instigating regulatory fit or regulatory misfit, can be transferred to other objects, 
beyond the target object. As such, even object that are beyond the core stimulus 
become game for over and under evaluation. This suggests that a consumer, who is 
precommitted to overvaluing a target object, will have a strong tendency to overvalue 
other objects, for a reasonable amount of time. Likewise, a consumer, who is 
precommitted to undervaluing a target object, will tend to undervalue and hence harbor a 
lower willingness-to-pay for other objects. Managers need to be keenly aware of this 
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APPENDIX A   
TWO-STEP ESTIMATION CALCULATION DETAILS 
 
Step 1  
We chose the exponential distribution, f1(y1| x1, 1) for model (1) 
hence, f1(y1| x1, 1)  = dexp(-dy1), the exponential distribution,  
such that, d = exp(x11), 
where, 
y1 is time_taken,  
x1 contains task_enjoyment, options_value, purchase_commitment and 
decision_difficulty,  
1 contains the coefficients of task_enjoyment, options_value, purchase_commitment 
and decision_difficulty  
 
Taking the natural log of f1(y1| x1, 1), we get: 
ln f1(y1| x1, 1) = x11 – exp(x11)y1 
 
Essentially, we conducted an exponential regression with y1 as the dependent measure 
and x1 as the independent variables.  1 are the coefficient estimates and V1 is the 
asymptotic covariance matrix of coefficients calculated for this exponential regression. 
 
As required for the Murphy and Topel (1985) correction, taking partial derivative of f1 with 




























=ΘΘ , the poisson distribution, 
such that, E[y2] = λ = exp(x22) 
where,  
y2 is num_options, 
x2 contains task_enjoyment, options_value, and purchase_commitment. Note that x2 
contains all the predictors in model 3, expect the endogeneous covariate, time_taken, 
1 contains the coefficient of task_enjoyment, options_value, purchase_commitment and 
decision_difficulty estimated by executing the exponential duration regression, f1(y1| x1, 
1)  = dexp(-dy1), 
2 contains the coefficients of task_enjoyment, options_value, purchase_commitment  
and time_taken based on running the model 3 regression  
 
 
Next, as is done in two-step estimation, the predictions for the endogeneous covariate 
y1, based on the exponential duration regression (namely, )exp( 11 Θx ), were appended 
to x2.  
 







































−=ΘΘ ∑  
 
Essentially, we conducted a poisson regression with y2 as the dependent measure and 
x2 and appended predictions for y1 as the independent variables. 2 are the coefficient 
estimates and V2 is the asymptotic covariance matrix of coefficients calculated for this 
poisson regression. 
 
Next, as required for the Murphy and Topel (1985) correction, taking partial derivative of 
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Next, as required for the Murphy and Topel (1985) correction, taking partial derivative of 





























     _____(6) 
               
Coefficient estimates of two-step estimation are consistent and asymptotically normal 
(Wooldridge (2002 p.414; Greene 2007 p.508). Hence, 2 is consistent and 
asymptotically normal. However, a correction needs to be made to the asymptotic 
covariance matrix of the coefficients of poisson regression in step 2 (that is, V2) to 
account for an estimate of 1 being used in the estimation of 2. We will rely on the 
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Murphy and Topel (1985) correction procedure to implement this correction (as aid out in 
Greene 2007 p.507).  
 

























































where, equations (4), (5) and (6) provide the values that are used to build matrices C 
and R.  
 
Muphy and Topel (1985) suggest that the corrected covariance matrix for the estimator 
in step 2, namely V2
@, be calculated as follows: 
 
V2
@ = 1/n [V2 + V2 (CV1C’ - RV1C’ - CV1R’]V2] 
 
where as mentioned earlierV1 is the asymptotic covariance matrix of coefficients of the 
exponential regression, that is,  f1(y1 | x1, 1), estimated in step 1, 
and V2 is the original asymptotic covariance matrix of coefficients of the poisson 




@ is the Murphy and Topel corrected covariance matrix of coefficients of 
model 3. Murphy and Topel correction procedure advocates that we use matrix V2
@ for 
testing the significance of the coefficients of model 3 (instead of using matrix V2
). 
However, note that the Murphy and Topel correction relies in the same coefficients that 
were estimated in the poisson regression in step 2. Hence, the correction does not 
impact the coefficients that were estimated in the step 2 regression. Murphy and Topel 
correction impact only the significance inferences of the predictors in the step2 
regression, as we utilize the covariance matrix V2
@ (instead of V2) in making significance 
inferences for the step 2 regression coefficients.  
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APPENDIX B:  
 
PART 1 STUDY 1 INSTRUMENT 




General Instructions: Please read each question carefully, and answer each question 
to the best of your ability to answer. Try to fill the space provided for each open-ended 
answer. When responding to a 1 -9 scaled question, please do so in a thoughtful 
manner. Some of the questions may be abstract. In that case, please answer them to 
the best of your ability. There is no time limit his study. You are free to work at your own 
pace and you may continue working on this section until you have completed responding 
to all questions in this questionnaire. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, 
and the moderator will come to your seat and assist you. We are interested in analyzing 
averages of people’s responses to the questions, over a large group of people. As such, 
we want to assure you that your individual responses will be kept confidential. 
 
The following procedure was undertaken to prime promotion focus: 
As a part of this study, we want to understand how people’s hopes and goals evolve 
over time. 
 
Please take 2-3 minutes to think hard about the hopes and goals that you had in the past 
(e.g., as you were growing up). By hopes and goals, we mean the things you really 
wanted to achieve or obtain, your aspirations, your dreams.  
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Please write at least three of these past hopes and goals in the space below. 
 
For example:  





Now, please take 2-3 minutes to think about your hopes and goals as they are today. 
What are the things you really want to achieve now, the things you are aspiring to, 
dreaming of, for the future. 
 
Please write at least three of these present hopes and goals in the space below. 
 
For example: 
1.Today I am a business-school student, and I hope to have a successful career in 





We asked participants to undertake a similar task to prime prevention focus. 
 
As a part of this study, we want to understand how people’s sense of duty and 
obligations evolve over time. 
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Please take 2-3 minutes to think hard about the duties and obligations that you had in 
the past (e.g., as you were growing up). By duties and obligations, we mean the things 
that you were expected or required to do, your responsibilities, the things you were 
trusted to do, the things you knew you ought to do. 
Please write at least three of these past duties and obligations. 
For Example:  
1. When I was in junior high, my parents really expected me to have good grades in 





Now, please take 2-3 minutes to think about your duties and obligations as they are 
today. What are the things you expected to do now? What are your new responsibilities? 
What are your commitments, the things you know you ought to do? 
Please write at least three of these present duties and obligations. 
 
For example: 
1. Today, I need to get a job soon because I have to pay back loans, and I also feel I 








Manipulation Check measures: 
 
> If I had to choose right now, I would prefer to do 
 
What others       What I want 
expect of me      to do 




> If I had to choose right now, I would rather 
 
Go wherever my      Whatever it takes to  
heart takes me      fulfill my responsibilities 
      1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
 
>I prefer to  
 
take a trip                                      pay back 
around the world                          my loans 
                   1               2             3          4          5          6          7       
 
Take a few minutes to review the following two laptops, namely, and the HP Artist 














3GB DDR2 SDRAM (1x2048/1x1024MB)  
 
HARD DRIVE 
160GB 5400 RPM SATA Hard Drive 
 
DISPLAY 








NVIDIA GeForce 8400M GS w/Webcam  
DIGITAL MEDIA 
5-in-1 media card reader  
 
COMMUNICATION 
















Intel Core 2 Duo Processor T5450 1.67GHz  
 
MEMORY 
2048 MB (2 x 1024 MB) 
 
HARD DRIVE 
250 GB (5400 rpm) 
 
DISPLAY 








NVIDIA GeForce 8400M  
DIGITAL MEDIA 
5-in-1 media card reader  
 
COMMUNICATION 




HP Pavilion - Features List 
 
 
>Assume that you have been meaning to buy the HP Artist Edition dv2800 (referred to 
as HP Artist henceforth), for some time now. Unfortunately, the HP Artist is not available 
at amazon.com. A comparable laptop, the HP Pavilion dv6744 laptop (referred to as HP 
Pavilion henceforth) is available on amazon.com for $694. However, the HP Artist laptop 
is available for sale, through an ebay-like website. This website claims to buy laptops on 
a bulk basis directly from the manufacturer, and is open to considering a price that you 
may want to offer for the HP Artist laptop. Note that that this specialized contractor 
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retains the right to reject your offer, if she feels that your offered price is not acceptable, 
given the quality of laptop that she sells. 
 
(Dependent Measures)  
Given the information that you have now,  
 




> What is the least (in dollars) that you would be willing to pay for the HP Artist laptop? 
(Please note that the minimum price that you agree to pay need not be $0. If they 
specified a lowest acceptable price that is too low, then the seller from the Ebay-like 
website may not accept it. Realize that if you specify a very low lowest price and the 
seller accepts it, then it can potentially mean that the laptop is of suspect quality and 
hence the seller agreed to sell it a low price. The lowest acceptable bid price you specify 
should such that you will not regret one bit if that specific price was not acceptable to the 





> I found the available information on the opinions in the reviews, to be relevant in 
specifying the price range for the HP ARTIST laptop 
 
Strongly     Strongly 
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Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
 
> I found the available information on the opinions in the reviews, to be very helpful in 
specifying the price range for the HP ARTIST laptop 
 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
 
>I specified the price range (i.e. maximum and minimum prices) for the HP Artist as if I 
am very likely to purchase it 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> I specified the price range (i.e. maximum and minimum acceptable prices) for the HP 
Artist, believing that purchasing it is the correct decision for me. 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> Given this situation, I believe that most people will find it easy to come up with their 
maximum and minimum prices for the HP Artist laptop. 
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Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> It took me a lot of mental effort, to come up with an acceptable price range (i.e. 
maximum and minimum prices) for the HP Artist laptop (reverse coded) 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
 
> When specifying the price range (i.e. the maximum and minimum prices), I 
emphasized on how useful will the HP Artist laptop be as a comprehensive computing 
equipment, rather than simply focusing on how useful is each of its individual features. 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
 
> In coming up with the price range (i.e. the maximum and minimum prices), I 
emphasized on the benefit of each individual feature in the HP Artist. 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 




In order to help us further interpret your responses to the questionnaire, please answer 
the following questions about yourself: 
 
> Your Gender (check one) 







>Your Race (check one) 
African America_________    








>Were you raised in the United States? (check one) 
Yes______________________ 













> Are you currently employed? (check one) 









> Combined Annual Household Income Before Taxes (check one) 
less than $20,000 
$20,001 to $30,000  
$30,001 to $40,000 
$40,001 to $50,000 
$50,001 to $60,000 
$60,001 to $70,000 
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$70,001 to $80,000 
$80,001 to $90,000 
$90,001 to $100,000 
More than $100,000 
 
 
Your Name: ________________________________ 
 







PART 2 STUDY 2 INSTRUMENT 
 
The Part 1 study 2 instrument was implemented using Metacard software. The 




We would like to thank you for participating in this study. Please carefully read each 
question, and answer each question to the best of your ability. Try to fill the space 
provided for each open-ended answer. When responding to a 1 - 7 scaled question, 
please do so in a thoughtful manner. Some of the questions may be abstract. In that 
case, please answer them to the best of your ability. There is no time limit this study. 
You are free to work at your own pace and you may continue working on this section 
until you have completed responding to all questions in this questionnaire. Even if you 
finish responding to the questionnaire early, you will need to wait till the end of the entire 
session, as all participants in a session are allowed to leave only at the end of the entire 
session.  
 
If you have any questions, OR if you are unable to understand any question in this 
questionnaire, please raise your hand, and the moderator will come to your seat and 
assist you.  
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We are interested in analyzing averages of people’s responses to the questions, over a 
large group of people. As such, we want to assure you that your individual responses will 
be kept confidential.  
 
After you complete this study, please raise your hand so that moderator can come to 
your desk, and get you started with the next study. 
 








Participants were provided a means for deselecting the options that already exist in the 
fully-loaded model, by default.  
 
Similar screens will also be created for priming additive framing.  
 
After finalizing their choice of options, participants were then asked to respond to the 
following items: 
 
>Given the options that you selected, roughly how much do you expect to pay for your 
ABC car (in dollars)? 
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> Overall, it was easy for me to make the option-choice decisions for my ABC car” 
(reverse coded) 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> Given this situation, I believe that most people will have to think very hard, in finalizing 
their choice of options, for the ABC car 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> The option choices that I finalized, represent .... 
very little value     a lot of value 
                       1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> The options that I chose for my car, represent a poor choice.” (reverse coded) 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 




> It was important for me to settle only on meaningful options in the car 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
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     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> Overall, I am very satisfied with my final car, specifically in terms of choice of options 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> Given the options that I ended up selecting, there is a high probability that I will buy the 
ABC car 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> Before committing to purchasing the ABC car, I am very likely to look for information 
on other car manufacturers, if this were possible 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 






> I am certain that buying the ABC car, with the options that I settled on, is the correct 
decision for me 
Strongly     Strongly 
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Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> I am likely to recommend the ABC car, with the options that I selected, to a close friend 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> I found the task of choosing options for my car, to be enjoyable  
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> I found the task of choosing options for my car, to be pleasant 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
> I found the task of choosing options for my car, to be interesting 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Disagree 




Participants then responded to the 18-item Lockwood, Jordan and Kunda (2002) to 
measure chronic regulatory focus. Finally, participants responded to demographic 
questions, and then were debriefed.  
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APPENDIX D:  
 
PART 3 STUDY 1 INSTRUMENT 
This study was implemented using Metacard software. The instrument was laid out as 
follows: 
 
We used multiple methods to prime regulatory focus, so as to reinforce the priming 
effect.  
 
All the scales in the final scale will be 7 points scale, which seems to be the standard 
number of points used in most Regulatory focus research. I have just put in 9-points 
here in this draft, for convenience purposes.  
 







Stimulus - Movado Moderno (#0604230) Watch  
 
 
TO PRIME THE “OVERVALUED” CONDITION: 
 
Assume that your father's birthday is coming up. Your father is a connoisseur (that is, an 
enthusiast) of Swiss watches. You are now planning on buying a birthday gift for your 
father. You check out the Movado Men's Moderno  watch (#0604230) as a potential gift. 
However, as it turns out, this watch is no longer available at www.amazon.com, where 
this watch was priced at $295. Item prices on amazon.com are considered middle-of-
the-road prices. The Movado is one of the most celebrated Swiss watch brands in the 
world. Traditionally, Swiss watches have been considered an elegant and celebrated gift 
item, and have been known to last decades, if properly cared for.  
 
Now, assume that you are employed with a respectable engineering firm, as a project 
manager. It turns out that a new Movado Moderno men's watch (#0604230), which you 
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were targeting as a gift item for your father, is available on www.ebay.com. However, 
only one Movado (#0604230) is available for auction-sale on Ebay. As it turns out, this 
specific Movado (that is, #0604230) is not available in the local departmental and 
specialty stores in your area. You ask your mother about what might be a good price to 
bid for this watch on Ebay. Your mother informs you that the Movado has always been a 
watch, which your father wanted to buy. However, your father has refrained from buying 
a Movado for himself, given that he has been saving for your college education, for more 
than 15 years now.  
 
Now that you are employed at a well-paying job, this might be a good time for you to buy 
something that your father has always wanted to have. This gift to your father is more 
than a gift. It is a statement of how much you value your father's sacrifices. To you this 
Movado is more than a regular watch. It is a way of showing your father that you do 
understand the sacrifices that he underwent in funding your education, and that you are 
now ready to stand up on your own feet, and fulfill some of your father's dreams. 
 
Hence, if your father values this Movado, you value it even more. Also, this might as well 
be your last chance to get the Movado in time, for your father's birthday. You are not 
going to let go of this opportunity to get the Movado for your father, on his birthday, 
Hence, you decide to bid $395 (even though its traditional price is $295) on 
www.ebay.com for this Movado, so as to ensure that you indeed win this watch that is so 




TO PRIME THE “UNDERVALUED” CONDITION: 
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Assume that your birthday is coming up. You are a connoisseur (that is, an enthusiast) 
of Swiss watches. You are now planning on buying a birthday gift for yourself. You check 
out the Movado Men's Moderno watch (#0604230) as a treat for yourself on your 
birthday. However, as it turns out, this watch is no longer available at www.amazon.com, 
where this watch was priced at $295. Item prices on amazon.com are considered 
middle-of-the-road prices. The Movado is one of the most celebrated Swiss watch 
brands in the world and can last long if cared for. As it turns out, this Movado 
(#0604230) is available at a Macys in your area, but there it is priced at $314.99.  
However, it turns out that a new Movado Moderno men's watch (#0604230), which you 
were targeting, is available on www.ebay.com. However, only one Movado (#0604230) 
is available for auction-sale on Ebay. 
 
Now, assume that you will be completing your undergraduate studies soon, and that you 
have been searching for a job. However, given the current dire situation with the 
economy, you do not foresee getting a solid-stable job. Given this, you decide that it may 
not be worth bidding a high price on the Movado (#0604230) auction on Ebay.com. You 
don't want to let go of this opportunity to own a Movado, however. You want to buy this 
Movado only if you can pay a substantially lower price to acquire it. For you, the current 
market value of $295 is actually a higher price than is worth paying for this watch. 
 
Hence, you will be able to value and to justify buying this Movado, only if you can 
acquire it at a substantial discount. You are going to use this opportunity on Ebay, to try 
to win the Movado (#0604230) at a substantially lower price. You will be bidding a lower-
than-market bid price on the Movado. Hence, you decide to bid only $195 on Ebay, on 





(Manipulation Check Measure)  
 
> I focused mainly on why overvaluing the Movado, when submitting my bid on Ebay, is 
the right decision for me” (“overvaluation focus” item) 
 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Agree 
     1           2           3          4          5          6          7         
 
 
>I focused mainly on why undervaluing the Movado, when submitting my bid on Ebay, is 
the right decision for me” ( “undervaluation focus” item ) 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Agree 




The following 25-item Behavior Identification Form (BIF) scale (Vallacher and Wegner 
1989) will be administered. The BIF scale is the defacto scale used to check whether 
participants’ construal is at a high level or at a low level. Coding of participants’ 
responses on the BIF questionnaire will be binary (high-level construal = 1, low level 
construal = 0), and each participant’s response across the 25 items will be summed to 









Next, we will be displaying you some shapes. You should focus on the shape on the top, 
in the middle. You will also see two different shape on the bottom, one on the left, and 
the other on the right.  
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Based on your first instinct (i.e., without spending too much time thinking about it), 
please judge whether the shape in the bottom-left OR the shape in the bottom-right, is 









The figure on the top in the center is more similar to which of the two figures on the 
bottom half.  
       A>  more similar to the figure on the bottom left 





Navon-Task Figure 2 
 
The figure on the top in the center is more similar to which of the two figures on the 
bottom half.  
A> more similar to the figure on the bottom left 




Navon-Task Figure 3 
 
The figure on the top in the center is more similar to which of the two figures on the 
bottom half.  
A> more similar to the figure on the bottom left 




Navon-Task Figure 4 
 
The figure on the top in the center is more similar to which of the two figures on the 
bottom half.  
A> more similar to the figure on the bottom left 




Navon-Task Figure 5 
 
The figure on the top in the center is more similar to which of the two figures on the 
bottom half.  
A> more similar to the figure on the bottom left 




Navon-Task Figure 6 
 
The figure on the top in the center is more similar to which of the two figures on the 
bottom half.  
A> more similar to the figure on the bottom left 




Navon-Task Figure 7 
 
The figure on the top in the center is more similar to which of the two figures on the 
bottom half.  
A> more similar to the figure on the bottom left 





Navon-Task Figure 8 
 
The figure on the top in the center is more similar to which of the two figures on the 
bottom half.  
A> more similar to the figure on the bottom left 




> I focused mainly on why overvaluing the Movado, when submitting my bid on Ebay, is 
the right decision for me” ( “overvaluation focus” item) 
 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Agree 





> In justifying my final bid price for the Movado watch, I focused on what I would LOSE 
by not winning the Movado  (loss focus item) 
 
Strongly     Strongly 
Disagree     Agree 




Participants then responded to the 18-item Lockwood, Jordan and Kunda (2002) to 
measure chronic regulatory focus. Finally, participants responded to demographic 




Finally, participants responded to demographic questions, and then were debriefed.  
 
